

The Institute of National Affairs founded two years ago by a group of young intellectuals is intended to inculcate a spirit of inquiry among our people into our national affairs primarily to shape their development conducive to the growth of healthy democratic traditions in our country. At the same time it is also our intention to present Indian case on various subjects before the public.

The present publication 'Dalai Lama and India' is to present to the world how our people and government felt about the recent crisis in Tibet.

My thanks are due to Shri A. V. Rajeswara Rau who has so ably edited the volume and Shri M. C. Gabriel who has helped in its preparation.

The Institute of National Affairs,
New Delhi.

H. C. HEDA

DALAI AND INDIA

INDIAN PUBLIC
AND PRIME MINISTER
ON TIBETAN CRISIS

Published By
THE INSTITUTE OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS

January 11, 1913, the Dalai Lama proclaimed the independence of Tibet and made an independent treaty with Outer Mongolia. But matters between China and Tibet had not been cleared up yet and in 1913 Britain renewed its proposal for a tripartite conference. This time both Tibet and China accepted and a conference was held at Simla on October 13, 1913. It was at the Simla Convention that the suzerainty of China was recognised. But soon after the Convention was signed the Chinese Government refused to back their representative and repudiated the Convention on grounds of disagreement on geographical demarcation of the Outer Tibet agreed to by the Convention. In 1917 China launched another attack on Tibet but met with rebuff.

Since 1914 the first World War had been raging and neither China nor Russia was able to risk British displeasure by trying to undermine her power with Tibet. Tibet herself was disposed in friendship towards Britain in the hope of thereby securing genuine autonomy at home and overthrowing the suzerainty of China. Between the two World Wars Tibet retained her autonomy and China continued to receive recognition from Britain as suzerain. The international status of Tibet under the circumstances continued to remain undefined. In 1930 missions were established by both China and Britain in Lhasa. Soon after China was engaged in her terrible wrestle with Japanese invaders. In 1939 began the World War II and though China was in the Allied camp, Tibet did not join forces with her and opened her own bureau for foreign affairs. Two years after the conclusion of the War, India became independent and her relations with Tibet were regulated as she had inherited them from Britain, whereas with the emergence of Red China, relations between Tibet and China suffered a series of changes which climaxed in the present bid for independence by the Tibetans.

INDIA AND TIBET

India may be called the spiritual home of the Tibetans. Except racially the Tibetans have little in common with China, while in many essential respects they are close to India. Besides the religion of Tibet which is a form of Mahayana Buddhism accommodating a variety of native practices and the Hindu principle of rebirth, the large bulk of Tibetan literature is translations from Sanskrit. India has been the original model for Tibet's art, music



The China-Tibet problem has attracted world-wide attention. The editor of this pamphlet has done well to collect some representative opinion on the subject. It will be of some help to those who desire to study it.

One thing is clear. It is, that the people of India feel their solidarity with the people of Tibet and sympathise with them in their sufferings. This sympathy is due to something deep in the Indian soul. It is not concerned with Governments, parties and politics. It transcends these. May the Tibetans who are with us today find their home again in their native land with honour.

New Delhi :
July 10, 1959.

SUCHETA KRIPALANI

MARCH

- 20 First News about fighting in Lhasa
- 21 Indian Mission Staff safe in Lhasa
- 22 150 killed in Tibet fighting
- 23 Flare up again Lhasa
- 24 Fighting continues : 100 man delegation to meet Nehru
- 25 Fighting continues : Indians in Lhasa panicky
- 26 Dalai Lama flees Tibetan capital
- 28 Tibetan delegation meets Nehru
- China seals off the Tibetan borders and abolishes Dalai Lama's Government: Panchen to head the Government
- 29 Dalai escapes Chinese vigilance
- 30 Lhasa quiet; Panchen Lama supports Chinese stand; Dalai reported to be in the mountain hide-out
- 31 Chinese troops cordon all monasteries in Lhasa

APRIL

- 1 Communist Party of India charges about Kalimpong decried in Parliament
- 2 Peking announces that Dalai and his party have arrived in India on 31st March
- 3 Dalai granted asylum; Party of 80 moving towards Tawang; Panchen elected Deputy of People's Congress
- 4 Dalai to rest in Tawang; India denies Prince Peter's charge; Peking repeats charge on Kalimpong
- 5 Prime Minister Nehru's press conference :
 - 1) Tibet an 'off shoot of India';
 - 2) Peter's statement 'a fantastic lie';
 - 3) Dalai Lama in Tawang

- 6 Dalai to stay in U.P. hill station; Nehru says 'We want to be friendly with China'
- 7 Opposition bid for debate fails in Parliament
- 8 Dalai Lama leaves Tawang; Panchen Lama hails Red leadership
- 9 Dalai Lama leaves for Bomdilla; 'Asylum decision not unfriendly to China'—Indian Leaders
- 10 Dalai's brother in Tezpur
- 11 Dalai arrives at Dirangjong
- 12 Dalai at Bomdilla; Welcome by crowds; Panchen Lama on way to Peking
- 13 Dalai to stay at Mussoorie; Bodies floating on river Kyichu—news from Lhasa; Rebel Lama who went to negotiate with Chinese shot down
- 15 Refugees from Tibet—Aid Body formed
- 16 Serious clashes in S. W. Tibet; Dalai visits Bomdilla Hospital
- 17 Chinese action denounced by P.S.P.—Ladakh move to invite Dalai
- 18 Dalai makes statement at Tezpur soon after arrival;
- 19 Reported letters from Ike to Dalai which were denied later; Lhasa blacks out Dalai's statement; Dalai on way to Mussoorie—warm reception at Silguri
- 20 'Dalai's statement a distortion' says Panchen; 'Dalai to enjoy full freedom'—Nehru
- 21 Dalai at Mussoorie; warm reception at Birla House
- 22 Dalai stands by Tezpur statement
- 23 Nehru in Dehra Dun (on way to Mussoorie)
- 24 Dalai admits writing to Chinese; 4-hour talk between Dalai and Nehru; Nehru appeals for restraint
- 25 Peking says—'Dalai under duress'
- 27 Nehru refutes Chinese charges
- 28 China warns India not to interfere in Tibet
- 29 Panchen Lama rules out visit to India

MAY

- 1 'Dalai's return to Tibet is good for all'.—Nehru
- 3 China asked to accept Bandung Governments' mediation
- 7 Dalai gives audience
- 8 'Bellicose speeches by Chinese not helpful'—Nehru
- 9 Dalai hopes to visit Delhi
- 18 Lhasa mob (pro Chinese) enter Indian Consulate
- 22 Dalai joins colourful Mussoorie ceremony (Buddha Poornima); Dalai's message.



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NOTE ON TIBET

TIBET—A REGION WITH AN AREA OF 4,75,000 sq. miles and a population of approximately 4 million, tucked away amidst mountains and with an average height of 20,000 feet above sealevel, bounded on the east by China, on the west by Kashmir and on the south by Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim—has assumed a magnitude of first importance in Asian politics since a couple of months ago, its nationalists raised the banner of revolt against China and the Dalai Lama had to fly to India for asylum.

Lying in a mountainous terrain Tibet has enjoyed a landlocked insularity which has kept it cut off for centuries from influences, chiefly of a political and cultural nature, emanating from its neighbour China, and given to its people a way of life distinctly their own. It is a theocratic state, with a third of its population taking monkhood and the rest living in a social structure, which because of the disproportion between the male and female populations, accommodates polyandry. The natural resources of Tibet are yet unexplored, but gold appears to be found in abundance, many of the rivers washing it down with the silt. Since the last century there has been one gold mine operating. Oil too has been considered a possibility. But the Tibetans live chiefly by trade. Nomadic settlers, they still follow the ways of the shepherd and their principal exports are wool, hides and skins and borax. What little manufactured goods are used by the Tibetans come from China and India, to the latter of which they have been connected for centuries by a virtual lifeline of commerce and culture.

TIBET AND CHINA

Despite the claims made by the Chinese that Tibet is a part of their country it is difficult to consider these claims as historically very tenable except on grounds of right by conquest. Otherwise besides the racial affiliation of the Tibetans with the Chinese in the same way in which Burmese and Nepalis have, there is little similarity between the two peoples. As far as the history of Tibet is concerned it has been one of unbroken autonomy within, combined with periodic suzerainty of China over its foreign relations. The Mongol and the Manchu dynasties were the only two powers who held Tibet under subjugation just as they held most of China. Both were foreign powers. The native rulers of China conducted periodic raids but never ruled over Tibet and during their times Tibet remained independent ruled by its monks and noblemen. Among the monks the Red Hat sect weakened due to certain wordly excesses and power passed into the hands of the Yellow Hat Sect which enjoins austerity and celibacy on its Lamas. In 1557 the Mongol Khan then ruling over China gave official support to the Yellow Hat sect and named its then head as Dalai (the Ocean of Wisdom) Lama. From then onwards the Dalai Lama became the head of the State. Later however, the fifth Dalai Lama created the Panchen Lama and gave him the second largest city of Tibet, Shigatse, to rule over. After that has followed a long rivalry between the two Lamas, the Dalai always seeking support from the rulers in India and the Panchen courting the favours of the ruling power in China.

STORY OF SUZERAINITY

At this point it would be interesting and pertinent to consider briefly the history of Sino-Tibetan relations. The earlier history of Tibet is wrapped in obscurity, but it is clear that the authority of China attempted expansion into Tibet only since the 13th Century. However, this authority was very nominal as may be seen from the fact that in 712 A.D. the king of Tibet May-Aktsom was offered a Chinese bride by way of bribe. Again we hear of the 50,000 yards of Chinese brocade that were given to Tibet as an annual tribute during the 8th Century. It was only during the 18th century that the Manchu Emperors made a determined effort to conquer Tibet and succeeded in establishing a nominal authority which gradually weak-

ened and was thrown off at every opportunity. In 1910 the Chinese Imperial Government invaded Tibet once again, the Dalai Lama fled into Darjeeling, and the Chinese proclaimed the deposition of the Dalai Lama in Tibet. In 1911 the Revolution in China broke out and the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, Tibet reasserted her independence and the Dalai Lama returned from his exile to Lhasa in 1912. With his return the Chinese garrisons stationed in Lhasa were driven out. Then on till 1950 Tibet has been virtually independent. The attempt of the Chinese Republic at Peking to recover its authority in Tibet was frustrated by a representation made by Tibet to the British Government. Britain and China had signed a treaty in 1906 and the British now took the view that Chinese action against Tibet amounted to a violation of the treaty. It was made clear that China's suzerainty over Tibet was recognised, but total sovereignty was challenged on the grounds that Tibet had independent treaty relations with Britain.

It is worth noting that this position had been arrived at by the attempts Tibet had made earlier to maintain her independence from Chinese rule. In 1901 Russian help was sought to protect Tibet. The resulting growth of Russian imperial influence in the East made Britain suspicious and uneasy. In 1903 Lord Curzon tried to convince his Government in London of the need for dispensing with the "constitutional fiction" of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. His policy was rejected then, but soon an awareness of Tibet becoming a dangerous political vacuum alarmed the British and in 1904 a military expedition was despatched to Lhasa that forced Tibet to the signing of the Lhasa Convention of 1904 by which the Tibetan Government would not allow interference by any foreign power or give that power any concessionary rights unless approved by the British. By this convention too Britain acquired control over the external affairs of Tibet. Then by the 1906 treaty with China, Britain relinquished the control of external affairs to China while ensuring that China or any other power would not interfere with the internal affairs of Tibet. Thus in 1911 when China tried to push into Tibet the British invited the Chinese Government for the negotiation of a new tripartite agreement to define the status of Tibet. China declared that as she had no intention of interfering with the internal affairs of Tibet, no new treaty was necessary. By now as we have seen earlier, the Dalai Lama had returned to Lhasa and driven out the Chinese forces stationed there. On

and drama also. In their essentially spiritual outlook on life the Tibetans owe much to the ancient teaching of India.

The origin of Lamaism in Tibet starts with the evangelical work of Buddhist missionaries who carried their doctrine across the Indian frontiers. The most notable among these in Padmasambhava of Nalanda who went to preach Buddhism in Tibet in the 8th century. Another was Atisa who gave a new calendar to Tibet. The Tibetans are believers in the Buddha. They believe that Dalai Lama is an incarnation of the Buddhisatva Avaloketismara. Particularly interesting is their incorporation of the theory of Rebirth, by which they believe that the Dalai Lama, whom they worship and who as the purest being attains *nirvana* on death, chooses to be reborn immediately in another body to help his people. It is also noteworthy that even the Muslims in Tibet believe in rebirth and contend for it being part of their religion.

Besides the ties of religion Tibet has been bound to India by commerce. The Indian mission at Lhasa maintains Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Gartok and Yatung. Commerce with India has been as ancient as the friendly relations between the two countries. After the creation of the Panchen Lama, political crisis has always inclined the Dalai Lama towards India for refuge and protection, as his rival has usually sought assistance from China. However, it must be stated categorically and with all the force one can employ that India has never had any territorial ambitions over Tibet and the Chinese charge of expansion is wholly baseless. However close the religious and cultural ties between India and Tibet, geographically and racially Tibet is part of China and not India. If India supports Tibet today it is entirely because she feels outraged by the way China has dealt with the situation.

TIBETAN GOVERNMENT

As we have noted earlier Tibet is a theocratic state with the Dalai Lama as its spiritual and temporal head. Following their belief in Rebirth, the monks and Lamas search for the new Dalai Lama immediately on the decease of his predecessor. All children born at that time are eligible and they are examined and questioned carefully for signs by which the Dalai Lama is to be recognised. It is also said that the dying Lama gives a description of the whereabouts of his successor just before his death.

Once the Dalai Lama is found he is trained in all the doctrines of Lamaism and is made an authority on all spiritual matters. He performs several ceremonies and is finally proclaimed as the head. The present Dalai Lama was found after an intensive search of five years.

Although supreme in spiritual matters the Dalai Lama does not act without consultation with his cabinet in temporal affairs. The general structure of Tibetan society is feudalistic, the lamas and monasteries owning most of the land. (Communists, it is reported had tried to mobilize the discontent in certain quarters against this system). The Dalai Lama consults a council of ministers called the Kashag and a National Assembly called the Tsongdu. In all matters related to administration he is advised by these bodies and does not act independently. In contrast the Panchen Lama is entirely spiritual in his duties, though being more closely allied to the Chinese rulers throughout the ages, he has presented rivalry to the headship of the state. In 1910 when the former Dalai Lama fled to India, the Panchen Lama was declared head of the state by the Chinese. The present announcement of the Peking Government to replace the Dalai Lama by the Panchen Lama is well in keeping with the tradition.

THE PRESENT CRISIS—BACKGROUND

The coming to power of the Reds in China was full of evil portent to the Tibetans, who feared once again the absorption of their state into New China. In July 1949, therefore, the Chinese Mission and the people sympathetic to the new regime were asked to vacate Lhasa. This move was resented by the Chinese Government. As the Government of India had her own relations with Tibet, the need for redefinition of the old ties was felt imperative. India made it clear that she had recognised the suzerainty of China and emphasized the internal autonomy of Tibet. In the following year India announced her recognition of Red China. A few days later China announced her intention of 'liberating' Tibet. It was understood that the internal autonomy of Tibet would not be tampered with. But the Tibetans were not reassured by the hopeful statements made by our Prime Minister at this time. They decided to act quickly. They organized representations to U.S., India and Britain. These representations were denounced by China as illegal. Finally it was decided that Tibetan representatives should meet Peking represen-

tatives in neutral territory and decide matters. In April 1950 a seven-man Tibetan mission came to India with this purpose. Their aim was to start preliminary talks and later repair to Hong Kong for final decision. But the British Government having already recognised New China refused visas to the Tibetan delegation to Hong Kong. The mission continued to stay in India and met the Chinese Ambassador in September. The meeting was unfruitful as the Chinese representative refused to define the future relations of China with Tibet. The Government of India then suggested a direct approach to Peking. But before the Mission could proceed Peking precipitated matters by sending her troops into Tibet. On the 24th October 1950 China announced her plan for 'liberating the three million Tibetans from imperialistic aggression.....' On the 28th Tibet requested India for mediation and diplomatic help in the settlement of the dispute. On the previous day India had expressed her 'surprise and regret' in a note to the Chinese Government and suggested a 'peaceful approach'. The Chinese Government replied promptly on the 30th that Tibet was an integral part of Chinese territory and that no foreign interference would be tolerated. The Chinese also asserted that they thought India was being 'affected by foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet.' A further protest was lodged by the Government of India repudiating the Chinese charges and making it clear again that India recognised the suzerainty of China but also thought Tibetan autonomy an agreed fact. On the 17th November China replied by saying that she had 'sovereign rights in Tibet' and charged the India Government with seeking to block peaceful settlement and the exercise of her sovereign rights. In December Mr. Nehru told the Indian Parliament that his Government had favoured a peaceful settlement and also expressed his wonder at the Chinese wanting to liberate Tibet, because he did not know from what they wanted to liberate the country.

The Tibet Government had already appealed to India for sponsoring her case at the U.N. The Government of India had replied that the appeal be made directly. But when finally the appeal was made India thought that the complaint should not be considered and the issue was put into cold storage, on assurances given by the Indian representative at the U.N. In March 1951 the Chinese troops halted their advance into Tibet and the now famous 17-point Sino-Tibetan Agreement was signed handing over the management of external affairs, trade and communications

to China. By this treaty the Tibetan Army was also to be absorbed in the Liberation Army of China. China was also permitted to establish a Military and administrative Commission at Lhasa and a military area headquarters in Tibet. In return China agreed to the regional autonomy of Tibet. But the sovereignty of China was still unaccepted by India till 1954, when in an agreement signed between China and India Tibet was considered 'a region of China.'

In this matter the Government of India had been persuaded by the statements and assurances given by the head of the Chinese State. In 1954 Mao Tse-Tung had told Mr. Nehru in Peking that Tibet would enjoy autonomy which no other province of China had. Other responsible officials of China said the same thing. Obviously all this was propaganda, for very soon the autonomy of Tibet was reduced to a polite fiction. In the first place Tibet was divided into three administrative zones each under separate authority of Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama and a Chinese General. Despite the Sino-Tibetan agreement this measure curtailed the administrative authority of the Dalai Lama very considerably. This was done in 1952.

After this followed what was called the liberation movement of the Chinese, though in reality it was only an attempt to gain a securer foothold in Tibet. Two national highways were built between the two states, air-fields established in various parts and plans were made for a network of railways. Along with these changes the Chinese tried to train groups of young Tibetans into acceptance of the Communist way of life that they were bent on forcing down the throats of Tibetans. With this purpose in view hundreds of Tibetans were taken to visit the Institute for National Minorities in Peking. On their return these Tibetans were expected to bring changes in their country and people. As a measure of persuasion this method was quite in keeping with the stipulations in the Sino-Tibetan Agreement to the effect that reforms would be carried out voluntarily by the Tibetans. But the method proved a failure and results were not forthcoming and the schools, hospitals, banks etc. that the Chinese brought into the life of the Tibetans did not cause any serious change in the lives of the people, and it in no way decreased their resentment against the Chinese. Besides there had been growing unrest among the Khampas, a martial people, who it is said had temporarily supported the Chinese because of their grievances against the feudal Government of the Lamas. These friends of China it

would appear suffered disillusion about their new masters, and were waiting for an opportunity for defection.

The opportunity came when land reforms began to be introduced. These reforms chiefly meant collectivisation of land. The farms, cattle and sheep owned by the lamassaries and the monasteries were pooled into 'farm co-operatives.' These measures rapidly led to the belief that the Chinese were out to destroy the Tibetan way of life. The Lamas lent support to the view and soon in the spring of 1956 there was a revolt. The Chinese glossed it over by saying in a belated press bulletin that 'military measures against the rebels were necessary'. In reality it meant the shooting down of thousands of Tibetans as a means of intimidation. In the following year another major revolt was staged by the Tibetans with equal success, but with at least one lesson for the Chinese that they could not push Tibetans too fast along the road to liberation, as they called it.

This led to the next measure of the Chinese namely the swamping out of the Tibetan population by a Chinese majority. Tibet was declared a thinly populated area and as a result the Han people were encouraged to go and settle down there. Thousands of Chinese were exported into Tibet for this purpose. In addition all the important posts were filled by the Chinese. In the meantime the revolts continued flaring up sporadically in various parts of Tibet.

As these continued with increased frequency and the situation was threatening to get out of hand, the Chinese Government tried to force the Dalai Lama to fight his own people. The Dalai Lama refused. Finally China addressed him directly and summoned him to a conference at Peking. This move only confirmed the suspicion among the Tibetans that the Chinese were bent on destroying everything they loved. It was not customary for the Dalai Lama to be addressed directly or to be summoned in this peremptory manner. The Tibetans began to believe that this was only being done to spirit away their king. Feelings ran high and ultimately when the Chinese threatened in the March of this year Tibetans broke into open revolt. Those who had been absorbed in the Liberation Army of China pulled off their uniforms and sided with their brethren. A sizeable quantity of arms had been collected during Chiang Kai-shek's struggle with the Communists and that was now used. China immediately replied by training 25 pounder guns on important places from the tops of hills. Monasteries were razed to the ground, thousands of people butchered and Norbulingka, the summer palace of the Dalai Lama was

damaged. As it appeared to the Dalai Lama, the situation was one of present destruction and future chaos. So he fled. After an arduous journey during which several attempts were made to bomb out the little group of refugees he reached India in safety. From all available reports the revolt continues. Although the Chinese have been reticent about what is going on in Tibet, there are reasons to believe that the flames of revolt have not died down. For the Tibetans, it is clearly a battle against overpowering odds; even so they appear determined to prefer the comforts of the martyr to those of life under the Chinese system.

INDIAN SYMPATHY

The press and public reaction to developments in Tibet is now too familiar to need repetition. Almost unanimous indignation has been expressed throughout the country. In certain quarters the Prime Minister's attitude of neutrality and peaceful approach has been subjected to severe criticism. In fact Mr. Nehru's sterner attitude came as a result of public pressure. Leaders of various political persuasion have expressed their resentment in no uncertain terms, so that the Chinese Government has reacted with undue violence and branded them as 'expansionists'.

However the Communist accusation of our leaders is not merely aggressive tactics in diplomacy. Nobody in his proper mind would give credence to such a preposterous charge as that of India indirectly claiming influence over Tibet. The same cannot be said of China's territorial ambitions. The recent incidents of Chinese maps lends support to this view. It may then be presumed with fair accuracy that China believes that not only Tibet but other neighbouring areas also belong to her. That she has evaded any direct and convincing answer to protests lodged by India with her against, what some papers have called 'Cartographic aggression', only adds dubeity to Chinese sincerity in her relations with India. Perhaps just now it is impossible to conceive of such a situation, but in the light of Mr. Mao's call to the young of China to go and inhabit the 'frontiers' the supposition does not look entirely irrelevant or meaningless. It is well within reasonable expectation that China will seek to influence these neighbour areas in the course of the next few years. On the whole China does appear quite anxious to preserve the principles of Panchsheel. As Mr. Nehru has been compelled to remark the latest statements emanating from China are made in the

language of 'Cold War'. This may be a very unhappy development but perhaps only symptoms of China's future policy towards India. China appears to regard India as a rival in the frontier areas and it matters little to her whether the spirit of cordiality which has characterised our relations in the past remain so or not. We can only hope that Mr. Nehru's emphasis on prevalence of friendly relations between the two countries is not misplaced and that more substantial demonstration of reciprocity will be forthcoming from China.

In the context of these developments the position of India and her avowed principle of neutrality have to be viewed. Some papers have urged a revision of India's foreign policy. But would it be sane? Hardly; considering that the world has been divided into two gigantic camps which are exerting a very strong gravitational force on their weaker neighbours. One of the ways of playing directly into the hands of one of these powers is the abandonment of neutrality, when neutrality is vitally necessary, not only for the preservation of our freedom, but to maintain a balance between the two big powers. It is also the hope of lesser nations who are gradually arriving at independence. If such a neutral group of nations does not exist the chance for every young newly independent nation is of getting engulfed in another dependence on one of the contending powers.

In the present situation of Tibet the Indian position is undoubtedly difficult. In a way India is responsible for totally committing Tibet into Chinese hands by the Sino-Indian Agreement of 1954, which described Tibet as a region of China. Then again it was on the strength of assurances given by India that the complaint of Tibet at the U.N. was withdrawn. Though this was done because of the anxiety of India to get China admitted to the U.N. still it does not absolve us entirely of our responsibility in the matter in so far as almost all the assurances for the preservation of Tibet's autonomy were given to India by China. In other words India was virtually recognised as a third party or witness. This means that India cannot sit pretty turning a deaf ear to the clamours of the distressed Tibetans. Nor at the same time, can India have recourse to measures that may endanger her position of neutrality. No other political event has come so close to affecting the Indian position of neutrality and it goes to the credit of the Prime Minister that he has been able to preserve it under these trying circumstances counselling restraint and dispassionate study. In view of the charges made by China that India has been

harbouring agent provocateurs at Kalimpong and that Indian interest in Tibet is expansionist in motive, the sanity of the Prime Minister's counsel cannot be a matter for two opinions. To succumb to temptation of passion one way or the other is not merely to compromise India's neutral position but to invite a clear threat to our security—not in the sense of hot war, but in the sense of merging our boundaries in the larger area of one of the rival camps. More than one political opportunity has been used for forcing India one way or the other, while both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are anxious to win India over to their side. It happened at the time of U.N. debate on Kashmir; then over Hungary. Tibet is another such opportunity and therefore demanding the greatest circumspection even in the expression of our sympathy for the Tibetans. The accusation of the Chinese that the Dalai Lama is in duress is another tactic to move India from her position and align her with the opposite camp in the hope of India repudiating this position and being drawn into the Communist bloc. The Prime Minister's statement in the Lok Sabha on the 30th of March sets the exact line of cordiality towards China combined with firm assertion of Tibet's autonomy within the suzerainty of China. There is no question of India supporting the feudal system or any reactionary group in Tibet. That is beside the point. What has roused the sympathy of the Indians is the manner in which China has treated a lesser people to whom she had made certain promises. Granting that the reforms introduced by China were progressive and so forth, it still remains a matter of doubt if such methods for their imposition as those adopted by the Chinese are defensible. It is not so much a defence of the Lama as a protest against Chinese methods and bad faith. The hospitality that India has extended to both the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees is to be considered in the same spirit. Although China fails to realize this because of her determination to absorb Tibet by force and as quickly as possible, it is still a fact that India is acting in the best interest of China if only China were prepared for a peaceful approach to the problem. It is evident from the statement of the Prime Minister that he is interested in creating conditions in which direct negotiations could replace the apparently hopeless and perhaps endless armed struggle that is going on at present. There can be little doubt that Western countries look upon this as the most helpful possibility and look forward to India effecting a settlement agreeable to both parties before long.

3 THE PRESS

INDIA AND TIBET

CHINA, IT WOULD SEEM, HAS CRUSHED THE MAIN Tibetan offensive in Lhasa, though the admission that Chinese forces were "mopping up" rebels in remote areas suggests that desultory guerilla fighting continues and that the area of the rebellion was not localised in Lhasa. From Peking's own announcement it is clear that the Tibetan uprising was widespread and concerted, being a country-wide rebellion, not confined to a few malcontents and hotheads. Chinese repression is certain to be severe. Whatever the fate of the Dalai Lama—and his whereabouts are a matter of conjecture—the elevation of the Communist-controlled Panchen Lama as head of a new "Preparatory Committee" implies that the Chinese will now trust no one except their tried creatures. Some eighteen "traitorous" Tibetan leaders are to be punished, doubtless by being liquidated, and a military control committee has been set up in Lhasa to demonstrate Peking's iron hand and as a deterrent to further attempts at rebellion. We shall soon hear of Tibetan "denunciations" of the rebels and of protestations of "loyalty" by Lhasa to Peking. And we shall know exactly what they are worth.

The Government of India's silence in the face of this situation is difficult to decipher and even more difficult to condone. Discretion and restraint are too often alibis for moral and political cowardice. That there has been a country-wide Tibetan uprising against the Chinese authorities not even Peking denies. Nor do

the Communists deny that the revolt has been "crushed" by them and that it was sufficiently deep-seated to require a drastic overhaul of the administrative machinery. In the past New Delhi has not hesitated to denounce violence by Washington, London or Paris, though on Hungary its pusillanimity provoked public opinion into goading the Government to a more positive attitude. Why this strange tenderness for Communist feelings as contrasted with a disregard for the sensitivities of the Democracies? We do not say New Delhi was wrong in denouncing the latter, for invariably its censure was deserved. But when the Chinese Communists or Russians are guilty of violence the Prime Minister appears to go almost out of his way to give them the benefit of the doubt. Tibet has close links with India, as Mr. Nehru himself declared. It has a claim, at the very least, to our sympathy. But even that has not been officially forthcoming. The uprising involved not only political but religious factors which deeply concern millions of Buddhists in India and throughout Asia. Above all, the Tibetans as a brutally oppressed people are entitled, as fellow human beings, to the goodwill and sympathy of the civilised world, not least of India which in her long history has also known bondage and suffering.

—*The Indian Express*, New Delhi, March 20, 1959.

REPRESSION IN TIBET

THE NEWS FROM PEKING HAS KILLED THE LAST lingering hope that, faced with a popular revolt in Tibet, the Chinese would try to come to terms with the people rather than seek to coerce them into surrender. The removal of the Dalai Lama from the chairmanship of the preparatory committee of the autonomous region, the decision to pack the committee with their own men, the vesting of absolute authority in the hands of military committees and the disbandment of what remained of the Tibetan army show that they are in no mood to conciliate the people. There is no disguise now about the nature of the regime they have clamped down on Tibet. The preparatory committee is still there, but it has no real authority and, in any case, it consists wholly of Chinese nominees. All the levers of power are in the hands of the commanders of the Chinese forces in the region. The Dalai Lama's whereabouts are still not known, but it is hard to believe that he has been abducted by the rebels or that he is

being held "under duress." Those who regard his person as sacred and look upon him as the symbol of their autonomy are hardly likely to force him to act against his wishes. In any case, whatever the truth about the Dalai Lama's whereabouts or the extent of his sympathy with the rebel cause, there is no doubt that the Chinese no longer trust him. In the Panchen Lama, who has always been more friendly to them, they have a more pliable instrument of their will. It is ironical that Peking should accuse the Tibetan leaders of violating the 1951 treaty. By doing away with what remained of the autonomy guaranteed under it, it is the Chinese who have torn up that treaty.

There is no reason to discount the Chinese claim that the revolt has been smashed. In face of the desperate odds against which they fought the Tibetans could never hope to win. They could at best hope to carry on a guerilla warfare in a few isolated areas. But the military victory of the Chinese is in fact a political defeat. For it is an open admission of their failure to create a popular base among the Tibetan people. Speaking at the eighth Party Congress in September 1956, Chang Kuo-hua of the Tibetan working committee of the Communist Party of China said that "we should not press on with reforms before the majority of the people of the higher social levels have shown genuine approval for them." The imposition of military rule on the entire territory shows how miserably they have failed to win over these people. However good some of the land and other reforms may be in theory, the important point is that they do not have the support of the majority. The tragic irony, however, of what may well prove to be the last bid to save Tibet's autonomy is that it has hastened the very process which it sought to check. The Chinese, determined to exploit the rich mineral wealth of the region, will now do everything they can to quicken the pace of change, break the power of the monasteries, settle large number of their own people in the region and integrate it completely with the rest of China.

The Chinese Government does not have to search for the "commanding centre" of the revolt outside Tibet. The causes of the revolt which had the support of as many as 18 members of the preparatory committee, the Tibetan army and the monasteries which, on the admission of the Chinese themselves, have a tremendous hold on the people, lie in the failure of Chinese policy, not in the machinations of a handful of refugees in Kalimpong. The Chinese themselves acknowledge that Mr. Nehru's attitude has been "friendly." But it will be a grievous error on their part if they mistake India's desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of Tibet for a lack of interest in what happens there. India has had close cultural ties with Tibet for centuries and even today she

has special trade and other interests there. She cannot but be concerned over any development which adversely affects these interests. The Chinese Government must not underestimate the strength of the feeling of the people in this country on the issue of Tibetan autonomy. What trust can they place in Chinese declarations after their open violation of the repeated pledges they gave to the Tibetan people that they will respect their autonomy? In the face of a military fait accompli the Indian Government can do little to restore Tibetan autonomy, but even so there is no reason for it to stretch the concept of non-interference to the point where it has to maintain an uneasy silence in the matter. It must be frank and tell the Chinese in the plainest language how it feels about the raw deal Tibet has received at China's hands. What is more, it must seek an early agreement on the Indo-Tibetan frontier and see to it that the consolidation of Chinese power in Tibet does not lead to any encroachment on Indian territory.

—*Times of India*, March 30, 1959.

THE RAPE OF TIBET

LET US HOLD OUR HEADS LOW TODAY. A SMALL country on our border has paid the ultimate penalty for its temerity to aspire to independence. Tibet is dead. We do not need reminders from Peking of the grim determination of the heroic 600 million Chinese to overcome what remains of the will to resistance of the three million Tibetans. The world has much experience of the Communist capacity to finish a job of that kind with thoroughness. Tibet was adying a long time before death came. It was eight years ago that the Chinese Communists moved in to assert a theoretical suzerainty over a people with a long history as a distinct entity, geographical, ethnical, linguistic, cultural and religious. During several periods from the 8th century there was conflict between Tibet and China. Whenever Chinese Central authority was strong and this happened at long intervals and in short spells, pressure was exerted against Tibet with varying success. But if the Chinese did at times establish effective rule over Tibet, let it also be remembered by those who are now willing enough to help Peking re-write history that there was a Tibetan king who once exacted tribute from the Celestial Empire. The quarrel over historical rights and wrongs is however highly irrelevant where the Communists tyrant stalks.

The suzerainty excuse was handy. Were it not, some other would have done duty in its place. In the final analysis, whatever the compromises imposed on us by the realities of the power situation, are we to subscribe cheerfully to the immoral principle that a people shall not be free because it has never been free?

Tibet is dead. There is nothing we could have done in material terms to save it. Let us accept that. The question that we must search our hearts to answer is: Can we say as much for our moral duty in the matter? The present government of China had by treaty in 1951 guaranteed the autonomy of Tibet. We had no part in this, direct or indirect. Later in 1956 when we were hosts, willing, to the Dalai Lama and Chou En-lai, reluctant, to the Panchen Lama, a treaty of trade and intercourse was enshrined in the significant context of Panch Sheel. An elaborate enunciation of principles which describe non-interference in five different ways was surely an extravagant way of safeguarding a few lakhs worth of business. Our meaning was, and the Chinese seemed to understand it then, that Panch Sheel had a validity in the ordering of relations between China and Tibet. We were not wrong in experimenting with the begetting of trust by trust. If to depend on Chinese good faith was a risk, it was a calculated risk. Since then we have had several warnings that the Panch Sheel pipeline of good will was one ended. And, now when we should be torn between feelings of shame and impotence, the Chinese have had the audacity not only to frighten us into continued silence by giving us the undeserved credit for harbouring the "commanding centre" of the rebellion in Indian territory at Kalimpong but to tell us how we shall conduct ourselves in our sovereign Parliament.

Tibet is dead. Much else could die with Tibet if we do not even now heed the warning. There falls the shadow of China in the lands all around us. It is a dark shadow for our influence. After Tibet they are bound to ask if there was wisdom in our counsel. It is a fair question and we shall not retain many friends by shrinking from the answer. We need a realistic reassessment of the basis of our foreign policy. To suggest that the entire basis is in disarray is to panic. Assuredly, it is important to be friends with China. But what kind of friends? A formal politeness that inhibits the free exchange of ideas and differences cannot pass for friendship even in this age when the Communists have familiarized us with the debasing of words and values. "The grave is a fine and private place, but none I think do there embrace".

—The Hindustan Times, March 30, 1959.

WHAT CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE?

MR. NEHRU'S STATEMENT ON TIBET IN THE LOK Sabha on Monday was singularly equivocal. He was generous with his bouquets, showering them with his right hand on Tibet and with his left on China. Did the Prime Minister not realise that in doing so he was equating the aggressor with the aggressed—precisely the line which the U.N. Security Council has adopted vis-a-vis India and Pakistan on Kashmir and to which both the Indian people and Government have rightly taken exception? "Where freedom is menaced, or justice threatened, or where aggression takes place, we cannot be and shall not be neutral", declared Mr. Nehru while addressing the U.S. House of Representatives during his visit to America in 1949. What has happened in the past decade to induce the Prime Minister to revise or modify this stand? Has freedom not been menaced in autonomous Tibet? Is justice not threatened? And has aggression not taken place? Why then is the Prime Minister so neutral in his attitude, balancing the scales even between the aggressor China, and aggressed Tibet?

In reply to a question inquiring what was the Government's policy in regard to giving asylum to Tibetan political refugees wanting to come to India, Mr. Nehru answered that some time ago general instructions were issued that any person endeavouring to cross the frontier should be stopped at the checkpost and should not be allowed to cross over until he had the necessary travel papers. It is not clear from the Prime Minister's answer whether these instructions still hold. Presumably they do since Mr. Nehru went on to say that "individual cases would have to be considered on merits whenever occasion for this arises". The question of giving asylum, according to the Prime Minister, does not arise now since no request for asylum had been made. Surely, cynicism could go no further. Does Mr. Nehru seriously believe that Tibetan refugees fleeing before the guns of the Chinese will carry with them "the necessary papers" in the form of exit permits from the Chinese authorities or their creature, the Panchen Lama, or entry visas stamped by the Indian Consulate at Lhasa? It is a curiously insensitive statement to come from a man normally as sensitive as the Prime Minister. And who again is "to decide individual cases on merits" while the refugees are asked to stay on the other side of the border? Even if the panjandrums of Delhi move with more than their usual alacrity the Tibetans seeking asylum will probably be either massacred or taken captive by the Chinese. The Government of India is hardly likely to have exhaustive dossiers of individual

Tibetans to enable it to examine each case on its merits. Nor is it correct to say that no request for asylum has been made. Various Tibetan meetings and delegations have voiced this plea as have also Indian sympathisers of these hapless forlorn people. Surely Mr. Nehru does not expect the refugees to broadcast pleas for asylum while they are fleeing from the Chinese.

The Government of India's handling of the Tibetan tragedy must leave a bitter taste in Indian mouths and a sense of shame and resentment. It is degrading for a people who in Mr. Nehru's own words "are not citizens of a weak or mean country" to act in a manner which is at once weak and mean. The Prime Minister makes much of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. What constitutes interference? If New Delhi can protest—and rightly protest—against South Africa's policy of Apartheid against the African who enjoys no autonomy but is subject to the authority of Cape Town and whose cause Indian spokesmen plead annually at the United Nations, how can it withhold protest against the naked and brutal aggression practised by the Chinese against the admittedly autonomous Tibetans? There can be only one explanation for this attitude. Mr. Nehru has one yardsick for some people and a different one for others.

—*The Indian Express*, New Delhi, April 1, 1959.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT

IN HIS STATEMENT TO THE LOK SABHA ON MONDAY, pitched in a studiously moderate key with the very evident desire not to exacerbate the feelings already roused by recent developments in Tibet, our Prime Minister succeeded in showing clearly where India's sympathies lay. Tibet is a neighbouring country with which India has very close spiritual, cultural and other kinds of friendly ties and thousands in India hold the Dalai Lama in veneration. Mr. Nehru disclaimed any desire to impose our ideas on Tibet and declared that India had no intention of claiming the privileges which the British rulers of India enjoyed in the past. But equally we would like to see Tibet develop along her own lines, enjoying complete autonomy in her own affairs though nominally under Chinese suzerainty. Mr. Nehru recalled the assurance given by the Prime Minister of China during his visit to New Delhi two and a half years ago:

Mr. Chou Enlai had then said that Tibet had always been a part of the Chinese State but that Tibet was not Chinese (a distinction that is vital in the context of the Tibetans' claim for an independent existence), that it was an autonomous region and that he wanted it to continue thus. Experts in international law have differed on the interpretation of the exact status that Tibet has been enjoying so far but none would question the wisdom of safeguarding "the existence of people of separate stock, race and religion on defined territory under its own authorities" (to quote Prof. C. H. Alexandrowicz) and none would deny that "the Dalai Lama, assisted by his Prime Minister, the Grand Council and the National Assembly, exercised full temporal power in Tibet, though his spiritual power extended much further". The People's Government of China undertook in their 1951 agreement with Tibet to respect her integrity but apparently the "reform" policies adopted by her representatives in Tibet, and particularly the general attitude and behaviour of her "Liberation" army in that country, have alienated the Tibetans and goaded them to extreme measures. The large-scale rebellion that broke out a few days ago is reported to have been suppressed with heavy loss of life but the much better armed Chinese troops would have to face for a long time guerrilla warfare in a hostile country and amidst a sullen people.

Pandit Nehru did well to discount the reports about the Dalai Lama's own personal reactions to recent events in the absence of authentic information. He had also no difficulty in repudiating Peking's charge that Kalimpong in Indian territory was the nerve-centre of the Tibetan revolt. Finally, he gave the only possible answer to the Chinese demand that our Parliament should not discuss affairs in Tibet: he emphasised that "this Government or this Parliament" would not "submit to any kind of dictation, from any country however great it may be." This is clear enough notice to Peking that the Government and people of India would not be deterred by any threat from expressing their views on these lamentable events in Tibet. Having thus put himself right with certain sections of opinion, both in India and abroad, that wanted him to take "a strong line", Mr. Nehru was justified in pleading for moderation and wisdom in debating such critical issues. We have friendly relations with China as with Tibet and it must surely be our endeavour to help solve the dispute between them and to bring them together again. It was in this spirit that the Prime Minister warded off all "hypothetical" queries on India's attitude to the problem of asylum for refugees from Tibet with the statement that all cases would be considered on their merits. The Indian people would, of course, recoil in horror from any proposal to let these un-

fortunate political refugees fend for themselves but the Government would have to proceed with caution and circumspection, ensuring that their policy did not aggravate the situation.

From Mr. Nehru's statement as well as from the words of the vast majority of the Opposition leaders, the Chinese Government ought to realise the deep concern of the people of India for the freedom and welfare of the people of Tibet. A fully autonomous Tibet is the only safeguard of peace in regions adjoining our north-eastern frontier and the only satisfying symbol of China's good intentions. There is already the fear that if Asian people stood idly by watching Tibet's tragedy, it would be the turn of other nations to suffer. The Chinese Government must recognise that their action in Tibet has not only stirred people's feelings in other Asian countries but has also given fresh ammunition to those foreign critics who want China kept out of the United Nations because of her "record of aggression" in Korea and other regions. Peking must realise that short-term military solutions of any problem do not have lasting effects. She must listen to good counsel from friends in New Delhi and abide by a peaceful, long-range agreement. Such accord, however, must be not with puppet-leaders but with the real spokesmen of the Tibetan people.

—*The Hindu*, April 1, 1959.

TIBET—R.I.P.

TIBET, THE ROOF OF THE WORLD, HAS CRASHED beneath the weight of Communist China. The rest of the world can seize upon the episode to point a moral or adorn a tale. But India which is next door neighbour to Tibet has more than an academic interest in the event. The echo of the crash has reverberated throughout the country. And the debris has shown a natural tendency to spill over and into India's borders. Prime Minister Nehru was questioned specifically in Parliament whether the Government of India had a policy about refugees fleeing Tibet. To those who recalled Austrian hospitality to Hungarian refugees, Mr. Nehru replied that Tibet is not Hungary nor India Austria. It is precisely because Tibet is Tibet that all the misfortunes have come upon her. The Government of India, too, do not have a free hand in their Tibetan policy. This policy was predetermined before the British left India. The British recognis-

ed the autonomy of Tibet subject to Chinese suzerainty. And this policy was bequeathed to the Government of India in August, 1947. But it should be remembered that the Chinese were no party to the British policy. Only the Tibetans were. The Chinese Government had declined to ratify the Simla Agreement in which the concept of Tibetan autonomy subject to Chinese suzerainty was embodied. When, therefore, in 1950 the Chinese Government declared that "Tibet is an integral part of Chinese territory and the problem of Tibet is entirely a domestic problem of China," the Government of India were both surprised and pained but could do nothing about it. They found that they could not under-write Tibet's autonomy.

Mr. Nehru's thesis that Tibet is not Hungary holds good on another count also. Russia never claimed that Hungary was part of Russia. Hungary was an independent country and not an autonomous state subject to Russian suzerainty. But there must be a truce to parallel-hunting, and we should look at the situation independently and on its own merits. On the character of the revolt itself there seems to be no agreement. The China lobby in this country has been at pains to argue that what the Communists have suppressed is no more and no less than an attempted counter-revolution by reactionaries. On the other hand, it is maintained with equal vehemence by the opposite school that the armed uprising was really a desperate, nationalistic bid for independence from the Chinese yoke. This controversy has done much to cloud the public judgment, even if the public is reconciled to the legal position as explained by the Prime Minister.

But apologists of Communist action have yet to find a satisfactory explanation for two aspects of the phenomena. The letters released by the New China News Agency would make it appear that the Dalai Lama was on the most friendly terms with the Chinese Communists and that he literally asked for military action against the reactionaries. But Mr. Nehru has cast doubts on the authenticity of these letters. If they were genuine, why should the Communists have been in such an indecent hurry to instal the Panchen Lama in place of the Dalai Lama? Again, the Chinese Government have committed a distinctly unfriendly act in naming Kalimpong as 'the commanding centre of rebellion.' This is a fine reward for India's role of Good Samaritan. But, even apart from that, it is a charge which Indian people are not likely to forgive. With China, as with Russia, India had signed the 'Panch Shila' agreements. Every one of the five rocks on which non-aggression had been built has tumbled down. India's policy-makers must now be infinitely sadder men, but are

they wiser too? Ideologically, they had sold China to India. The "China Way" and "Giant's Leap" had been made to look respectable. China's way in Tibet has been littered with uncounted corpses. The giant's leap to the world's roof-top shows that dwarfs are destined to get short shrift. In the past China has been guilty of what has been called "cartographic aggression" against India—showing parts of India as Chinese territory. With Tibet gone, the future of the various other Himalayan States pose a big question mark. An even bigger question mark is posed when, with the Tibetan buffer removed, India and China stand face to face.

—*The Pioneer*, April 1, 1959

"COMMANDING CENTRE"

DALAI LAMA'S SAFE ENTRY INTO THE INDIAN SOIL in the evening of March 31 will relieve the Tibetans and his adherents and well-wishers in other countries of deep and sustained anxiety about him. By giving political asylum to the spiritual and temporal head of Tibet the Government of India has acted not only in conformity with international practice but the wishes of the people of this country except, perhaps, that small and misguided section who dance as marionettes at pulls from elsewhere. How events in Tibet will shape now and what their repercussions will be beyond her borders can hardly be anticipated at this stage.

Dalai Lama's escape and reports of fresh flare-up in Tibet, however, indicate a grim and prolonged resistance by the Tibetans despite the superior might of Chinese arms. Whether Dalai Lama has been carried to India under duress or he has willingly taken refuge here to avert capture by the Chinese will be clear before long, though a fairly correct guess can be made from the circumstances already known. If that guess is fully corroborated by authoritative disclosures now, the stand of the rebels will be strengthened and, to that extent, the Chinese version of the happenings will lose ground in the eye of the world.

India's policy in respect of the situation in Tibet has been made perfectly clear by the Prime Minister. As a friend of Peking, whose suzerainty—as distinguished from sovereignty—over Tibet is recognised by her, she scrupulously refrained from doing or saying anything that might be politically incompatible with her posi-

tion. Yet she cannot conceal, and has not concealed, her spontaneous sympathy for the Tibetan people with whom she has age-long spiritual and cultural ties and whose will for autonomy, guaranteed by a solemn treaty, has clashed with what they not only feel but experience as the contrary will of the other party to the treaty. Unfortunately, however, the Chinese Government has misconstrued this attitude of India. It has not only criticised the discussion of the Tibetan affair in India's Parliament but charged the Government of India with connivance of what it has called the rebel activities from the commanding centre at Kalimpong.

To the first point the Prime Minister gave a fitting reply by stating that the Indian Parliament was a sovereign body and its functions would not be limited by any external power, however, strong. What the C.P.I. felt about this categorical assertion of the Prime Minister, endorsed by every patriotic Indian with the least sense of national dignity, has not been expressed in words as its feeling about the former's definite denial of Peking's allegation about Kalimpong has been given out in a formal statement. Mr. Nehru said in Parliament on March 30 that to describe Kalimpong as the commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion was wrong. The Chinese Embassy in Delhi circulated, even after the Prime Minister's statement an article in *People's Daily* which reiterated the allegation. The C.P.I. also in a statement on March 31 refused to be satisfied by what the Prime Minister had said and, in a way, supported Peking's charge. Mr. Nehru again dealt specifically and in detail with this charge in the Lok Sabha on April 3 and proved to the hilt that it was false.

About the Chinese Embassy's performance he used mild words and said that it was improper. That might be diplomatic propriety on the part of the Prime Minister but why the Embassy, which circulated the article after the Prime Minister's explanation and, reportedly, after consultation with a top leader of the C.P.I., remains unexplained. If the C.P.I. came in for severe castigation in the Lok Sabha for such activities, it fully deserved that condemnation. Kalimpong, Mr. Nehru admitted, has been a nest of international espionage about which the Government is fully alert. But the Communist espionage there seems to be far better organised, despite the Government's alertness, than that of the "imperialists and reactionaries." That is indicated by the New China News Agency's correct and detailed report about Dalai Lama's entry into India on March 31 before anybody in India, except the Prime Minister and some high officials connected with the NEFA administration, came to know anything about it.

CHINESE ZULM IN TIBET

IN WONDERLAND THERE WAS A LOOKING GLASS house in which everything was upside down. We are reminded of this familiar story by the Chinese version of the situation in Tibet. The report issued by the Chinese Embassy begins with the statement, 'Violating the will of the Tibetan people and betraying the motherland, the Tibetan Local Government and the upper strata reactionary clique colluded with imperialism, assembled rebellious bandits, and launched armed attacks against the people's liberation army garrison in Lhasa during the night of March 19....The valiant units of the people's liberation army completely smashed the rebellious bandits.'

A visitor to this world from some other planet will conclude from this statement that the Tibetan Government is nothing more than a local body, that the authorities of the body lose no opportunity to do every possible disservice to their motherland, China, that of late their unpatriotic activities have greatly increased, that these include such heinous crimes as banditry and conspiracies for the secession of Tibet from their National Government, the People's Republic of China, and the formation of a local junta composed of bandits and other undesirable elements to misgovern Tibet. Naturally the Chinese soldiers who are the guardians and defenders of the freedom and security of Tibet, dissolved the local body known as the Government of Tibet and took over the entire administration of Tibet in their own hands. But impartial observers who know who is who and what is what in China and Tibet will not be impressed by this statement. They cannot but arrive at the conclusion that it is the Chinese Government who are practising banditry and imperialism and that it is they who are violating the will of the Tibetan people. The entire policy of China towards Tibet is based on deceit, falsehood and violence.

According to the Chinese Embassy, the rebellious activities of the Tibetan traitors are not a sudden development. The Embassy report says, 'Since the Chinese people's liberation army entered Tibet and the Central People's Government and the Tibetan Local Government concluded the 17-article agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1951, they have been plotting to tear up this agreement and preparing for armed rebellion'. This statement is an unconscious admission by the Chinese Government of the fact that the so-called agreement of 1951 was imposed upon the Tibetans by force and that it was not acceptable to them. If it had not been so, they would not have been 'plotting to tear up the agreement.' All nations

which love their freedom would behave similarly in similar circumstances. The happenings in Manchuria in 1931 are an instance in point. According to the rulers of Japan, the people of China committed in 1931 the same offences that the Tibetans are supposed to be guilty of today. They did not respect their treaties with Japan concerning Manchuria, they indulged in intrigues, they tried to mislead the people, they were disloyal to Japan. Here is an extract from a statement made by a Japanese spokesman at the time: 'Chang Hsueh Liang, that most rapacious, wanton, stinking youth, is still failing to realize his odiousness and has established a provisional Mukden Government at Chinchow to plot intrigues in the territories which are safely under the rule of the troops of the great Japanese Empire, when the heart of the Manchurian mass is no longer with him'. Why did China not fulfil the 15-point agreement with Japan she had signed? Because she had signed the agreement under threat of war from Japan. The 17-point agreement which Tibet signed in 1951 is no more valid than the 15-point agreement China signed in 1915 was. It will not pay China to enforce the 1951-treaty and make Tibet a Chinese colony on the basis of that treaty. Japanese colonialism was responsible for Japan's ruin. The fate which befell Japan should be a warning to China.

—*The Leader*, April 1, 1959

TIBET AND INDIA

MR. NEHRU'S LATEST STATEMENT ON TIBET IN THE Lok Sabha reflects the heartbeats of the Indian people who are greatly bewildered at the action of the Chinese Government in seeking to liquidate Tibetan autonomy. There is little doubt that the Dalai Lama and his cabinet members are with the revolutionaries. The Peking regime's claim that he is opposed to the rebellion seems patently phoney. From the accounts of the insurrection against the Chinese authorities furnished by the official Chinese news agency itself, it is evident that the Dalai Lama shared the disgust of his ministers and other prominent members of the Tibetan local Government at the growing interference by the Chinese military authorities. The position was evidently getting intolerable. The fighting in Lhasa in the second half of March 1959 was not a projection of the revolt by Khampas which had been in existence for several years. The Tibetans are simple, peaceful and tolerant people. They had

accepted the Chinese suzerainty in the belief that Tibet's autonomy would not be affected. Mr. Nehru revealed that two and a half years' ago when Mr. Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of China, visited India he had assured his Indian counterpart that Tibet had always been an autonomous region and he intended to respect that status. When it became increasingly clear that China wanted to introduce communism in Tibet by force, naturally it led to an upsurge of resentment. It is difficult to conceive that the Tibetan people would think of ever launching a revolt against the Chinese authorities without the consent and blessings of the Dalai Lama. It is, indeed, plain that the rebellion was started to preserve the authority of the Dalai Lama which the Chinese wanted to usurp.

The military superiority of China and the lack of any outside assistance to the Tibetan rebels have temporarily enabled the Chinese to put up a puppet regime under the chairmanship of the Panchen Lama who had been groomed in Peking years ago to oust the Dalai Lama. Later, when an agreement was reached with the Tibetan Government and under the terms of the India-China treaty also Peking's suzerainty over Tibet was recognised the Dalai Lama was allowed to continue. Nevertheless, the Chinese communist leaders always felt that the Dalai Lama would never agree to function as their stooge. So they were eager to create an opportunity in which the spiritual head of the Tibetan people, revered as incarnation of Lord Buddha, was replaced by the Panchen Lama. The premature leakage of the communist plan to kidnap the Dalai Lama to Peking led to the revolt which was spontaneous. Nobody has probably any illusion that the virtually unarmed Tibetan people would be able to withstand the onslaughts of the powerful Chinese army. But the fight for independence will be kept up. The Chinese will find it difficult to mentally subjugate the Tibetan people who have fought many battles in the past against powerful Chinese emperors. They are probably fighting the most crucial war at present. Once they are able to throw off the Chinese yoke, they can live in peace and freedom which have been accepted as the birthright of every nation.

In this whole episode, what has struck as significant to the people of this country is the attempt of China to browbeat India and the scant regard of the Peking regime for its past commitments about Tibet made to Mr. Nehru. The fact that even such an unquestionably staunch friend of China as Mr. Nehru had to say in the Lok Sabha that assurances given to him by Premier Chou En-lai had not been kept and that the Chinese charge that Kalimpong was the commanding centre of

the rebellion was blantly false shows that in its determination to annex Tibet, the communist Government of China has thrown all considerations of morality to the winds. If India had not observed strict neutrality in the matter of current upheaval in Tibet, the Chinese troops would have been thrown out long ago. The Chinese aggression and the untenable allegations against India ought to prove an eye-opener not only for Mr. Nehru but also for millions of people in this country who had taken a complacent view of the Chinese intentions. It is well to remember that the Chinese map still shows some thousand of miles of Indian territory as a part of China and despite several requests from New Delhi, the necessary correction has not been carried out. The worth of a Chinese friendship, for which India antagonised a powerful section of the American opinion, has to be reappraised. The tide of public opinion in this country is so much decidedly in favour of Tibetan nationalists that even the Indian communists have preferred to remain silent after an initial support to the Chinese Government.

—*The Searchlight*, April 1, 1959

INDIA AND CHINA

IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT PEKING CAN SEE THROUGH the casing—of “wisdom and restraint”—of Shri Nehru’s utterances on Tibet in the Lok Sabha on Monday (March 30) and will take note of the limits beyond which Indian policy, let alone feeling, will not be manipulated by the Prime Minister or cannot be manipulated by him even if he so wished, because these things for us are historically conditioned, more or less. No Indian Prime Minister can, without repudiating his own national past or his own representative character, withhold sympathy from the Tibetans in their present plight or wish for them anything less than “progress in freedom”, this freedom being something very different from the condition intended for Tibet by its Chinese ‘liberators’. By recalling a conversation with the Chinese Premier during his Indian visit in 1956, Shri Nehru underlined the inseparability of the idea of ‘full autonomy’ and the background of India’s attitude in regard to Tibet or of whatever understanding or agreement concerning Tibet that has been entered into between China and India. If that autonomy—that is, real autonomy freely felt as such by the Tibetans and not just anything so called by the Chinese Central

Government—is denied or destroyed, then that background is gone. The result will be that though for the time being India may not be able to stop it, or our Government may fail to find any way of helping the Tibetans practically or the formal aspects of the Sino-Indian treaty over Tibet may remain intact, yet underneath the surface Sino-Indian relations will not only have undergone a profound change but will acquire a somewhat dangerous instability not only because of India's ineradicable sense of a special friendliness towards the Tibetans on account of age-long cultural and religious kinship but also because of her feeling of a practical interest in the autonomy of Tibet on other grounds. The point is that Sino-Indian relations cannot be the same without Tibet's autonomy as with it.

Our Chinese friends should understand that India's respect for Chinese suzerainty cannot be pushed to the point of abjuring on our part all interest in the question of Tibetan autonomy. In other words this question is not to that extent an 'internal affair' of China as to be wholly taboo for Indians to take an interest in. The Chinese suggestion that any discussion in the Indian Parliament of the Tibetan situation was objectionable interference in the internal affairs of China met with a firm reply from the Prime Minister who with a touch of irony attributed the Chinese complaint to their possible ignorance about the role of Parliament in a parliamentary democracy. Had he not wanted to avoid reference to any Cold War item involving other countries the Prime Minister could point out the preposterousness of this complaint of interference in the mouths of people who, for example, have been engaged in a campaign of unprecedented ferocity to undermine the present regime in Yugoslavia. But no irony could be more devastating than the scarcely veiled disbelief with which the Prime Minister treated the official Chinese version of the events in Tibet. As regards the question of giving asylum if sought by refugees from Tibet, the formal position taken by the Prime Minister has been too tragically interpreted by a section, which is wrong. The right of action according to circumstances is reserved and there is no reason to fear that the Government will forbear to use it where due and thereby give indirect support to the repressive forces now in operation in Tibet.

Is it altogether useless to hope that the Chinese may yet consider their policy? At the turn of the century Rabindranath Tagore while welcoming the outburst of Japanese energy and its growing prestige as an Asian nation sounded a note of grave warning also, because he saw signs of future danger, for Japan as well as others, in the aggressive character of Japanese nationalism which Japan imitated from the West. Subsequent history took a few decades proving the poet's fears. Tagore, if he were alive

today, would have given a joyous welcome to the ending of the long period of Chinese suffering at the hands of foreigners because nobody had a deeper sympathy for China in her sorrows or a greater respect for the best values in her civilization than Tagore. But Tagore would have sounded a warning also, which China perhaps would as strongly resent as did Japan.

—*Hindusthan Standard*, Delhi, April 1, 1959

PERFECTION IN PUPPETRY

THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S STATEMENT ON TIBET should evoke more pity and anxiety than anger. For the poor devils must have been under a terrific pressure from somewhere in order to be brought to the point of issuing such a statement of which, let us assume for humanity's sake and in the name of commonsense, most of them must be feeling ashamed and for whose effects on the party's future itself many are sure to be fearful. The issue raised by the statement is that of the right to differ—but with a difference. There is no question that in a free society individuals and parties, so long as they do not resort, or do not prepare to resort, to force, have the right to differ from majority opinion or the opinion held by Authority and to propagate their views. Even in times of war this right should not be suppressed. During the Boer War many in England not only criticised the Government's war policy but there were people who sympathised with the enemy—the Boers—openly and with impunity. So there is no question of the Communist Party's right to hold any view—even an inhuman view, so long as there is no scope for actual participation in inhumanities—on any internal or external affair. Individuals and parties have the right to support causes anywhere in the world and on any particular issues to hold that some foreign government or governments are more right than their own governments, provided the choice is free and not dictated from outside. But the question becomes an awfully serious one when a party legally functioning is seen by its conduct not to have the right to differ from Authority based on a foreign land. For that is precisely the impression derivable from the matter and manner of the C.P.I.'s statement.

Except making some vague noises, the C.P.I. showed it had no idea how to face the news from Tibet until the Chinese announcements provided not only the cue but the whole copy, as it

were, of what to say. Most of the Communist members stayed away from the Lok Sabha when Shri Nehru made for the first time a special statement on the situation in Tibet on 23 March. It will not be unfair to infer that most of the Communist members stayed away because the Chinese Government not having broken its silence yet, they did not know how they should react. When Peking spoke, a week after the first pathetic whiff of news release our External Affairs Ministry permitted itself to make on the Lhasa situation, the C.P.I. knew what to echo. Its statement is not even a colourable paraphrase but is actually a mere stringing together of the very phrases used by the Chinese authorities, whose every point is repeated mechanically without any sign of a mind having been applied in re-presenting, let alone weighing it. The Tibetan situation is painted faithfully in the same colours used by Peking. Not a shade differs. The same charges and innuendoes including those against this country are copied as on a photographic plate.

But of course some of the copying has to be sustained by blatant falsification. For instance, in their first statement the Chinese made a point of emphasising the sentence, "We have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China with whom we have friendly relations" in Shri Nehru's statement of 23 March in the Lok Sabha and giving it the widest possible play. The C.P.I., toeing this line, says in its statement, "Everybody in this country will be glad to find that the Government and Mr. Nehru have taken a proper attitude on this question and refused to oblige the reactionaries," which sounds as asinine rigmarole after what the Prime Minister said in the Lok Sabha on 30 March—unless the C.P.I. welcomes the Prime Minister's expression of sympathy for the Tibetans and not for their Chinese 'liberators'; his recollection of a conversation with the Chinese Premier to imply that the Chinese were pledged to maintain Tibetan autonomy and that this pledge was broken; his scarcely veiled disbelief towards the Chinese version and interpretation of the happenings in Tibet; his firm rejection of the impertinent suggestion that the Tibetan situation being an internal matter of China it would be improper for the Indian Parliament to discuss it; and his repudiation of the charge that any part of Indian soil was allowed by the Government for improper activities. Apart from executing orders, the C.P.I.'s pretence of being closer to Shri Nehru's attitude on Tibet than others is perhaps a deliberate piece of trickery to mislead unwary people, if possible. But the question is not so much whether a party may oppose the government's policy or go against the general feeling in the country or try deliberately to mislead the public—all these have to be tolerated in a free society—but whether the same principle can apply to a party which while claiming the maximum rights against the government and public

in its own country is seen to have no right to differ from some Authority located in a foreign country. The point in the final analysis has perhaps to be argued not with the puppets but with those who hold the strings, whether in Moscow, Peking or Washington.

—*The Hindusthan Standard*, Delhi, April 2, 1959

SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

POLITICAL COMMENTATORS HAVE TO TAKE NOTE OF the new swings in Sino-Indian relations in the context of recent development in Tibet. Mr. Nehru made the statement in Lok Sabha that India wanted to have friendly relations with the people of Tibet. She desired that Tibetans should progress in freedom. Mr. Chou En-lai told Nehru that Tibet was an autonomous unit of China and that Tibet was not "Chinese". This emphasis on Tibetan autonomy by Mr. Chou En-lai impressed Mr. Nehru greatly. But the latest decision of Chou En-lai to impose new democratic reforms on Tibet shows that the old accent on Tibetan autonomy is not there. We remember the classic statement of a cynic who said : "Consistency means persistency in error." Mr. Chou En-lai seems to be under the spell of the said cynic. The People's Daily of Peking has come out with the slogan that the policy of democratic reforms in Tibet could not wait further.

Mr. Nehru also told Lok Sabha that India was anxious for continuing friendly relations with China. But Communist China could hardly appreciate the democratic technique of India. The Indian Parliament is free to discuss matters in its own unfettered way. It does not accept any dictation from any country. The suggestion, made in the official Chinese Communiqué about the impropriety of the discussion of the Tibetan situation in the Indian Parliament, is pointedly disliked by Mr. Nehru. Mr. Nehru significantly pointed out that "the methods of Government and the way legislatures and organisations function in China are different from ours." Communist China does not fully realise "the way of our functioning." In China, the Government decisions are not criticised. And the Chinese naturally do not like the language of criticism.

Here in India, Parliament is free to discuss any matter with the approval of the Speaker. Mr. Nehru affirmed the right of

Parliament to discuss the Tibetan situation. And Parliament can express its opinion freely. He also stressed the exclusive right of the Government of India to give asylum to Tibetan refugees. Under international law, a State can admit or refuse a foreigner into its territory. It is a matter "entirely in the discretion of the Government concerned." And Mr. Nehru informed Lok Sabha that "our sympathies go very much to the Tibetans." On the policy of the Government of India, Mr. Nehru observed as follows: "India had always made it clear to people who came across the border from Tibet that while they were welcome to come to India, the Government of India would not like Indian soil to be used for subversive activities or aggressive propaganda activities against a friendly country. That had been the policy in regard to every foreigner who came here."

Mr. Nehru underlined the fact that the Dalai Lama was venerated in India. The Dalai Lama's letters to the Chinese Political Commissar of the Tibet Military Area Command, during the earlier stages of the Lhasa uprising, appeared "surprising" to Mr. Nehru. In those letters, which are not taken to be genuine, the Dalai Lama complained that he was an unwilling prisoner of the rebels. Mr. Nehru accepted that India's deep reactions to the armed intervention of Peking in Tibet were only natural. He did not, however, like to hurt China, but he expressed concern for the assaults on Tibetan autonomy. He refused to be dictated on the basic approach of India to the Tibetan issue and to the people of Tibet.

Mr. Nehru did not accept the Chinese version that the fighting in Lhasa was started by "rebels." The trouble in the Khampa region had nothing to do with the "conflict of minds" in Tibet. On the question of fighting in Lhasa, Mr. Nehru cryptically stated: "I cannot say who began". He regretted that considerable damage had been done to some of the old monasteries in Lhasa. He told Lok Sabha that the Consul-General of India in Lhasa was not in a position to report what was happening all over Tibet. It is said that a large area in Tibet (between Lhodzang in north-east Tibet and Nangkarna in South-West Tibet) is still under the control of "rebels". According to Mr. Lukhangwa, a former Prime Minister of Tibet, who is now in New Delhi, the complete independence of Tibet was declared on March 12.

The Panchen Lama who is the present Head of the Tibetan local government has given his full support to the measures, taken by the Peking Government. India will not interfere in Tibetan affairs. But students of history will look upon the national uprising of March 10 in Lhasa as the symbol of Tibetan resistance

to Peking's political and cultural conquest. Mr. Nehru made it clear that India would deeply regret the withering away of Tibetan autonomy and of the authority of the Dalai Lama. To quote Mr. Nehru's words, "India's kinship with Tibet was something deeper than the changing political scene." Thus, a critical approach to China has emerged in India's public thinking. China's mighty strength may crush the resistance of Tibetan people. But can India remain morally indifferent when the institution of the Dalai Lama and the cultural foundations of Tibet are in the process of extinction?

—*The Indian Nation*, April 2, 1959

KALIMPONG

THE RESTRAINT WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAD INDUCED the House of the People to cultivate in discussing Tibet was regrettably not observed on Wednesday in his absence. It was not for the first time that the character of Kalimpong as a border town came up for discussion, but the Communists, probably unwittingly, had supplied provocation to non-Communist members. Obviously there was not sufficient material to damn the Communists as anti-national. The pattern of their attitudes is well known and it will be conceded that they could express sympathy with China without being anti-Indian. Kalimpong may have been a centre of spying and counter-spying and of newspaper sensationalism, and the Prime Minister has referred to this aspect, but what the Government have been concerned with is to repudiate the Chinese allegation that Kalimpong has been the command centre of the present rebellion. If it were a fact, it would mean that the Government have failed in their duty, and the Government have stated categorically after full investigation that Kalimpong has not been a command centre of rebellion. There was no need for further investigation, and the Communists probably would not have asked for investigation if they had known that it would be an unnecessary repetition. The Communists could also claim that they did not make an allegation on the lines of the Chinese allegation but were merely referring to it. The secretariat of the National Council of the Communist Party of India said:

"The People's Government of China, with full sense of responsibility, has drawn our attention to Kalimpong, which, according to it, has become the command centre of rebels. We all know that

many shady happenings are taking place at Kalimpong and that a lot of doubtful foreigners are visiting the place. In the interest of both countries as well as the inviolability of our national soil, our Government should immediately investigate the affairs in Kalimpong and place the truth before the people.'

The Communists are known for their set attitudes, just as others are known for their set pro-American attitudes. As long as both sections do not go beyond certain limits, it is a part of the high-minded policies of this country to allow freedom of view subject to the needs of national security. In referring to the Chinese allegation and suggesting investigation when there was no need for any, the Communist statement does not seem to justify Acharya Kripalani's large assumptions. The marked features of India's foreign policy are that it expresses the interests and views of the overwhelming majority of the people and that on crucial occasions it has found conformity even from Communists and anti-Communists.

The circulation by the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi of an article in the People's Daily of Peking was also the subject-matter of animated discussion. Foreign missions must follow diplomatic etiquette and where they err they should be politely told about it. The People's Daily article is reported to have repeated allegations about Kalimpong, though, as pointed out by the Prime Minister, in a modified form. It is difficult to believe that the Chinese Embassy intended any insult to India or cast any reflection on the Prime Minister's integrity in making his statement on Kalimpong. The Chinese Embassy may have committed an impropriety not amounting to a breach of diplomatic privilege, as stated by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, but it is good for clear understanding of the issues involved to remember the structure of the press in Communist countries. The Tass is a branch of the Soviet Embassy and entitled to certain privileges and Pravda is the organ of the Soviet Communist Party which runs the Government. The New China News Agency and the People's Daily of Peking have probably a similar position with regard to the Chinese Government. In such cases, it might be difficult for Governments and embassies to make a distinction between Government statements and newspaper articles and despatches, and judgement on an embassy's conduct has to be tempered with understanding. The events in Tibet will have their repercussions, and they might be trying at times, but if Sino-Indian relations can with proper restraint survive the test, any lapse from restraint in any quarter will seem deplorable.

UNFORTUNATE INDEED !

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA ISSUED A STATEMENT on the Tibetan situation on March 31. The statement, as published in the Press, shows that it is hostile to and critical of the basic approach of India to the Tibetan issue. India's basic approach was explained by Mr. Nehru in Lok Sabha. First, India has sympathies with the people of Tibet, but she will not interfere in the internal affairs of China. Secondly, the Chinese allegation that Kalimpong is the centre of Tibetan unrest is unwarranted, and it was strongly repudiated by Mr. Nehru. Thirdly, the differences should be settled peacefully. The C.P.I. did not subscribe to the basic approach, explained by Mr. Nehru.

The C.P.I. echoed the Chinese version that the Tibetan uprising had the sympathy and support of Chiang Kai-shek and the American imperialists. It expressed the satisfaction that China had successfully scotched the imperialist plot in Tibet. It repeated the Peking declaration that the Tibetan rebellion was reactionary. All this was not in line with Mr. Nehru's basic approach. The C.P.I. referred to the Chinese allegation that Kalimpong had become the "command centre of the rebels." It went further and stated: "We all know that many shady happenings are taking place at Kalimpong". This positive statement was made after the repudiation of Chinese allegation by Mr. Nehru. The Communist Party's statement made it clear that Indian Communists had not accepted Mr. Nehru's strong repudiation as the last word. The Communist Party asked the Government of India to investigate the allegations, made by the Chinese Government. In sober analysis, the Communist Party showed greater faith in Peking than in New Delhi. Mrs. Lakshmi Menon told Lok Sabha that Mr. Nehru had repudiated the Chinese allegation after full enquiry.

A closer scrutiny will reveal that the said statement was politically improper and offensive. It described the Praja Socialist Party as an agent of America, perhaps because Praja Socialist members were critical of Peking's assaults on Tibetans autonomy. But they shower abuses on those who try to link the C.P.I. with the Communist bloc because of its acceptance of the Chinese thesis on Tibetan issues. Those who will closely read the statement of the C.P.I. will have to conclude that the C.P.I. lives within the inverted commas of the Communist Party of China. The C.P.I. may send its greetings to the Communist Party of China for proper guidance to the Government of China on the crushing of Tibetan rebellion. But it is unusual when it charges the P.S.P. with bringing "grist to the mill of American imperialism." And

much more unusual is the Communist Party's policy on the Tibetan tangle which is not in accord with the accepted policy of India. Is it not painfully strange that the C.P.I. enthusiastically accepted the Chinese version of the Tibetan rebellion, but it refused to accept Mr. Nehru's "repudiation" and Mr. Nehru's concern for the Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet?

Acharya Kripalani was shocked that the Communist Party had obtained information via Peking. His analysis of the Communist Party's statement on Tibetan situation angered Communist members. The Union Home Minister, Pt. Pant, deplored the statement of the C.P.I. Mr. Nehru's repudiation should have been accepted. Any insinuation that Mr. Nehru has violated Panch Sheela principles should have drawn forth a strong protest from the C.P.I. But all these did not happen. The C.P.I. did not show respect for Mr. Nehru's version and approach. But it gave the utmost importance to the Chinese version. Both the Home Minister and the P.S.P. leader (Acharya Kripalani) were sore, because a solemn statement made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, was "in any way disputed by a section of our people in the country". Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, referring to the editorial of the People's Daily of Peking, significantly observed: "The Prime Minister's integrity and honesty have been challenged, and I take very strong exception to it". Why was it that Mr. Nehru's appraisal of and approach to the Tibetan situation were brushed aside by the Communist Party of India? Acharya Kripalani wanted to know the inner working of the mind of the C.P.I. He found that Indian Communists could "show only one patriotism, and that is for the Communist bloc". The anti-Indian bias and the pro-Chinese sentiments in the Communist Party's resolution on the Tibetan situation are undoubtedly disturbing trends in Indian politics.

—*The Indian Nation*, April 3, 1959

THE FUGITIVE

JOY THAT THE DALAI LAMA HAS REACHED INDIA is mingled with apprehension about the effect of his request for political asylum. Rumours that he has crossed the border had been current for some days, but the first, surprisingly detailed, confirmation seems to have come from China and, though Mr. Nehru has now revealed that the External Affairs Ministry had

been receiving "a number of messages . . . through a rather devious route" since Wednesday, it looks as if the Chinese were equally well informed. It may be supposed that the pretence that he was under duress has been abandoned. Tass, the Russian news agency, describes the Dalai Lama as "the fugitive" and that no doubt reflects the revised Communist attitude.

Will the Chinese attempt to get him back? There is no extradition treaty between India and China and even if a treaty existed it would probably not have been applicable to one who occupies so notable a position and, suzerainty notwithstanding, can hardly be regarded as a Chinese subject. Other measures might be resorted to if the Chinese were anxious to secure him. But it seems at least possible that, being so well aware of his movements, they could have intercepted him if they wished, however elusive so small a party as his might have proved. From this we may draw the conclusion (though at this stage very tentatively) that the Chinese were less interested in capturing him than has been supposed. Perhaps they had given up hope of bending him to their will and preferred a more compliant instrument. A Dalai Lama in honourable exile may cause them a little disquiet, but less real trouble than a "difficult" Incarnation at the seat of his authority. The 13th Dalai Lama took refuge, first from the British, when he went to Mongolia: then from the Chinese, when came to India in 1910: events in China, not in Tibet primarily, were responsible for his return two years later.

Whether this assessment of the Chinese attitude is accurate or not, there is no doubt that India has done what is correct and also what is right—the diplomatic overtones of the first epithet sometimes conceal moral wrongs. Checkpoints had been told to look out for the Dalai Lama and he is being received "respectfully". There has been some natural murmuring about India's inaction among warmhearted people here. But, abroad, such complaints come very ill from people who did nothing to save Hungary. To receive refugees who agree not to use this country as a basis of political activity against China; to advise the Chinese, if receptive; to use moderation now that they have overthrown the main opposition in Tibet: this is all that India can be expected to do. Here is the embarrassing position, familiar to individuals, in which heart and brain are at variance. A compromise has been reached between these conflicting councillors. Mr. Nehru and his advisers could scarcely have done better. We can only hope that China appreciates that friendliness does not rule out compassion.

WELCOME

THE PRIME MINISTER'S ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE Dalai Lama has crossed the Indo-Tibetan frontier and is now in India with his party of eight will be welcomed not only in our country but elsewhere in Asia where millions of Buddhists reside. As the spiritual and temporal head of Tibet His Holiness occupies a unique position. It is hardly likely as Peking has attempted to suggest, that the Dalai Lama has been "abducted" by the rebels, and is here very much against his will. Nobody can believe that. It is to be hoped and expected that the Government of India having extended asylum to the Dalai Lama will respect the normal rules of international hospitality and allow His Holiness to stay on Indian soil, whatever Peking might choose to say.

Tibetan autonomy has been recognised and respected for at least two hundred years since 1720 when Kang Hsi's army entered Lhasa and Chinese suzerainty was accepted along with Tibetan autonomy. Over the years the Chinese have attempted to absorb Tibet so far unsuccessfully. In 1894 the Chinese Commissioner in Lhasa was expelled by the Tibetans and though in 1910 the Chinese brought in an army they were able to maintain military rule for barely two years. Tibet's equivocal position derived in pre-Bolshevik days largely from the rivalry between Tsarist Russia and Britain. The Kuomintang, before the Communists, insisted that Tibet was part of China, and when India became independent it inherited this troubled legacy.

In 1950, within a year of the Communists' coming to power in China, Peking demanded the "peaceful accession" of Tibet, backing up this demand by stationing an army not far from Chamdo in eastern Tibet. Even then the Tibetans sought to counter Peking's threats by sending an overseas mission to solicit support. In October 1950 the Chinese invaded Tibet at a time when the Korean war occupied the attention of the United Nations but nonetheless the Dalai Lama enjoyed sufficient local prestige and authority to compel the Chinese to sign an agreement in May 1951 under which Tibet returned to Chinese authority but with its autonomy recognised "with no change in the religious structure or the position and authority of the Dalai Lama." The fact that His Holiness has now been driven to take refuge in India is illuminating and instructive. Peking has bared its fangs. Lhasa might be cowed into surrender. But New Delhi will not be scared.

—*The Indian Express*, New Delhi, April 4, 1959

EVERY PATRIOTIC INDIAN MUST HAVE READ WITH PAIN the statement of the National Council of the Indian Communist party on the Tibetan situation. The Council sent its greetings to the People's Government of China which 'is leading the people of Tibet from medieval darkness to prosperity and equality.' This statement will hurt the people of Tibet. The Bandung Conference to which the People's Government of China was a party declared that 'colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be brought to an end.' The People's Government of China is pursuing in Tibet a colonialist policy. The fact that a section of opinion in India congratulates China on her colonialist policy will bring disgrace upon India. Regarding the argument that China is leading Tibet from medieval darkness to prosperity, this is how all colonial powers defended colonialism. France says that Algeria owes her progress to French rule. The Japanese argued that Manchoukuo benefited greatly by Japanese rule. Banditry came to an end. Trade and industry increased. But Indian Communists did not send to Japan a message congratulating the Japanese Government on their achievements in Manchoukuo nor have they sent greetings to Gen. Charles de Gaulle on his Government's announcement that they were determined to stay in Algeria. Why they have singled out Tibet for special treatment the Council of the Indian Communist party did not care to explain.

The Council ascribed the 'reactionary rebellion' in Tibet to 'Western imperialist intrigue.' They said, 'India herself suffers from imperialist intrigues against her safety in Goa, Kashmir and the Pakistan border. The same kind of intrigue was organised in Tibet'. There is no comparison between the situation in Tibet and the situation in Kashmir, or Goa or the Pakistan border. In Kashmir and the Pakistan border Pakistan has been guilty of aggression and in Goa the Portuguese are pursuing a policy of colonialism. But in Tibet, the aggrieved party is not China but the Tibetans. China imposed on Tibet in 1951 by force of arms a treaty which is not acceptable to the Tibetans. The rebellion is Tibet's reaction to Chinese colonialism. Assuming that there is Western imperialist intrigue, by pursuing a colonialist policy the Chinese Government are playing into the hands of the Western powers.

The most painful feature of the Communist party's statement is its vilification of India. The Council stated, 'The People's Government of China has drawn our attention to Kalimpong which according to it has become the command centre of the rebels....

Our Government should immediately investigate the affairs in Kalimpong and place the truth before the people.' The Communist party issued this statement on Tuesday. In a statement in Parliament on Monday, the Prime Minister had repudiated the Chinese suggestion that Kalimpong was the centre of rebel activity. The fact that the Communist party repeated the Chinese allegations and ignored the Prime Minister's repudiation implies that the Prime Minister was not speaking the truth when he refuted the Chinese allegations. Why do the Indian Communist party disbelieve their own Prime Minister and put faith in the rulers of China? The conclusion is irresistible that the Communist party still adhere to their policy of extra-territorial patriotism. We say 'still' because there is a section of public men in India who think that last year at its extraordinary session at Amritsar the Communist Congress abandoned its extra-territorial patriotism. We see no signs of improvement. The Communist party are behaving today exactly as they did before the Amritsar party Congress. For instance, last year the Indian Communist party sent a message of goodwill to Yugoslavia. Later when they learnt that Soviet Russia did not approve of what was happening in Yugoslavia they changed their first message and expressed disagreement with Yugoslavians. It is the Communist party's subservience to Peking and Moscow which is responsible for the vile allegations they shamelessly made against their own country in their statement on Tibet.

—*The Leader*, April 4, 1959

TIBET IN PARLIAMENT

WHATEVER PEKING MAY THINK OF IT, IT WAS natural that Parliament should have recorded its anxiety and anguish at the recent developments in Tibet. As the Prime Minister rightly emphasized, India's concern with Tibet was "deeper than the changing political situation... India's contacts with Tibet are very old geographically, culturally and from the point of view of trade, much more so culturally and religiously." If Peking was in doubt about India's deep reaction it should after this have a clear understanding. Moreover as a sovereign body in charge of destiny of this country, Parliament would yield to none in the exercise of its inherent right to discuss and to decide upon any question affecting India's interest.

Both those who sought to draw out Mr. Nehru on India's policy towards Tibet, and the Prime Minister, showed less than political

perspicacity when they went in a kind of circle of doubt and affirmation. India obviously has a definite policy in the matter. The policy was laid down and accepted in the circumstances of 1951 when China displayed its aggressive assertiveness in regard to Tibet and this country showed an unprecedented accommodation. The question that cried for attention and discussion was therefore not whether or not India had a Tibetan policy but how good indeed that policy was, particularly in the light of the present revolt and its brutal suppression by the Chinese. It is understandable that Mr. Nehru should be so keen to emphasize what he regards the virtues of his Tibetan policy. He would not admit that his Government's original sin was the letting down of our primordial and peaceful neighbour in 1950. Figleaf excuses have not been unknown to mankind since the Fall of Man. What is really incomprehensible is why Parliament should have denied to itself an opportunity to question the very basis of India's present Tibet policy.

Mr. Nehru was at pains to explain indirectly why India signed the 1951 agreement with China. He said in effect that India could not go on clinging to the "imperialist" advantages that accrued to her from the famous expedition of Col. Younghusband on behalf of the then British Government. This was an unconscious diversion. Nobody in this country would like to be associated even indirectly with an "imperialist" adventure in the sense of subduing and exploiting a foreign country. Nor is it necessary to ask whether it is wise to renounce all the advantages that India has found herself in possession of as incidental blessings of British imperialism. Moreover if India was really having a bout of anti-imperialist virtue in 1950, the obvious and more honourable course for the Government would have been to transfer whatever advantages this country enjoyed in Tibet as a result of Col. Younghusband's expedition to the people of Tibet themselves. To hand over allegedly imperialist "gains" to a new imperialism was neither sensible nor edifying.

There has been so much talk and confusion about China's 'suzerainty' and "sovereignty" over Tibet (the two terms being indiscriminately mixed up) that an elementary truth has often been forgotten. The Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama, the God King, themselves are proof that Tibet never was nor could it ever be a part of China as the province of Chekiang, or Honan or Yunnan is for instance. Whoever has ever heard of two sovereigns in a single State? Mr. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, whom Mr. Nehru has very appositely quoted, himself admitted two and a half years ago when he was here that "Tibet was not Chinese" though it had always been a part of the

Chinese State. In any case, it was entitled to "full autonomy", in Mr. Chou's words as quoted by Mr. Nehru. And India comes in to the picture by virtue of her being the only other party to the agreement which made it formally a "region" of China.

Against this background, any question as to whether a refugee from Tibet should or should not be given asylum on Indian territory becomes morally irrelevant. This country is in honour bound, with or without the sanction of international law, to open her doors to all those who might fear political victimization in Tibet. To be sure, such things are better done than said. The example of Austria in relation to Hungary, which Mr. M. R. Masani recalled in his well argued plea for unrestricted asylum to Tibetan refugees, ought to have reminded our Parliament that a good deed could be done without much noise and discussion. Now that the Prime Minister has taken up a rather ambiguous attitude, it remains doubtful if the Government of India would be equal to the need. Nobody in his senses should imagine that the Chinese overlords would oblige an intending refugee with travel documents and authorization papers acceptable to our border check-posts now proposed to be indefinitely strengthened. The practice of the Government of India has not hitherto been very encouraging. The rebellion in Tibet has been going on for three years. It is hardly likely that there would have been no refugees in this period. If no influx has so far been registered, the prime fault perhaps lies with New Delhi's sanctimonious insistence on "papers". It would be much more logical to ask a victim of a shipwreck for his ticket than to expect a refugee from a Communist regime to be armed with authorization papers. New Delhi's vital interest in the future of Tibet and anxiety to remain on the right side of China, "the great country", could not have been yoked more ridiculously.

—Thought, April 4, 1959.

DALAI LAMA IN INDIA

HOWEVER DISTRESSING ITS CONTEXT, THE NEWS OF the Dalai Lama's safe entry into Indian territory is sure to send a thrill of thankful joy in countless hearts up and down this country. Not that the overall anxiety of the Tibetan dilemma is brought any nearer to an end by this. On the contrary, the situation perhaps is actually going to become somewhat worse or at least more complicated, that is, from the point of view of

our diplomatists' peace of mind. But in this matter the feelings not only of the people but—let this be clearly noted—also of our Government have been guided by a preference of something deeper as well as higher than our diplomatists' peace of mind. The national mind, knowing that there would arise new complications and maybe also risks, was nevertheless clear that it wanted the Dalai Lama to escape his pursuers into safety in India. Few things in recent years have convulsed the public mind in India so deeply as the past few days' hopes and fears about the fate of the Dalai Lama. When the Prime Minister repeatedly hoped for the Dalai Lama's safety he certainly did not think of his safety in Chinese hands though obviously he could not openly say that in the situation that had arisen the Dalai Lama's safety lay just outside those hands, and much less he could suggest that the Dalai Lama should try to take refuge in India. But from the terms in which the Dalai Lama was referred to in Shri Nehru's statements there could hardly be any doubt that if the former could reach the Indian border without mishap he would be given honoured asylum here. That the Dalai Lama and his entourage could make this journey from Lhasa to a point on the Indian border in the NEFA area eluding their pursuers, is a near-miracle whose account when told should prove to be one of the most wonderful escape stories of all time. But the authentic story is not likely to be broadcast for some time though the public can look forward to be treated to many a marvellous tale by enterprising publicists.

What is of immediate importance is not how the Dalai Lama made good his escape but what are likely to be the consequences of his having taken refuge in India. That the Dalai Lama will make any statement regarding his own position immediately is not probable nor the Government of India is likely to appreciate a precipitate statement by the Dalai Lama or itself make a statement of the precise conditions of the asylum given before something about the Chinese reaction is known. At the time of writing there is no public knowledge of that reaction though the Chinese seem to have got information of the Dalai Lama's entry into India at the same time as our Government and which is more interesting—from our side of the border. Be that as it may, our Chinese friends we hope have by this time been able to take the measure of the state of Indian feeling on the Tibetan question and will not rely too much on the capacity of the Indian Communist Party to counter that feeling. The resentment in India will be all the greater if any attempt is made to create confusion by treating Indian feeling over Tibet as if it were a Cold War issue. It may have some such connotation for those Powers which are engaged in the Cold War.

But India's attitude is wholly different. India has no interest at all in any kind of denigration of China whose present great revival is regarded by Indians with the friendliest admiration, but at the same time India has an unsunderable interest, moral as well as practical, in Tibet's freedom—call it autonomy or by any other name, so long as the substance is not destroyed. It is in the context of such a climate of opinion that the future position of the Dalai Lama as a political refugee has to be visualised, a crucial factor of the situation being that though the Dalai Lama can be physically restricted, he cannot, by definition, be divested altogether of his status and turned into just a private individual. We are sure the Chinese Government can foresee some of the consequences that are likely to flow from this position which the Government of India with all its anxiety to please China cannot altogether prevent. Even now a solution should be possible and a most embarrassing and even dangerous situation for both the countries can be avoided if China showed some spirit of compromise and not insist on unilaterally deciding the fate of the Tibetans.

—*Hindusthan Standard*, Delhi, April 4, 1959.

ARRIVAL OF DALAI LAMA

REPORTS FROM NEW DELHI SHOW THAT THE PRIME Minister's announcement in the House of the People that the Dalai Lama had arrived in India to seek political asylum was greeted by M.P.'s with thunderous applause. We certainly feel relieved that his Holiness has accomplished his arduous journey and that he is safe. But the arrival in this country of a head of state in the capacity of a refugee should not be an occasion for jubilation.

There is another circumstance which deserves attention. Though India's relations with China are friendly, the arrival in India of the Dalai Lama is likely to be regarded by the rulers of China as a rebuff to them. The Dalai Lama wields enormous influence in Tibet. He is not only the sovereign of Tibet. He is also regarded as the earthly Bodhisattava who has attained the right to nirvana and who will be reborn for the spiritual benefit of his fellow-creatures. If the Chinese Government had succeeded in seizing the Dalai Lama, they would have used his presence in their camp to rally popular support to the Chinese regime. Chinese propagandists would have told the world that

the Dalai Lama thoroughly disapproved of the rebellion and that it was bandits who were responsible for the disturbances. In fact an official Chinese news agency did release letters purporting to have been written by the Dalai Lama to the Chinese political commissar which contained such statements. One of the letters said, 'The unlawful actions of the reactionary elements break my heart.' In another letter, he was alleged to have said, 'A few days from now I shall make my way to the military command secretly'. The fact that the Dalai Lama has instead come to India proves that the Chinese propaganda was based on lies. Naturally the arrival of the Dalai Lama must have upset the Chinese Government. There is nothing more dangerous than a government whose plans for colonial expansion have gone awry. Reports of jubilation at New Delhi will further infuriate Chinese policy-makers. The Tibetan question should be discussed in a calm atmosphere. It is the duty of India and other peaceful nations to bring about such an atmosphere.

The people of Asia have great faith in the efficacy of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful negotiation. Principle 8 of the Bandung declaration bears testimony to this fact. The Government of India have done well to inform the Chinese Government of the arrival of the Dalai Lama. This intimation implies that the Government of India recognise the suzerainty of China over Tibet in accordance with the Chinese-Tibetan treaty of 1951. At the same time it is no use ignoring the fact that no treaty relating to Tibet can work which is not acceptable to the Tibetans. The 1951 treaty is not acceptable to the Tibetans because it is unfair to them. It was imposed upon them by force of arms against their wishes. The treaty needs to be revised in accordance with Tibetan wishes and interests. It will be a mistake to ask the United Nations to intervene in Tibet. The United Nations has been unfair to China. She can therefore have no confidence in it. If instead the Government of India invite Mr. Chou En-lai to New Delhi and if he and the Dalai Lama meet around a table the settlement of the Tibetan question will be greatly facilitated.

—*The Leader*, April 5, 1959

TIBET AND DOUBLE-THINK

WITH THE ARRIVAL OF THE DALAI LAMA IN INDIA, this country's real involvement in the Tibetan affair begins. It

has been asked how Peking received the news much earlier than Delhi. Actually, it may only be that Peking published the news earlier than Delhi deemed it fit to release it. Mr. Nehru's statement a few days ago that grant of asylum to Tibetan refugees was discretionary had lent itself to more than one interpretation. Many wondered whether it was not a timely hint to the Dalai Lama to do anything but come here. Now that he has been officially received and assured of "respectful treatment," both sorrow and anger at Mr. Nehru's ambiguity should be partially abated. Simultaneously, Peking may also disabuse itself of any notion that it can browbeat India into shutting up her mouth or tying up her hands. That in the legal and historical context of the conflict India cannot physically intervene in Tibet is not a "fig leaf" excuse as has been suggested in some well-meaning but impetuous quarters. India did well in saying—as she did in 1951 before signing the 1951 agreement with China—that she did not wish to cling to the "imperialist" advantages that accrued to her from the Younghusband expedition organised by the British Government. The principal error of judgment made at the time was in handing these "advantages" to China, a third power, instead of to Tibet itself. And this in spite of Mr. Chou En-lai's verbal admission to Mr. Nehru at the time that "Tibet was not Chinese".

Historical chickens sooner or later come home to roost. Even though Tibet is not Chinese territory, it is now being 'Hanonised' with a vengeance. The Sino-Indian agreement stemmed from the Sino-Tibetan agreement which guaranteed the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy. That treaty has now been abrogated and by implication the Sino-Indian treaty must also be written off. The assumption was mutual that Chinese policy towards Tibet no less than Indian policy towards Tibet should be contained within the framework of Sino-Indian relations. Mr. Nehru had then rightly pointed out that "what mattered most to the peace of Asia and the world was how India and China behaved towards each other and on the degree of co-operation which they could show in mutual relations". This is the acid test. The behaviour of a country is usually of one piece. If China can commit brutal aggression on Tibet, it would be hard to reconcile it with her professions of non-aggression towards India. Considering that Tibet as such is not a valuable economic prize to be won by conquest, it must be frankly recognised that China's chief interest in holding Tibet is because of its 1,200-mile access to India. Already, by cartographical aggression to which Russian map-makers have been a major party, 30,000 miles of Indian territory (nearly the whole of the North-East Frontier Agency and Ladakh) have been shown as Chinese

territory. The charge that Kalimpong was and is being used as the "commanding centre of the rebellion in Tibet" is aggression of the verbal and psychological species.

The Communist Party of India has dutifully echoed the Peking line and Acharya Kripalani's comments thereon nearly touched off an explosion in Parliament. Any party, including the Communist Party, has surely a right to differ from the Prime Minister. To suggest that he may be mistaken is not to question his integrity and we wish that the Deputy Minister for External Affairs had not mentioned it. Besides, as has been well said, at the time of the Boer war there were many in England who openly sympathised with the Boers without incurring the penalty of traitors. The right to differ from the Prime Minister or the Government of India is a democratic right. It must not be denied even to Communists. But the question is whether the C.P.I. has the same right to differ from Moscow or Peking? The impression that it does not have the right is what is fateful because Moscow and Peking are in foreign lands. The C.P.I. predicament is nothing new. But whether the Communists are more to be suspected than some other "democrats" is also a delicate issue which has arisen. The Communists are berated for not literally accepting the veracity of Mr. Nehru's statement on Kalimpong. The "democrats," on the other hand, are able to get away with it when they entertain and air serious doubts about Mr. Nehru's assessment of the mysterious Dalai Lama letters. These "democrats" still expect their half-witted countrymen to believe that the Dalai Lama was fleeing from reactionaries in Tibet—as if the entire military might of China could not have protected him but India could!

—*The Pioneer*, April 5, 1959

THE DALAI LAMA

MR. NEHRU ANNOUNCED IN LOK SABHA ON APRIL 3 that the Dalai Lama had crossed into the Indian territory on March 31. The Dalai Lama and his party are expected to reach Tawang on April 5. The Dalai Lama reached the border check-post, Chutangmu in N.E.F.A. area and asked for political asylum. He was accorded asylum in India. Mr. Nehru told Lok Sabha amidst cheers: "He will receive respectful treatment."

It was surprising that the news of the crossing of the Dalai Lama into the Indian territory was first broken by Peking. On

April 2, Peking Radio, quoting the New China News Agency, stated that the Dalai Lama had taken refuge in India. Details of the escape of the Dalai Lama from Lhasa are not yet available. But he had to trek through dangerous terrain and cross the Brahmaputra. The Dalai Lama is aged only 23, but he is wise. He is respected by Buddhists all over the world. He is not hurt on the way. And the Government of India are taking precautions that he is not unnecessarily harassed.

Peking is unhappy. The Panchen Lama in his first speech as the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region expressed concern for the Dalai Lama and wished for the "liberation" of the Dalai Lama from the control of rebels. And he called upon Tibetans to assist the Chinese Liberation Army in putting down Tibetan rebellion. He charged "rebels" with "abducting" the Dalai Lama, murdering and insulting monks and nuns, desecrating Buddhist sculpture and stealing ritual articles. These words were spoken by the Panchen Lama obviously at the dictation of Peking. Thus, Peking is sore, because the Dalai Lama could not be liberated from the control of "rebels".

They say that the Congress Party's view is found in Mr. U. N. Dhebar's article, entitled *The Tibetan Tragedy*, published in the latest issue of the A.I.C.C. Economic Review. Mr. Dhebar pointed out that the Chinese Government had been unable to secure the emotional allegiance of Tibetans and that "a world Power has once again failed to behave justly and fairly with its weaker neighbour". Expressing deep sympathies to the people of Tibet in their hour of trial, Mr. Dhebar observed:

"India does not wish to interfere in the matter. But it would be a failure of duty on our part as friends to hide or conceal what we feel about the situation. How to revise the decision, to restore peace in that place, to re-establish cordial relations and to generate trust is for the Chinese Government, the Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet to consider. All we wish is that the peace of a happy family should return to Tibet".

—*The Indian Nation*, April 5, 1959

INDIA, TIBET AND CHINA

IN POINTING AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON SUNDAY to the three factors that should govern our foreign policy in the crisis that has risen in Tibet, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru has spoken

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for the vast majority of thinking Indians. None of us, except the Communists who look for inspiration outside our country, would gainsay India's claim to look to her own security in a world that is still fully to accept Panch Shila. A second factor is India's traditional friendship with China. The Government now in power in Peking know very well that our Government have resisted the temptation to involve themselves in the "cold" war between power blocs and have again and again urged the need to make the United Nations a truly universal organisation by admitting China and other countries now out of it. India has also scrupulously refrained from interfering in China's domestic affairs though professing and practising a different philosophy of government. But there is yet a third and very important factor, namely, our interest in Tibet and our concern for the safety and well-being of her people. Mr. Nehru has been at great pains to point out that this interest is not merely political: it is based on very real cultural and spiritual affinities. A striking manifestation of this interest was shown almost every day in the week that has gone past by the anxiety with which Indians of almost all shades of opinion followed the reports of the Dalai Lama's movements and the relief and happiness with which they learnt that he had come safely into Indian territory and been welcomed and received with all due respect by the Indian authorities. We join our readers in the hope that His Holiness will soon recover from his recent ordeal and that he will find it possible to have an early meeting with Mr. Nehru.

We are also certain that His Holiness will fully justify our Prime Minister's confidence that he will not engage himself in any activities that would "embarrass us and him." For his part, Mr. Nehru has told us that it is not the Government's intention to put any "undesirable curbs" on a person who is so "greatly revered in India by Buddhists and others" and for whose safety the Government of India would be "one hundred per cent" responsible. Sometime must pass before any final arrangements for the Dalai Lama's sojourn in India can be made but there is no doubt that they will be in accordance with our best traditions of hospitality and succour. Mr. Nehru has incidentally exposed the hollowness of the Indian Communists' stand on the entire Tibetan issue.

As the Prime Minister has indicated, there is no reason why China should be upset by India's decision to offer an asylum to the Dalai Lama. It is not only well within India's rights but the barest act of courtesy to one who has been the acknowledged leader, spiritual and temporal, of a friendly people. On the other hand, China must now take the opportunity of being guided by opinion in friendly countries like India in finding a lasting and acceptable solution of a very delicate problem. The agreement

between Tibet and China has broken down but the twin-basis of that agreement, Tibetan autonomy and Chinese suzerainty, has not been challenged. There is no reason why a new agreement should not be built on this foundation. Mr. Nehru has again recalled the Chinese Prime Minister's assurance that China "respected and wanted to respect the autonomy of Tibet" and that the Chinese had "no desire to push Communism in Tibet." Mr. Chou En-lai had himself recognised that the Tibetans were "not Hans" like the Chinese. Surely, he must admit as a corollary that they must be allowed to grow up economically and socially in their own way. India has got her own agreement with Tibet, chiefly regulating (Hindu as well as Buddhist) pilgrimage, trade and transport. In particular, as Mr. Nehru has indicated, hundreds of Buddhists from Ladakh are now in Tibet who do not ordinarily carry travel papers or passports. With all this, however, India has no desire to play any assertive or aggressive part in this region which would inflame passions further and hinder rather than help a friendly and peaceful settlement. Her good offices are always available but it would be the best thing if the Chinese leaders were themselves to take the initiative and bring about a rapprochement with the people of Tibet and their real leaders.

—*The Hindu*, April 7, 1959

DALAI LAMA DILEMMA

THE DALAI LAMA HAS BEEN CORDIALLY RECEIVED by India: that is evident. He has been admitted into this country 'unconditionally'; about that, too, there is no question. The primary concern is to ensure his personal safety which would be "100 per cent the responsibility" of the Government of India, Prime Minister Nehru solemnly declared at a Press Conference in Delhi on Sunday. What next? To be precise, will the Dalai Lama, while in exile here, continue to function as the head of the theocratic State of Tibet? Further, while in India, will he indulge in activities designed to regain his vacated seat of supremacy at Lhasa? And, if his efforts in this direction—in action or even speech—tended to be hostile to the Government of China, what would be the attitude of the Indian Government, being on the best of terms with the Chinese Government? As was to be expected, these questions were asked in the Prime Minister's Press Conference. For the time being, at least, such questions are hypothetical. Nobody knows what is in the Dalai

Lama's mind. Probably, such things are far from his mind at the present moment. Nor was it possible for the Prime Minister Nehru to give categorical answers to all the questions until the situation actually arose. It is not yet known when a meeting between the Dalai Lama and Mr. Nehru is going to take place. The Dalai Lama will need a period of rest after an extraordinarily arduous journey even for a young man.

It would be, perhaps, more correct to presume that the Dalai Lama has no future plans—nor can he be in a position to formulate any, until he has met Prime Minister Nehru. Also, it may not be at their first meeting. Taking all these practical considerations into account, it is still evident—from the Prime Minister's replies at Sunday's Press Conference—that the questions are exercising Mr. Nehru's own mind already. Without shirking the questions (as if he were prepared for them) and speaking broadly the Prime Minister explained the position as—should we say?—one of reciprocity. The Prime Minister said that there was no intention to put any undesirable curb on the Dalai Lama's activities and, he was sure, the Dalai Lama would not take any steps which would embarrass India or himself. There cannot be any conceivable obstacles to the Dalai Lama's functioning as a spiritual head even in the secular State of India. But, the fear of religion being mixed up with politics cannot be dismissed. Not that the Dalai Lama himself is expected to do anything to give cause for alarm; but, then, there may be other interested parties, not prompted by devotion to Buddhism alone, who will try to exploit the Dalai Lama's exile in India for political purposes. A significant report has already appeared in the Press about the existence of certain hitherto-unheard-of religious followers of the Dalai Lama amongst the Chinese Buddhists in Formosa who propose to visit India to pay their homage to him. Many more complications of the kind are expected to arise. It is, therefore, wise for the Government of India to be forewarned and forearmed against all such eventualities.

Two important statements were made at his Press Conference by the Prime Minister—one concerning the security of India (which must be the primary concern of any Government of any country in the world) and the other affecting the Government's policy of keeping India out of the cold war. These are the yard-sticks by which any action of the Indian Government should be judged by friendly or hostile critics at home and abroad. If the Government of India do anything—we do not know what they are going to do—against the Dalai Lama's presence (otherwise most welcome) being exploited politically, it

would be to prevent the spread of the much-dreaded cold war of which India has yet managed, somehow, to keep out. If the Government of India do anything to prevent this country from being used as a convenient ground of anti-Chinese activities (Peking's allegations about Kalimpong were silly), it would be to prevent India's further involvement in something more than the cold war to even endanger India's security. Meanwhile, our genuine sympathies go out to the Dalai Lama who, though assured of personal safety as long as he chooses to remain in this country as an honoured guest, is in greater danger of being pulled in different directions by his political advisers and so-called religious followers. That would be a tragedy.

—*Amrita Bazar Patrika*, April 7, 1959

REDS' LOYALTY TO INDIA

EVEN MR. NEHRU, WHO INDIRECTLY SAVED THE COMMUNISTS from being condemned by the Lok Sabha on Friday, has now been compelled to say that the CPI was showing "a certain lack of balance in mind and a total absence of feeling of decency and nationalism" in the context of Tibetan events. The statement made by the Prime Minister at his monthly press conference on Saturday showed that he was gradually realising the depth of national feeling and sentiments on this issue. The communists were not satisfied with merely echoing the Chinese allegation that Kalimpong was the "commanding centre" of the rebellion. Their party organ has accused some Indian political officers on the border of collusion with anti-Chinese spies. This is a grave charge. Even the Peking regime has not thought fit to level such an allegation against the Indian officials. If the communist accusations were true, it would mean that India was conspiring against Red China in collusion with American and Formosan authorities. This is so fantastic that only blind stooges of international communism could level it. It will shock many people in the country and outside that such accusations were made by Indian nationals.

Mr. P. C. Joshi, a member of the Central Committee of the CPI addressing a public meeting in Bombay on Saturday on the occasion of the concluding day of the three-day convention of the city communist party said Tibet was as much a part of the Peoples Republic of China as Kashmir was of India. Mr. Joshi asked: "What would happen if the people of China were to ask their Government to interfere in Kashmir to reinstate Sheikh Abdulla

in power " This question has been asked by sworn enemies of India in Pakistani newspapers. It is significant that Mr. Joshi's line of thinking is similar. Perhaps he represents the feeling of his other comrades also. In their over anxiety to please their masters in foreign lands the Indian communists are exceeding all bounds of decency. The reply to Mr. Joshi's question is that Sheikh Abdulla was ousted by a duly elected Government. In dealing with him, the process of law has not been abandoned. But in Tibet, the dictatorial regime drove the universally respected and acclaimed spiritual and temporal leader to flight. There is really no comparison between conditions obtaining in Kashmir and Tibet. Even communist propagandists in Moscow and Peking have not taken the line of Mr. Joshi because it is absurd and stupid. The fact that communist leaders have made common cause with inveterate enemies of India in Pakistan with regard to tying up the Tibet issue with Kashmir shows lack of loyalty for India among the red fraternity of this country.

In the given situation, it must be said that Mr. Nehru's denunciation of communists at the press conference was rather mild. Communists are not only completely uprooted from national sentiments but they have also demonstrated that in the event of any national crisis, they will unashamedly play the fifth column of foreign powers. This attitude from a political party which claims second position in the country portends serious danger for the nation. Surely, the Indian voters who supported the communist candidates in the pathetic hope of removing poverty and backwardness would not approve of their representatives playing the stooge and fifth column of foreign powers and stabbing the interests of the country. It is time India took lessons from what is happening in the United Arab Republic. The indulgence given by President Nasser was utilised by communists in seeking to subvert the country and convert it into a part of the vast communist empire. Nasser took action before it was too late. The blatantly anti-Indian propaganda being carried on by Indian communist leaders is a grave warning to the nation which must be heeded if a disaster is to be avoided in future. The communist disloyalty to the country has come to the surface for the first time after independence. It was visible also in 1942 when the Indian communists supported the British imperialists while the entire country was engaged in a life and death struggle against imperialism. But many people had forgotten about it and the nation had forgiven the communists. The present attitude of the red fraternity on the Tibetan issue is a rude reminder that their anti-national role has not changed and they could betray the nation again.

—The Searchlight, April 7, 1959

INDIA AND TIBET

THE PANCHEN LAMA IS IN LHASA; THE DALAI LAMA is in India. All these show that there have been revolutionary changes in Tibet. Mr. Nehru in his Press Conference at New Delhi, discussed the Tibetan situation with devastating frankness. His approach and assessment have won the warm approval of the people of India.

Mr. Nehru, in his analysis of the Tibetan situation, accepted two major postulates. First, the mass of Tibetan people are devoted to the Dalai Lama. To quote Mr. Nehru's words, "I cannot conceive of the Dalai Lama being pushed about by his own people." It may be stated that Mr. Nehru recognised the "national character" of the Tibetan revolt of March 1959 when he stressed the fact that the Dalai Lama was very much revered in Tibet and outside by Buddhists and non-Buddhists. Secondly, the Sino-Tibetan Agreement which recognised the sovereignty of China over Tibet and the autonomy of Tibet has broken down. Since the uprising in Lhasa in March 1959, there had been no autonomy in Tibet. Mr. Chou En-lai told Mr. Nehru that Tibet was different from China and that the autonomy of Tibet would be respected. Tibet is not Communist. That Tibet was different from other parts of Communist China was apparent from the fact that the Dalai Lama was till recently the religious and the political Head under the Chinese umbrella.

Mr. Nehru observed: "Tibet affects some deeper chords in our heart. Tibet, culturally speaking, is an offshoot of India, of Buddhism." India will not politically interfere in Tibetan affairs. But there is a "tremendous bond" between India and Tibet. Hence, different parties forgot their party badges and were stirred by the deepest sympathies for the people of Tibet. The Communist Party of India had no kinship with the national sentiment. It had its roots in different thinking. It stood completely isolated when the Party adopted the resolution on Tibetan situation. The deep-rooted sentiments of the Indian people were hurt by the statement of the C.P.I. on Tibetan affairs. (Mr. P. C. Joshi, a prominent member of the Central Committee of the C.P.I. continues to harp on the Communist thesis that critics of the Peking stand on the Tibetan situation are trying to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Mr. Nehru refused to accept this narrow stand).

India believes in Panch Sheela. She will follow it. We may disapprove of Peking's stand. But there is no question of the breach of Panch Sheel. Mr. Nehru recognised that it could

not be easily followed in a one-sided way. The cold war attitude is bad. The Government of India are responsible for the safety of the Dalai Lama in India. There will be no unnecessary curbs on him. And Mr. Nehru was sure that the Dalai Lama would not like to take any steps "which would embarrass us or him." He ridiculed the suggestion, made by the C.P.I. weekly, that some Indian political officers on the border had collusion with anti-Chinese spies. Mr. Nehru remarked acutely as follows: "The Communist Party of India shows, more than I suspected, a certain lack of balance in mind and total absence of feeling of decency and nationalism." The C.P.I. was silent on pro-Chinese espionage in India to defeat the basic approach and policy of the Government of India.

If Mr. Nehru's assessment of the situation is accepted, the position may be summed up in the following way: (1) the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1950 is dead; (2) Peking has not made any official declaration that Tibet should not be autonomous; (3) the people of Tibet are devoted to the Dalai Lama; (4) the Communist Party of India is isolated from the deep sentiments stirred in Indian hearts by the Tibetan events, and it has shown "a lack of balance in mind" in some of the accusations against some Indian political officers. The allegation made by Prince Peter of Greece that the Government of India had given assistance to the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 was "a fantastic lie", according to Mr. Nehru. He had had no correspondence with Mr. Chou En-lai on the Tibetan situation.

It is clear that the Dalai Lama is not to function on "a political plane" in India. The Dalai Lama and the entourage are not to operate as an "emigre Government" to carry on any anti-Chinese campaign. (Communist China gave asylum to the Nepali leader, Dr. K. I. Singh, and it may be recalled that he was utilised for the propaganda purpose by Peking). Mr. Nehru made it clear that India was not interested in any propaganda campaign. He was extremely critical of the Communist thinking in India, but India would remain friendly with Communist China. Tibet was not Communist. That was the major premise of Mr. Nehru. If the Communising of Tibet takes places at the dictation of Peking the autonomy of Tibet is blown to pieces. That is Mr. Nehru's emphasis. It is not yet known what will be the consequences of the breakdown of the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1950. India's agreement with China over Tibet related to pilgrimage, trade and trade-routes. Mr. Nehru pointedly stated: "We cannot ignore events in Tibet or look away from them. What we do about them is another matter."

—*The Indian Nation*, April 7, 1959

TIBETAN AUTONOMY

THE SAFE ARRIVAL OF THE DALAI LAMA IN INDIA and the friendly reception given to him on behalf of the Government and people of this country have aroused world-wide interest. The readiness with which the Indian Government granted political asylum to the Dalai Lama is fully in keeping not only with the traditional friendship between the peoples of the two countries but with our own foreign policy, for however strong may be our desire to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese Government, it would be wrong to minimise the concern felt in this country over the recent developments in Tibet and the general anxiety that the autonomy of the Tibetan people, repeatedly assured by the Chinese Government themselves, should be fully preserved. At his Press Conference Mr. Nehru enunciated three principles to guide India's policy in dealing with the delicate Tibetan situation—the safeguarding of India's external security, maintenance of friendly relations with China and offer of sympathy and support to Tibetan aspirations. So far as India's external security is concerned, the present Tibetan developments have underlined the need for special vigilance—particularly in dealing with, among other things, the danger signs now visible in Kalimpong and other spy nests which have now come to light. The assurance given by Mr. Nehru that the authorities are now fully alert would be welcomed. India's sympathy with Tibetan aspirations admits of no question, but in what way India can now extend support to those aspirations and help in bringing peace and contentment to the Tibetan people is not an easy problem. Our desire for friendly relations with China makes it all the more necessary that we should urge fair and just treatment of Tibetan claims for autonomy. Whatever nice distinction may be drawn between suzerainty and sovereignty, the autonomy of Tibet is a matter in which India is vitally interested. What, however, at the moment, has caused concern is not so much the Chinese Government's attitude to Indian opinion as the way the Indian Communist Party has reacted in its public statements, subordinating even their professed national sentiments to the dictates of their outside affiliations. Mr. Nehru is fully justified in charging them with "lack of decency and nationalism" and saying that "they cease to be Indians if they talk in this way."

—Deccan Herald, April 7, 1959.

SECOND THOUGHTS

THE VIEWS THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED ON THE situation in Tibet at the press conference he held on Sunday show he is having second thoughts on the subject. He said, 'When I spoke in the Lok Sabha two days ago, rather deliberately I suppressed myself in an effort to avoid adding to the heat of the cold war. I felt strongly enough about some matters but I felt that I must try to be a little dispassionate.' The Prime Minister decided on the present occasion not to suppress himself to the same extent as he did on previous occasions. He drew attention to 'the powerful sentiments' and reactions which the events in Tibet had provoked in India. The decision is to be welcomed. Second thoughts are best.

The policy of isolation was unjust and unwise and the argument that he wanted not to add to the heat of the cold war was not convincing. Not only the Prime Minister but the overwhelming majority of people in India want that every possible effort should be made to ease international tension and bring the cold war to an end. But to connive at injustice being done to a weak and defenceless country by a stronger country is not the way to achieve the object in view. It is the way to accentuate international tension and to turn a cold war into a shooting war. When the world allowed Japan to work her will upon Manchuria, it did not promote the cause of peace. It is incumbent on all peaceful nations to speak candidly on the Tibetan situation. It is not suggested that the Prime Minister should not be 'a little dispassionate.' On the contrary it is essential to their peaceful settlement that international disputes should always be discussed dispassionately. But it is one thing to discuss a question dispassionately; it is altogether a different thing to keep mum. What the Prime Minister did when news of the Tibetan rebellion was received was that he discouraged discussion on the subject. He told Parliament in the first statement he made on the subject that it was embarrassing to discuss events happening in a neighbouring country, about which it was not easy to get a full picture. One should not expect to get a full picture of events in countries under Communist control. But the picture was clear enough to show that the Chinese-Tibetan tension constituted a menace to international peace and that China and not Tibet was responsible for this regrettable state of affairs.

Even now though he has made known to the world that the events in Tibet have provoked powerful sentiments in India, the

Prime Minister has not stated what he proposes to do in the matter. He does not want to displease China. He said that India wanted to continue to have friendly relations with China. We value China's friendship but we do not believe in friendship at any price. 'A friend,' wrote Emerson, 'is a person with whom I may be sincere. Before him I may think aloud'. Pt. Nehru's statement quoted above implies that Mr. Chou En-lai is not a friend of this type. Obviously he is a person with whom Pt. Nehru must not be sincere and before whom he must not think aloud if India wants his friendship. Such behaviour which is a sign of sycophancy will not promote friendship. Because we consider China our friend, it is all the more incumbent on us that we should speak plainly to her.

When Britain and France committed aggression in Egypt President Eisenhower did not uphold their action even though the United States is more akin ideologically to Britain and France than India is to China. Pt. Nehru argued that China had not violated Panch Shila. China has violated the Bandung declaration which is a product of Panch Shila and which besides enjoining on its signatories to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and abstain from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country, lays stress on the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means such as negotiation. Pt. Nehru cannot do better than emulate the example of President Eisenhower and ask China to retrace her steps.

—*The Leader*. April 8, 1959

AFTER THE ARRIVAL

THE DALAI LAMA IS NOW INDIA'S GUEST. ONE OF THE most momentous and hazardous escapes in recorded history has ended successfully. Even if India were less hospitable than she is, he would perhaps have no other country to seek hospitality from. India is his home now, until fate smiles on him once again and he rides back to Lhasa with the dignity and authority due to his high status. But the Dalai Lama is in India only physically. His thoughts and prayers would ever remain with his unfortunate but valiant people whom neither death can deter nor convenience demoralize. If he has chosen to be away from them, the Dalai Lama has evidently done so because of his confidence in India's unfailing assist-

ance in his people's sore trials. The Dalai Lama's adventurous undertaking had a purpose obviously synonymous with that of his people now locked in an unequal struggle.

All this is a reminder that India's problem has just begun. The relief with which the Dalai Lama's arrival has universally been greeted here is not even a fraction of the solution the Tibetan problem cries for. True, the Dalai Lama, despite his comparatively young age, is known for wisdom and patience that would do credit to any sage or statesman. He would not therefore do anything which might, to quote the Prime Minister, embarrass the Government of India or embarrass him. Politics, in the sense of utilizing his residence in India as command base of the fight for the freedom of his country, is not for him. As the honoured guest and revered friend of India, he would naturally refrain from activities and utterances that might carry an unsettling implication for India's policy of friendship with all countries, particularly with China. Nevertheless, he owes it to himself, to his people, to the world and to India to explain why he has chosen to be away from Tibet at this crucial juncture. The explanation is called for because while the world at large is in no doubt as to the reason for his search for sanctuary here, Peking and its supporters abroad go on repeating the thin theme of his being under "duress." They would have the world believe that if the "reactionaries in collusion with imperialism" had not forced him to come away the Dalai Lama would still be cooperating with the Chinese in their red man's mission, even if that meant demolition of Tibet's sacred institutions. Only the Dalai Lama can tell what the truth is. His will be the most authentic voice on this subject.

One need be neither in the confidence of the Dalai Lama nor unusually imaginative to know what the burden of the Dalai Lama's statement will be. The Treaty which he concluded with the Chinese in 1951 and which was reinforced by an agreement between India and China in 1954 embodies his aim and China's professed objective. It stood on the twin pillars of Tibet's autonomy and China's suzerainty. Without the first the latter would be a grotesque imposition. What made it obligatory for the Dalai Lama to come away was the known breach of China's solemn obligation on Tibet's autonomy. It is therefore the quest for the fulfilment of that obligation by the Chinese that has brought him to India. And it is for that he will have to struggle on. Herein lies India's opportunity. As the only other party to the agreement that vouchsafed Tibet's autonomy side by side with China's suzerainty, India would be perfectly justified to emphasize to Peking her deep interest in sincere implementation of that treaty. Peking's own frequent reference to the Dalai Lama's departure from Lhasa as having

been made under "duress" itself suggests that whatever be Peking's motive in trotting out that theory, it still does not, at least publicly, regard the Dalai Lama as a persona non grata. By the same token it would be morally and politically impossible for the Chinese rulers to fail to heed the Dalai Lama's views. In any case, Peking can have precious little reason to refuse negotiations with the Dalai Lama the basis and purpose of which would naturally be Tibet's autonomy.

In view of what has happened in Tibet during the last few years, what is called for is not merely a verbal reiteration of the sanctity of Tibet's autonomy. Just as the Chinese insist on tangible evidence of the exercise of their suzerainty, the Tibetans under the Dalai Lama would like to have equally tangible sanctions for their autonomy. It is only on this basis that the Tibetan question may yet be solved in peace and amity not only between Lhasa and Peking but also between New Delhi and Peking. Any other course would in the circumstances of today in Tibet be futile and even dangerous. India is in no mood or position to bring about by use or by show of force the treaty obligation the Chinese willingly accepted. At the same time, the state of public opinion and popular sentiment in this country is such that New Delhi will never have its conscience at ease without doing something in that limited objective to help Tibet, the "off-shoot" of India, if only "culturally speaking" as the Prime Minister emphasized at his last press conference. Moreover, failure to do so would expose this country to the possibility of a serious embarrassment or even indignity. It is no mere speculation to say that if the Dalai Lama in particular and the Tibetans in general lost all hope of moral and diplomatic assistance from New Delhi, they would probably do what history and morality enjoin upon all enslaved peoples. Such unilateral action, if you will, would, if permitted to assume significant proportions, be a grievous embarrassment to India's foreign policy and if checked might make her an object of ridicule. A diplomatic initiative for ensuring Tibet's autonomy and a peaceful settlement between Lhasa and Peking are thus an unavoidable necessity for India. No diplomatic initiative would of course succeed with Peking unless it had behind it necessary strength and support. Fortunately not only public sentiment in India but also opinion in most of the other countries of Asia has clearly shown that any reasonable course of action adopted by New Delhi would have immense popular backing. The rulers of China are undoubtedly fanatics. To them their ideology is always preferable to humanity which to them is a mere abstraction. They may therefore not worry overmuch about what the state of public opinion in Asia or anywhere in the world is. Nevertheless, they will have to weigh very seriously whatever advantages they might think of as a result of an unabashed rape of Tibet against the sure loss of

face in the rest of this continent. In any case, India would lose nothing by an honest endeavour to secure justice for Tibet and for restoring Sino-Tibetan relations to a more normal basis.

—Thought, April 11, 1959.

ASYLUM

EXCEPT THOSE WHO THINK THAT TRUTH IS A COMMUNIST monopoly, nobody in India believes that the Dalai Lama left Lhasa under duress. That is a good thing, for the markedly impersonal tone (at least in English) of the statement issued to the Press at Tezpur might otherwise have lent support to the theory that he was under constraint—at least of Protocol. It was composed (not, we think, by the Dalai Lama himself) with close regard to the niceties and nuances of the situation, but spontaneity is totally absent. Possibly the consistent use of the third person is the outcome of some royal or priestly custom—the equivalent of the royal “we”. But surely even a God-King might have been permitted to say “I come to India of my own free will” and “I am extremely grateful to the people and Government of India” and need not graciously have referred to the good administration of NEFA, however well the compliment is deserved.

Yet, flat as it seems on first reading, the statement has much to commend it. If reconciliation is possible, it smooths the way to it. Though the Chinese are charged with steadily disregarding the autonomy promised in the 17-point agreement responsibility is attributed to vaguely named “Chinese authorities” (perhaps in Peking) rather than the Dalai and Panchen Lama’s Chinese colleague on the Preparatory Committee. Though it leaves no doubt of the nature of the struggle in Tibet, there is no reference to bloody oppressors or any other of the choice items of abuse which one presumably well versed in the Communist vocabulary might have been tempted to use. On the contrary “all that the Dalai Lama wishes to say at the moment is to express his sincere regret at the tragedy which has over-taken Tibet and to fervently hope that these troubles will be over soon without any more bloodshed.” To his own future plans, the statement adds, the Dalai Lama will give thought “and, if necessary, expression” as soon as he has had a chance to rest and reflect on recent events.

Glad as India is to have the Dalai Lama safely within her borders and great as is her interest in his future welfare, plainly her greatest interest is in Tibetan autonomy. If the Chinese wish

to restore this and to have the Dalai Lama's help in doing so, the statement raises no insuperable barriers. But it is hard to believe that the Chinese have any thought of reconciliation. In their view Tibetan autonomy has not been destroyed; it is being restored. Quite genuinely, the Chinese may from the beginning have meant by "autonomy" something different from what Tibet and India supposed. It could be a mixture of free will and predestination, with the outcome certain—free, loyal adulation of Communist achievements. Consistently with their own beliefs, they could scarcely think otherwise. Thus their attitude and actions are unlikely to be influenced by Indian, Asian or any other opinion. They may wish for, and expect, a quick end to the Tibetan struggle; but that is because, according to theory, it is being carried on only by reactionaries and imperialists, and obviously the number of these can be but a small fraction in a region under Chinese suzerainty.

—*The Sunday Statesman*, April 19, 1959

NOT UNDER DURESS

THE BREATHLESS WAITING FOR THE DALAI LAMA'S first public statement after taking refuge in India, came to an end on Saturday. The statement made at Tezpur was a forthright denial of the story put out by Peking that the Dalai Lama was kidnapped from Lhasa by the 'rebels' and that he left Tibet under duress. The Dalai Lama has stated categorically that he left Lhasa and came to India of his own free will and not under duress. We have referred to the offensive implications of the Chinese allegations, especially when it was repeated after the Dalai Lama had been on Indian territory for several days. If the Dalai Lama had really been under duress during his flight from Tibet and continued to be so even after his entry into India, the charge of duress must apply to India, also; because from the moment of his stepping into India the Dalai Lama's protection has been, as declared by the Prime Minister himself, wholly a charge of the Government of this country. Once under India's protection, the Dalai Lama was free to declare whether he had been kept under duress by the 'rebels' or not, unless it was assumed that the Government of India itself put some curb on that freedom.

Now the Dalai Lama had made an unequivocal statement whose authenticity is beyond question. How the Chinese autho-

rities react to it will be observed with interest and perhaps some anxiety, also. Because if even after this statement by the Dalai Lama Peking sticks to the charge of duress, it will be directly, not merely constructively, a reflection on the integrity of the Government of India. Who knows the Chinese authorities may insist that the Dalai Lama is still not free but is under duress by his entourage at whose dictation he has made the statement. But such a stand by Peking would imply a charge of collusion against the Government of India, for it must be taken for granted that the Indian authorities have by this time made themselves thoroughly conversant with the real position. One may recall in this connexion the Prime Minister's declaration that asylum to the Tibetans would be given on the merits of individual cases.

Though couched in restrained and characteristically unexcited language, the Dalai Lama's statement roundly contradicts the Chinese version of what has been happening in Tibet. In the statement the charge against Peking for breaking the pledge to honour Tibet's autonomy is unequivocal and the demand for Tibetan freedom, called by whatever name, sounds irrevocable, equally. The Dalai Lama is not known to be anti-'reform'. His tones are conciliatory and peaceful. But at the same time there is no doubt that he symbolises his people's determination to struggle for their freedom at all costs. And that symbol has now taken refuge among a people who cannot but sympathise with the Tibetans' urge to keep themselves free and who share the disappointment at China's going back upon a solemnly given assurance. Our Chinese friends certainly realize that in view of the entire context of the situation—it is just not possible to reduce the Dalai Lama to the status of a glorified prisoner and far less to immobilise his symbolic role. All sorts of complications and tensions are, therefore, likely to arise and multiply if the situation is not effectively contained, emotionally and otherwise. It will be a grievous mistake for Chinese to think that a policy of force can bring about a durable solution in Tibet. History would be against such a supposition. Besides, a continuation of a Chinese policy for force in Tibet must attract various Cold War troubles—it has already begun to do so. India of course must try her best to avoid all Cold War association but at the same time she simply cannot give up her sympathetic interest in Tibet's autonomy. For Tibet, China and India, the only safe course at this juncture would be to try to keep this issue confined to themselves, which is possible only if China recognises the necessity for a large change in her present policy, admitting Tibetan freedom to be a common concern.

—*The Hindusthan Standard*, Delhi, April 19, 1959.

INDICTMENT

IN A STATEMENT THAT IS FORTHRIGHT WITHOUT UNDULY straining the limits of discretion the Dalai Lama has given his version of the circumstances in which he has been compelled to seek refuge in this country. That this is in every sense the "authorised" version of the Tibetan tragedy can hardly be doubted. Nothing that Mr. Chou En-lai can say or has said can detract from the authority with which the Dalai Lama has spoken. From the Tezpur declaration there emerges a picture of communist imperialism to which there can be no adequate parallel except that of Hungary itself. The manner in which Tibet has been occupied by China's armed forces in deliberate violation of the 17-point agreement confirms once again that communist habits die hard and that before or after the Twentieth Congress and irrespective of the doctrine of the "hundred flowers" there has been no modification of the essential character of communist imperialism. In its pursuit of communisation neither religious scruples, respect for international agreements nor the will of the people—if it is ever expressed—will deflect it from its goal of absolute domination. Both the Dalai Lama's declaration and the currently available reports from Tibet indicate that the Tibetan revolt is something more than a minor riot inspired, as Mr. Chou En-lai would have us believe, by a temporary disaffection. They also indicate that the Tibetan struggle for independence against Communist China dates back to 1951 when the 17-point agreement was imposed on the Tibetan people and finally accepted "as there was no alternative." Thereafter we have the usual and dismal story of a Preparatory Committee incapable of taking decisions or opposing those taken freely by the Chinese authorities.

It is possible that repugnant though it was to Tibetan nationalist sentiment the 17-point agreement recognising Tibet's autonomous status could have provided the basis for Sino-Tibetan co-operation if Peking despite its zeal for communisation had refrained from the mass atrocities to which it resorted. Yet it must be conceded that given the fact of communism there can be no reconciliation between religious freedom and communisation. Sooner or later communism has no alternative, should it remain true to itself, but to destroy the lamas and monasteries of Tibet. There is a certain inevitability in the ruthlessness with which Peking has undertaken this task and the heart of the Tibetan tragedy surely lies in the assumption that a Tibet in which religious freedom flourishes can co-operate with a communist totalitarian State. This is a matter about which there can be no compromise and it is here that we must question Mr. Nehru's conviction that Tibetan

autonomy and Chinese suzerainty can co-exist. Everything that has happened in Tibet and the Dalai Lama's presence on Indian soil are a confirmation that they cannot. Religious freedom in Tibetan conditions is indistinguishable from political independence and it is Peking's defiance of what might be called Tibet's right of religious self-determination that has provoked the entire Tibetan people into open revolt. It is futile, in these circumstances, for the Chinese Premier to persist in his stupid fiction that the crisis is due solely to a "handful of rebels," that the Dalai Lama is under duress, that the uprising is an internal affair" and that Peking continues to respect "the religious beliefs, customs and manners of the Tibetan people." It is indeed a remarkable expression of "respect" to destroy the lamas and monasteries of Tibet and create a situation in which the Dalai Lama is forced to solicit asylum in a neighbouring country.

In insisting that the Dalai Lama has been "abducted" Peking implies that since the Tibetan leader is on Indian soil New Delhi is party, however indirectly, to the so-called abduction. Yet the Chinese Premier's constant references to Sino-Indian friendship suggest that despite the extremes to which it has already gone Peking will not abandon its hope of maintaining friendly relations with New Delhi even at the cost of modifying its policy in Tibet. This friendship or the hope of maintaining this friendship is a valuable instrument of diplomacy which should not be discarded for the simple and temporary satisfaction of officially expressing our disapproval and of hostility towards Communist China on the Tibetan issue. To the extent that the Tibetan crisis is a serious setback for the communist bloc in terms of international opinion both Peking and Moscow can have no reason for any equanimity. Mr. Chou En-lai's somewhat embarrassed and unconvincing apology contains the possibility that Peking is far from happy about a situation in which Chinese communism has figured in so disreputable a garb. This Chinese awareness of error, if not exactly a stricken conscience, places New Delhi in a position of vantage in attempting to persuade Peking into a more reasonable frame of mind. It would be naive to suppose that China will ever abandon its objectives in Tibet, but something will have been achieved in the cause of freedom if it is impressed on Peking that, irrespective of the cold war, the friendship and goodwill of the independent Asian States cannot indefinitely be taken for granted.

—*The Times of India*, April 20, 1959.

UNDER DURESS

NOBODY OUTSIDE THE TORTURED, TORTUOUS WORLD of communism ever believed the theory that the Dalai Lama had joined the Tibetan national resistance against Chinese tyranny under duress. Mr. Chou En-lai insisted only yesterday that the Dalai Lama was in India by act of abduction at about the time that the Dalai Lama was making on Indian soil his first public accusation of repeated bad faith by the Chinese. But it may be doubted that the ruling clique in Peking is simple-minded enough to stick to its story only to appear to be consistent or even to test the loyalty of Indian communists in the purgatory of abasement. The more logical explanation of Peking's clumsy attachment to a bare-faced lie is that it has not lost all hope of making a deal with the Dalai Lama which will enable him to return to Tibet. From the Dalai Lama's declaration it is obvious that there can be no deal in terms of his personal safety and dignity. If these were his concern he might as well have stayed back in Lhasa. But if the Chinese are thinking in terms of a deal on the basis of real autonomy for Tibet then there should be careful plumbing of their intentions.

The Chinese Communist record in the matter of respect for international obligations is not a good one. It is a particularly bad one in the case of Tibet. There are, however, some compelling reasons why they should not be discouraged if they are looking for a way to retrace their steps in Tibet without losing too much face. First, there is not the slightest prospect of outside succour for the Tibetan struggle. Secondly, in spite of Mr. Chou En-lai's flamboyant references to the crushing of the Tibetan uprising, the Chinese are far from being masters of the situation throughout the country. There seems little reason why guerilla activity should not continue in the outlying regions, and it must be with a certain amount of trepidation that Peking looks ahead to large forces being bogged down and harried in the harsh Tibetan winter. Thirdly, though world opinion is not a factor of much consequence in Communist policy-making, the Chinese may be reaching the conclusion that the distrust and suspicion of Asian neighbours is too big a price to pay for a few Chinese settlements in the inhospitable reaches of the Tibetan plateau. There is no need to be in a hurry to probe Peking's purpose. There should be more evidence presently of the extent of Chinese difficulties in Tibet and of the amount of ground they will be prepared to give for a workable compromise. A close watch should in fact be kept for signs of the kind of duress the Chinese have invited on themselves.

—*The Hindustan Times*, April 20, 1959.

THE INCONGRUOUS COINCIDENCE OF THE DALAI Lama's categorical declaration that he left Tibet and came to India of his own free will, with Mr. Chou En-lai's insistence that he was abducted and brought here "under duress," will not be lost on India. In a situation of this nature the victim is more to be trusted than his oppressor. Compared with the Chinese Prime Minister's speech, which contained the usual patterned Communist cliches and innuendoes, the Dalai Lama's declaration was dignified and restrained. He was thankful for the hospitality of India, "the land of enlightenment, having given birth to Lord Buddha". Nothing that his holiness said could be construed as trespassing the frontiers of hospitality or as inciting conflict or passions. He told the truth. And the truth needs to be told and known.

India's duty does not end with the mere grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama, his relatives and entourage. A news report speaks of "Chinese soldiers pursuing three Khampas across the Nepalese border, transgressing into Nepalese territory and killing one of the Khampas". Shortly after Communist China's first aggression on Tibet in October 1950, Mr. Nehru made the significant declaration that any transgression of the Indo-Tibetan border would be resisted, and he added that the same principle would apply to the Nepalese-Tibetan border. India proclaimed her determination to do this by guaranteeing the integrity of the Himalayan border States of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. There can be only one transgressor—China. And the time has come in view of recent developments for Mr. Nehru boldly to reaffirm and reiterate his warning. It is well known that only on the Prime Minister's persuasion did the Dalai Lama in 1956, when he was on a visit to India, agree to return to Lhasa. In view of this, New Delhi should not allow itself to be persuaded by Peking to induce the Dalai Lama once again to return. India at least should resolutely refuse to be a party to any variant of the spider and the fly. Bona fide refugees from Tibet should also be given asylum, though admittedly the procedure involves many administrative complications. Moreover, if a politically subjugated India could send a medical mission to the Chinese in Yenan during the Sino-Japanese war, there is no reason why a free India could not extend the same gesture to the Tibetans. New Delhi need not be officially involved in this, but it should do nothing to discourage the despatch of a non-official medical mission.

—*The Indian Express*, New Delhi, April 20, 1959.

LAMA IN INDIA

MUSSOORIE MARKS THE END OF THE DALAI LAMA'S heroic flight from Chinese Communism. But it is the beginning of a razor-edge period of trials and temptations for the Government and the people of India. This is primarily because the Dalai Lama has come to symbolise, not the essentially human tragedy of a Government suppressing a people, but the larger cold war issue of Communism versus anti-Communism. The highly imaginative stories foreign newspaper correspondents have been despatching from their chartered planes over Tezpur give us an idea of the manner in which the Dalai Lama drama is being exploited for cold war purposes in the West. It would be a grievous mistake if Indian public opinion fell to the temptation and followed the West in this regard. As the Dalai Lama's host country, India has certain special responsibilities. The Dalai Lama himself was aware of these when he asked his followers not to indulge in any activity that might cause embarrassment to India. The embarrassment seems more likely to be created by Indians themselves. And Shri Asoka Mehta led the list in Delhi a few days ago.

Shri Mehta was of the opinion that the Dalai Lama should be given complete freedom of action in India. Such phrases as 'freedom of action' have an inherent appeal about them, but we cannot afford to be blinded by it. Complete freedom of action can also mean the right to set up a parallel government for Tibet on Indian soil, the right to carry on a campaign against China and perhaps even the right to collect arms and raise an army. It would be unthinkable for the Government of India to encourage such activities and at the same time keep up her diplomatic contacts with Peking. The freedom of action we can grant a foreign leader who has been given asylum must always be limited by our political relations with the country from which he has fled. India has recognised the Peking regime and its suzerainty over Tibet. It would be untenable if, against these facts, we were to allow the Dalai Lama and his followers to plan from India the overthrow of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. We can do that the moment we have decided to end our relations with China. Since such a prospect seems to be out of the question the only alternative is to respect diplomatic responsibilities. This is not to say that India should go to the other extreme and make the Dalai Lama a gagged prisoner in India. In fact no one would say that New Delhi is striving to immobilise the Lama. He has already been given plenty of freedom and the forthright manner in which he has denounced the Chinese regime in his Tezpur statement to the press is unmistakable proof of India's willingness to be of help. But

let not this freedom ever violate the realities of the situation. Partisans may shout. But the moment the Government of India takes a false step, it will lose its standing with the Communist bloc which in turn will completely eliminate our usefulness in future negotiations, either over Tibet or any other issue.

—*The Free Press Journal*, April 20, 1959.

DALAI LAMA SPEAKS OUT

IN THE FIRST STATEMENT TO THE PRESS THAT HE HAS made since his arrival in India, the Dalai Lama has taken the opportunity to refute the Chinese assertion that he has left Lhasa and Tibet not out of his own free will and that he has been under some kind of duress. It was only on Tuesday that the Chinese Prime Minister associated himself with "all the people of Tibet" in expressing "deep concern about the Dalai Lama" with whom he sympathised in "the grief and worry and the plight he is in" Mr. Chou En-lai and his Government will now have to find another explanation why the acknowledged head of the autonomous Tibetan Government chose to risk a hazardous journey and exile instead of staying and blessing the "liberation" that the Chinese troops have undertaken in Tibet. That the rebellion in that unhappy country is more than the last-ditch fight of the remnants of a dying social order is proved by the reports that fierce fighting has been continuing for over a month now. Militarily the Chinese are undoubtedly superior but force does not settle any question satisfactorily or permanently. The Prime Minister of China, in the course of the statement to which we have referred, expressed his belief that "the Ruling Committee in Tibet, headed by the Panchen Lama, would quickly bring about national autonomy in Tibet." The objective is desirable but the means to realise it must be chosen with care. It is now clear that the uprising is on a truly national scale. The Dalai Lama has traced the sequence of tragic events that led to the rebellion and his decision to seek freedom outside his country. Any administration set up by the Chinese or any leader imposed on the Tibetans will not meet with their willing acquiescence. The Panchen Lama is certainly a person of importance and held in esteem—but only when he is free. The moment the Chinese chose to make him their vehicle to bring a new order of things to Tibet, he ceased to be acceptable to his people as a leader whom they could follow.

In a statement full of feeling, the Dalai Lama has brought out

the fact that in the 1951 agreement, his country was forced to accept Chinese suzerainty "under pressure" and because "there was no alternative left to the Tibetans." But even this agreement which guaranteed full autonomy to Tibet was set at naught by the Chinese. Autonomy implies a recognition of full independence in internal matters and a safeguard against interference by the suzerain authority. It is for the Tibetans who are distinct from the Chinese in race, culture and traditions to pursue their own way of life, unimpeded by any fiat from Peking. The Chinese themselves could testify to the reluctance of the Tibetans to embrace the Communist faith or adopt the new Chinese way of life. Time and again in recent months, their desire to force the pace of "reforms" has met with stout Tibetan opposition. If China is to win friends in Tibet as well as in the councils of the nations, she must give up the use of force and reconcile herself to such peaceful evolution as, the Tibetan leaders feel, is good for their people.

As for India, she is ever ready to lend her good offices to bring about a rapprochement between China and Tibet. She could do no less than offer a welcome to the Dalai Lama: her ties with Tibet are sanctified by friendship and tradition. She is equally a friend of China. The leaders at Peking should know that India has consistently chosen to champion China's rights at the forum of the United Nations. They may feel a sense of frustration at being repeatedly denied membership of this world organisation and may well have developed an indifference to public opinion in other countries. But they owe it to India, to Tibet and other Asian countries to discard force and to reach a peaceful settlement of questions that crop up now and then. In appealing to them to do so, our Prime Minister has not been prompted by mere considerations of security or self-interest but actuated by those principles of freedom and fair dealing for which Indians have always stood and which make up Panch Shila. The Dalai Lama will accept, and Mr. Nehru will do his best to promote, any settlement that restores complete internal autonomy to Tibet.

—*The Hindu*, April 27, 1959.

REJOINDER

WITH A RESTRAINT THAT STOPS WELL SHORT OF being equivocal, Mr. Nehru has defined his Government's attitude towards the Tibetan problem and more specifically towards the

manner in which Peking is currently exploiting it against this country. It is far from clear what advantage the Chinese communists can derive from the wide variety of irresponsible anti-Indian accusations in which they have now sought refuge. Nothing, however, that they have said or can say will minimise the basic facts to which the Prime Minister drew the attention of the Lok Sabha. These are that the crisis in Tibet is not restricted to dissatisfaction among the reactionary few but is on the contrary the result of a popular uprising against communist domination; that the Dalai Lama, supposed "under duress," is entirely free to receive and negotiate with any representative of the Chinese authorities or the Panchen Lama; and that the Tezpur statement is a clarification by the Dalai Lama of the circumstances in which he was compelled to seek refuge in India and for this clarification New Delhi is not responsible in any way. These are the facts which govern India's relations with the Tibetan crisis and confirm the view that in this entire affair New Delhi has scrupulously been nothing more than a passive agent. The deliberate campaign of abuse and fantastic allegations directed by Peking against this country have imposed a heavy strain on the ties of friendship which New Delhi is eager to preserve despite the Tibetan tragedy.

Whatever the provocation, New Delhi has no intention of resorting to a cold war on its own against a neighbour whose co-operation and understanding are essential for the peace and stability of this country's northern frontiers. Perhaps Mr. Nehru is unduly optimistic in assuming that there can be any reversion to a situation in which friendly co-operation can be established between the Tibetans and the Chinese on the basis of the 17-point agreement. The pace of communisation in Tibet will be such that there can hardly be any possibility of a compromise between Tibetan autonomy and Chinese suzerainty. The thousands of Tibetan refugees that are seeking asylum in this country are an indication of the thoroughness with which Chinese control is being introduced at every level of Tibetan national life. Autonomy of whatever brand cannot hope to survive when Chinese suzerainty is the dominating and decisive factor in all Tibetan affairs. In clearly expressing India's sympathy for the Tibetan people, firmly rejecting Peking's fantastic accusations and reiterating our hope that Peking will not press matters to the point of sacrificing Sino-Indian friendship Mr. Nehru has for the time being done all that he can do consistent with the interests of the country he represents and with those of Asian peace and stability.

—*The Times of India*, April 29, 1959.



Dalai Lama on Buddha Purnima Day at Muz

(Photo by Punjab Photo Serv



Dalai Lama with Prime Minister Nehru during his previous visit

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PRIME MINISTER

THE PRIME MINISTER, SHRI JAWAHARLAL Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on March 23, 1959:

Recent reports about happenings in the Tibet region of China have naturally aroused a great deal of interest in the country. The sequence of events is not quite clear to us. But I should like to make a brief statement on the principal facts in so far as we know them. Last week, on the 17th March, in the course of the discussion on the Demands for the Ministry of External Affairs, I referred briefly to the tense situation there. I mentioned that there had been a clash of wills although no major violence had occurred recently.

We have since received fuller information from our Consul General in Lhasa. It appears that various rumours in regard to the Dalai Lama caused excitement in Lhasa. About two weeks ago, a large crowd of Tibetans entered the premises of the Indian Consulate General. They spoke to our Consul General about the rumours and their apprehensions. Three days later, a large number of Tibetan women came to our Consulate General and requested our Consul General to accompany them to the Chinese Foreign Bureau and be a witness to their presenting certain demands. The Consul General told them that this was not proper and he could not accompany them or associate himself with any demonstration. The Consul General brought

these incidents to the notice of the Chinese Foreign Bureau at Lhasa. He had rightly decided not to interfere in those internal affairs. On the 20th March, fighting suddenly broke out between the Chinese troops and Tibetan elements. There was firing in the vicinity of our Consulate General and some stray bullets hit our building. For some time it was not possible for the Consul General to go out of the premises. All our staff and their families are safe and no significant damage to property has been reported. Apparently, the situation in Lhasa has somewhat quietened down.

There are about thirty members of our staff in the Consulate General at Lhasa. Together with their families, the number is about 100. There are also sixteen other Indian nationals in the Lhasa region about whom we have no full information at present.

As soon as the fighting broke out in Lhasa, we requested the Chinese Government, through our Ambassador in Peking and the Chinese Ambassador here, to ensure the fullest protection to our personnel and properties in Lhasa and they promised to do so. On the 21st March, a representative of the Chinese Foreign Bureau in Lhasa called on our Consul General and suggested to him that for the better protection of himself and his staff, they should move into the Foreign Bureau. We have instructed our Consul General to inform the Foreign Bureau that it will not be right or proper for our Consul General to leave the premises. A large number of Indian nationals are involved, including the families of our personnel, and there are valuable properties and records within our premises. In accordance with international law and usage, our Consul General and his staff and our records and properties are entitled to the fullest protection and we have no doubt that the Chinese Government will see the reasonableness of our request.

This outbreak of violence in Lhasa itself is a new development. Previously there had been conflicts in various parts of Southern Tibet between the Khampas and the Chinese forces. But the Lhasa region had remained quiet.

The House will appreciate that this is a difficult and delicate situation and we should avoid doing anything which will worsen it. We have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of China with whom we have friendly relations. In 1954 the Sino-Indian Agreement was concluded. It was in this that, for the first time, the principle of Panch Sheel was stated.

There is a long tradition of cultural and religious ties between India and the Tibet region of China. In this region lie many places of pilgrimage which are considered holy by both Hindus and Buddhists and large numbers of our people visit them every year. The Dalai Lama, whom we had the honour and pleasure of receiving in our country in 1956-57, is held in high veneration by our people and we hope he is safe. We earnestly trust that the present troubles will be resolved peacefully.

Our Consul General at Lhasa and his staff are in a difficult situation for reasons beyond their control. I have no doubt that the House will wish me to send our best wishes on this occasion to him and to our other representatives in the Tibet region.

SITUATION IN TIBET

The Prime Minister, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement on the situation in Tibet on 30 March 1959:

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: These adjournment motions as adjournment motions, if I may say so, can hardly arise. But so far as I am concerned, I do not wish to take shelter under any technical plea of not giving any information that I think ought to be given. Indeed subject to certain very broad considerations to which Shri Tyagi referred I wish to place all the information that we get before the House as it comes in and I propose to do so in the future too. It is not necessary for Hon. Members to demand a statement from me but I shall do so whenever any important piece of information comes. I shall place it before the House.

At the present moment we have a mass of statements in the Press, rumours, allegations, statements of the Chinese Government from which it is a little difficult to sort out exactly the truth of what is happening. We have one thing on which you can certainly say that there it is. There are Press communiques issued by the Government of the People's Republic of China. I do not understand why Hon. Members bring in the news agency in this matter. It is a Government communique and the news

agency did a completely right thing in placing the official communique before us and before the public. You may not like the wording of the communique or the content of it. That is a different matter. But it is the duty of a news agency to deal with such an important matter and not to suppress it but to place it before the public.

May I also refer to what for instance, Hon. Member Shri Imam has talked about the massing of troops. Now, I am completely unaware of this. In fact, I have not heard a rumour to that effect, leave out the facts. And he wants an adjournment motion because there is massing of troops on the Indian border.

Shri Naushir Bharucha: He said about fanning out of Chinese troops.

Shri Mohammed Imam: That is the word I used in my adjournment motion.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: All kind of things are appearing in the Press which again are based sometimes presumably on reports not from within Tibet but from outside Tibet, whether it is Hong Kong or whether it is any other place. I do not say that any such rumour must necessarily be wrong. How can I say that? But, normally speaking, they are not correct. Any how, my information is that there are no massing of troops on the Indian border, so far as I know. How can I discuss it when I do not accept that fact?

But, the major things that we have to consider are, as I said on the last occasion, the contacts of India with Tibet are very old, geographical, of course, trade, but much more so, cultural and religious. Vast numbers of pilgrims go from here there and some come from Tibet to India. So that, this contact, this relationship is something deeper than the changing political scene. Naturally we are affected by it. Apart from that, as I said on the last occasion, large numbers of people in India venerate the Dalai Lama, respect him very greatly and he was our guest, honoured guest, some time ago. Because of these contacts our reaction to anything that happens in Tibet is bound to be very deep, as we see it. It is not for me to object to those reactions. But, we have to bear them in mind.

May I say that all these questions that have been recently put about giving political asylum are, probably, of no service at all to the people who might seek political asylum in India? It is no good. One has to see the difficult

situation as it is and not merely create conditions which make it more difficult to deal with the situation or deal with the persons seeking political asylum. There it is. Whatever I say in regard to that will make it more difficult for these people, I say. So that, on the one side there is this feeling of a certain kinship, if I may use that word, cultural kinship between the people of India and the people of Tibet.

That, of course, does not mean that we interfere in Tibet, in any way. We did interfere, not we, I mean, but the previous Government of India took an expedition to Lhasa under Col. Younghusband, 55 years ago. It very much interfered, imperialist intervention. They sat down there and imposed the British Government's will, acting through the then Government of India on Tibet and imposed our troops there in Tibet, in Yatung, Gyantse. All kinds of extra-territorial privileges were imposed on Tibet because Tibet was weak and there was the British Empire. With some variations, we inherited these special extra-territorial privileges when India became independent.

Regardless of what happened in Tibet or China or anywhere, we could not, according to our own policy, maintain our forces in a foreign country, even if there had been no change in Tibet. That was a relic of British Imperialism which we did not wish to continue. We had to withdraw them back. It so happened that soon after this change in the Government in China—about that time, soon after—their armies marched into Tibet. What I am venturing to say is that the policy we adopted towards Tibet would have been adopted regardless of what China did and we should have withdrawn our forces, etc. That was the main thing we did.

Shri Braj Raj Singh: There, everybody agrees.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Apparently people seem to imagine that we surrendered some privileges in Tibet. The privileges which we surrendered in Tibet were privileges which we do not seek to have in any other country in the world, Tibet or any other. It was patent from the strictly practical point of view, even apart from sentiment, that we could not do anything in Tibet either in law, constitutionally or practically.

Our attitude and historically, previously—I am not going to the past history of 500 years—the position of all previous Governments in India and elsewhere has been the

recognition of some kind of suzerainty or sovereignty of China over Tibet and Tibetan autonomy. That was normally the basis of approach. The measure of the autonomy has varied, because the strength of China, or the weakness of China, the strength of Tibet, and the weakness of Tibet has varied in the course of the last hundreds of years. But, that is the position. Every Government in China has claimed that. Many Governments in Tibet have repudiated that. So, there it is. Anyhow, we could not become judges or interfere or intervene either in law, or in fact, or in the circumstances, we could do nothing. That is just past history.

May I say one thing to the House? When the Premier of the Chinese Government came here 3 or 4 years ago or 2½ years ago, he discussed this question of situation in Tibet with me at his own instance. I did not raise it so far as I remember. He told me then that Tibet had always been, according to him and according to the Chinese position, a part of the Chinese State; that is, they have always claimed it and they have had it, according to him; but yet, Tibet was not China. Tibet is not China; Tibet is not a province of China. Tibet is an autonomous region which has been a part of the Chinese State. That was, as far as I remember, his words. Therefore, we want to treat it as an autonomous region and give it full autonomy. That is how he explained the Chinese Government's attitude to Tibet. All I can say was that we had to recognise Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. But, I was glad to hear Mr. Chou En-lai laying such stress on Tibetan autonomy. I said, if this was fully acted upon and was well known to Tibetans, possibly the difficulties would be much less, because, I remember, difficulties had arisen already, three years ago.

For nearly three years, there has been what is called the Khampa revolt in China. Khampa region, although it consists of people of Tibetan origin, is not technically Tibet now. About 50 or 60 years ago, the Khampa region in Eastern Tibet was incorporated in China. It was never really adequately controlled or ruled by any authority, Tibetan or Chinese, because Khampas are mountain people, rather tough people, not liking anybody ruling them.

When the new Chinese Government came in, quite apart from Tibet proper, the Khampa region was in China proper. They started introducing their new reforms or changes, whatever they did in land or otherwise in the Khampa region. That brought them into trouble with the

Khampas in Tibet—not actually in Tibet, but the Tibetans in China, you may say. That trouble started 2 or 3 years ago or more than that—about three years ago, locally confined there. Then it spread and it spread to the south and south-east chiefly. Naturally one does not have details. But, it was a kind of guerilla activities which went on causing much trouble to both the parties and damage and all that. That has been continuing. When the Premier Chou En-lai talked to me, this Khampa trouble had started. It is not a kind of trouble which is of great military importance to every Government; not that; it is a nuisance and it prevents things from settling down.

That has been continuing. Nothing new has happened except that in some border some convoy has been attacked or taken away or something has been happening. The new thing, what has happened in Lhasa, may I say has not flown from that; it is really a completely new development. The very matter was mentioned by me in this House and to the Press here the moment we heard of fighting there. Previous to that, only a few days previously, I had spoken in this House and talked about the conflict of wills there. I thought that expression was a good expression to describe what was happening there because there was no violence at that stage. Nobody had hit anybody. But, this conflict had come out in the open in the sense of people talking in the open. It lasted 3, 4 or 5 days when actual firing began. I cannot say who began it, but it began. Normally, one would say that where it is a question of military might, the Chinese Government is much stronger than some kind of local recruits of the Tibetan Army. It is obvious. So, that has been the background of it.

Now, it is unfortunate that all this damage is done. I do not know what damage has been done, but some considerable damage has been done to some of the old monasteries in Lhasa, and may be, some valued manuscripts have suffered thereby; and all that has happened, and our sympathies go out very much to the Tibetans....

Shri Jaipal Singh: Hear, hear.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: ...quite apart from the actual incidents, what happened, who was to blame and who was not to blame.

In the press today, the Chinese News Agency has published some letters, which, it is said, have been written by the Dalai Lama to the Chinese Governor, the military Gov-

ernor of Lhasa, just in this month. I would not like to say anything about those letters. I should like to have a little greater confirmation about them, about what they are, in what circumstances they were written, whether they were written at all. It is very difficult; because all these things are being said by various parties, it is exceedingly difficult to sift the truth out of this lot of chaff. And whatever I may say, whatever my Government may do, may have far-reaching consequences.

We talk about Tibet, and we want to have friendly relations with the people of Tibet, and we want them to progress in freedom and all that. At the same time, it is important for us to have friendly relations with this great country of China. That does not mean that I or this Government or this Parliament or anyone else should submit to any kind of dictation from any country, however great or big it may be.

Some Hon. Members: Hear, hear.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: That is not the point. But it also does mean that in a difficult situation, we should exercise a certain measure of restraint and wisdom in dealing with her, and not in an excited moment do something which may lead our country into difficulties.

(Interruptions)

Today is the 30th of this month. It was on the 20th, the early morning of the 20th, that firing began—it is now ten days—in a country from which no news comes, except rumour. The only news that has come to us or to the wide world—I am leaving out China; they might have some special ways of getting news—the only news that came was from our Consul-General's telegrams to us. We got them pretty rapidly.

But what can the Consul-General report? Remember that too. The Consul-General reports by and large what he sees from the window of his consulate. Obviously, he cannot tell us what is happening all over Tibet. He does not know. He is in touch with Lhasa, and more or less Lhasa is what he can see from his consulate, just round about what buildings firing took place, and he can report that. He cannot even tell us what is happening in Lhasa itself. He cannot tell us precisely and definitely what has happened to our nationals who are spread out. He can tell us definitely that our staff in our consulate is safe. He

can tell us also that so far as he knows our other Indian nationals are safe, but he is not certain, because he just cannot reach them, so that all news has been cut off, and it comes to us in extremely small dribblets, news that we can rely upon. And it becomes difficult for me to make statements or to say that we shall take some action, because of vague rumours which are obviously not always reliable.

Now, may I just say one word—I think I have answered it—about the people from Ladakh? It has been the old custom of people from Ladakh to go to Lhasa, and they do not take any travel papers or anything. They go for courses of instruction. Lhasa is in a sense their spiritual centre, their educational centre, from the Buddhist point of view. So, plenty of people go there. At the present moment, I have been informed that four head abbots from Leh are there, as well as—I forgot the number,—about 30 or 40 or 50—or it may be somewhere about a hundred—monks and others who have gone there. We have not got them on our register there, because they simply come and go, and do not report to us. But as soon as I heard about this two days ago, we are making inquiries about them.

Now, I come to the statements issued presumably by the Chinese Government. Now, these statements give a narrative of facts according to them, and I have nothing to say to that. I can neither confirm it nor deny it, because it is not in my knowledge to make a firm statement; if it was, I would make it.

As I said, so far as the letters which are said to have been written by the Dalai Lama are concerned, they are rather surprising letters. But more I cannot say; I should like to know more about them before I say.

There are two things mentioned in this statement of the Chinese authorities. One is about Kalimpong. About that, as soon as that appeared, the External Affairs Ministry, through a spokesman, contradicted that statement or corrected it. I suppose hon. Members have seen it, but I shall read it out, or part of it, if they have not,

“Asked for his comments on the description of Kalimpong as ‘the commanding centre of the rebellion’ in the news communique released—an official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs emphatically repudiated the suggestion. He said that a number of people from Tibet have been residing in Kalimpong for many years...”

many years meaning twenty, thirty, forty, fifty and more—

“and among them are some who arrived during the last three or four years.”

It is not many, it may be in dozens, perhaps.

“The Government of India have repeatedly made it clear to them that they should not indulge in any propaganda activities against a friendly Government on Indian soil. The last warning was given about six months ago and since then these persons have remained quiet. There have been no unlawful activities in Kalimpong or elsewhere either by these people or others. It is, therefore, entirely incorrect to say that Kalimpong is the centre of any rebellious activities. The check-posts on the India-Tibet border are adequately manned and the strictest watch is always maintained on movements between India and Tibet.”

Now, an hon. Member wanted precise information as to whether the Chinese Government had complained to us about Kalimpong. I shall tell him, so far as I can remember, in the last few months, maybe, a year, there has been no complaint; but there were on two occasions perhaps, two or maybe three in the last three or four years, references to Kalimpong, to some people in Kalimpong carrying on propaganda and like activities. Our position has always been, and we have made it quite clear to people who came from Tibet, important people, that ‘you are welcome to come here, but we cannot allow Indian soil to be used for subversive activities or even aggressively propagandist activities against friendly Governments’. That general policy of ours applies to every Embassy that is here; maybe sometimes, they overstep the mark or we do not object when we might have objected. That applies to every Embassy here or every foreigner here. So that was the rule that we followed. And on two or three occasions, some leaflet came out in Kalimpong, which we thought was undesirable, and we drew the attention of the people who had brought it out, saying ‘you should not do this, this kind of thing from Indian soil.’ And our instructions and warnings had effect, so far as we know we are not aware, in fact, in the last many months, of any activity in Kalimpong; it may be in people’s minds there; naturally, they may have feelings; they may have sentiments. But I am merely saying that it is wrong to say that Kalimpong was a kind of centre from which activities were organised.

Shrimati Renu Chakravarty: Has the Prime Minister read Elizabeth Partridge's article which has come in one of the papers where she says that she has contacted the rebels? It has come out in the papers.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I have not read that particular article. I do not know to which article the hon. lady Member is referring. In one or two cases, foreign correspondents have gone and talked to people there in Kalimpong or wherever it is; I do not know where, it may be Kalimpong, or it may be elsewhere, but they have not mentioned names or the place or the individuals contacted. And they have given an account from the point of view, more or less, of those people in Tibet, who were on the site of the revolt. That I cannot catch, I cannot get it, but broadly speaking, it is wrong to say that Kalimpong has been the centre. Certainly, we have very good control of our check-posts, of people coming and going from Tibet to India, and nobody in Kalimpong can easily come or go, and you cannot control something where the movement is not easy.

I am told that when we enquired about Elizabeth Partridge's article, we found she had not gone anywhere near the border; she had written it from far away.

The second point to which reference has been made by hon. Members is to what is said in those press statements about our discussions here. It is not necessary for me to say that it is open to this House, this Parliament, and it is completely free to say or do what it chooses, to discuss any matter it chooses, subject always to the necessities of good sense and wisdom of which you, Sir, are the best judge. Nobody else outside this House is going to judge.

Unfortunately, the methods of government and the way legislatures and organisations function in China are different from ours. Perhaps it is not quite realised there, the background or the way of our functioning. Quite apart from what we do, or whether what any hon. Member says is right or wrong, he has the right to say it; he has the right to say the wrong thing, as many hon. Members on the opposite side know very well.

Shri Hem Barua: You enjoy that right equally.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: It is, I suppose, a little difficult for people trained in a different tradition for a long time to understand the normal ways in which a parliamentary system of Government functions, and we should not be over-eager to find fault with somebody who does not

agree with us, who describes our system in a different way, but certainly it should be made perfectly clear to all concerned that this Parliament is not going to be limited in the exercise of its right of discussion, saying or action or anything, by any external or internal authority, whoever it may be. Having said that, obviously that right has to be exercised always with wisdom and always thinking of the consequences, and how that right should be exercised.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT IN LOK SABHA

THE PRIME MINISTER, SHRI JAWAHARLAL Nehru, made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on April 2, 1959:

Mr. Speaker, Sir, I must express my deep regret for my absence yesterday from the House as I had gone out of Delhi. Since my return this morning, I have tried to get myself acquainted with what happened in the House by reading the official reports. I have not read any newspaper yet. I do not know what the newspapers say. I think the official reports would naturally be more reliable. I must say, reading them, although I got a gist of what happened, I sensed that much of what happened yesterday was—shall I say,—I wish to say nothing disrespectful but there was an exhibition of a certain lack of restraint, if I may say so, and certain strong feelings which came in the way of the consideration of the matter that was placed before you and before the House.

Now, the matter is important and I can very well understand the strong feelings and the matter is important not because of the one or two or more adjournment motions that were moved here but because of what lies behind those motions. It is that which has led to strong feelings in the House and in the country. The actual motions were perhaps not very important but the other thing is important. Because the other thing is important, it is all the more necessary that we should not be led away by relatively extraneous or minor matters into doing or saying things which affect the other major things at issue. They are big things at issue and in that matter I cannot say that

every Member of this House is of identical opinion. But I do think that nearly all the Members of this House will broadly agree—I imagine so and anyhow whether large or not, we have to realise—the importance of what is happening and the consequences of what is happening. We have to shape our policy keeping full regard naturally, the first thing for the honour and dignity and the interests of India; secondly, the honour and dignity of the causes for which we stand. Also, we must remember that when conflicts arise which lead to this certain degree of passion on various sides one has to be particularly careful, especially this Honourable House whose words go out to the ends of the earth. We have to be particularly careful at a moment of difficulty such as this, that we function and we say whatever we have to say with dignity and, as I ventured to say last time, wisdom. That does not mean moderating any policy. We follow the policy which the House will ultimately agree to.

Now, Sir, the two matters, as far as I can gather, that were raised yesterday in two adjournment motions were a statement issued by the Communist Party of India and the circulation of an article in the *People's Daily* of Peking, circulation presumably by an agency attached to the Chinese Embassy here. These were the two matters, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. Speaker: Yes, they are the two matters.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Before I deal with them, may I, Sir, mention one thing. Perhaps you have, Sir, another adjournment motion today. I have received notice of it and I do not know whether you have been pleased to consider it, but I might also deal with that adjournment motion. There is an adjournment motion—there are two in fact—asking me, first of all, as to whether there is any truth that the Chinese authorities have expressed a wish to search the premises of Indian Missions in Tibet or asked us to vacate those premises. Now, here is an instance of every rumour, which are appearing in newspapers in great abundance, affecting the people being brought into the House by way of an adjournment motion or some other motion. There is no truth in this at all. Nobody has asked us to vacate our premises. Nobody has asked us to search our Missions abroad. But everything comes in in the shape of an adjournment motion or asking me to make a statement. It is very difficult to keep pace with the amount of statements which are appearing in the Press now, coming chiefly

from Kalimpong or Hong Kong—those appear to be the two sources of information. Anyhow, there is no truth in that..

Then, again, there was another adjournment motion asking me whether it is true that the Chinese Embassy sent for a top leader of the Communist Party of India to discuss various matters with them. Now, how am I to know, Sir? I do not. I have no information on the subject. I can say nothing.

Another matter—it is not the subject of an adjournment motion, I think I was asked to make a statement on it—is the visit, as it is said, of a group of Tibetans to me a day or two ago. Now, day before yesterday a large number, about 125 people came to visit me. Normally speaking, Sir, every morning in my house a few hundred people come. It is an open door more or less. Large numbers of peasants, students and others come because, unfortunately, I am supposed to be one of the sights of Delhi.

Anyhow, about these 125 people, they said they had come to Delhi and wanted to pay their respects to me. I said, certainly come. The great majority of them were Indian nationals, chiefly from Darjeeling, Kalimpong and those northern areas. Some were from Calcutta, that is to say, Indian nationals of Tibetan origin representing some association in Calcutta, Banaras, Kalimpong and others. There were a few, I forget how many people from Tibet proper who had gathered here some days ago. They came. We had no discussion. They did give me a paper, a kind of a memorandum which I took, and then I bid good-bye to them. That is all that happened.

Coming to the two matters which were referred to yesterday, one was the statement of the Communist Party of India. Now, I have, naturally, endeavoured to get a copy of that statement and read it carefully. I presume that it is a correct copy that I have. I have no reason to doubt its correctness, but I cannot guarantee that.

Mr. Speaker: I have been given an alternative copy.. If there is any difference I will point out.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Well, I am not going to read it, Sir, but I take it that I have a correct copy. I have read it carefully and, if I may express my own opinion about it, the whole background of the statement is not one with which I would agree. I do not agree with it. There are certain slants with which I do not agree. But the question

before us, I take it, is not whether we agree with the statement or not slant given in that statement or not, but, rather, if any great impropriety has been committed by the issue of that statement. I am not myself quite clear how, normally speaking, if a statement is issued by a political party outside that statement becomes the subject matter of an adjournment motion in this House. It is not clear to me. Of course, each case depends upon the content but, broadly speaking,—whether one agrees with the statement or disagrees is a completely different matter—political parties sometimes attack each other, criticise each other, or say something which another party may consider very objectionable. But, nevertheless, it is not clear to me how this matter can be raised by way of an adjournment motion.

Now, it has been stated that it was raised because this statement challenged the *bona fides* of what I had said two days before about Kalimpong. I have read the statement carefully. What I would say is this, that it does not precisely and explicitly do that. But it does certainly throw a hint that what I might have said, whether through misinformation or otherwise, might not be correct, so that I do not quite know what to do about it.

I shall repeat and, perhaps, a little more fully what I did previously, what I said about Kalimpong. You will remember, Sir, that in certain statements issued by the Chinese Government Kalimpong was referred to as the Commanding Centre of the Tibetan rebellion, and I said this is not true at all, and the External Affairs Ministry had also denied this. At the same time, I had said that I have often said that Kalimpong has been centre of trouble.

Kalimpong, Sir, has been often described as a nest of spies, spies of innumerable nationalities, not one, spies from Asia, spies from Europe, spies from America, spies of Communists, spies of anti-Communists, red spies, white spies, blue spies, pink spies and so on. Once a knowledgeable person who knew something about this matter and was in Kalimpong actually said to me, though no doubt it was a figure of speech, that there were probably more spies in Kalimpong than the rest of the inhabitants put together. That is an exaggeration. But it has become in the last few years, especially in the last seven or eight years. As Kalimpong is more or less perched near the borders of India, and since the developments in Tibet some years ago since a change took place there, it became of great interest to all kinds of people outside India, and many people have

come here in various guises, sometimes as technical people, sometimes as bird watchers, sometimes as geologists, sometimes as journalists and sometimes with some other purpose, just to admire the natural scenery, and so they all seem to find an interest; the main object of their interest, whether it is bird watching or something else, was round about Kalimpong.

Naturally we have taken interest in this. We have to. While we cannot say that we know exactly everything that took place there, broadly we do know and we have repeatedly taken objection to those persons concerned or to their Embassies. We have pointed this out and we have in the past even hinted that some people better remove themselves from there, and they have removed themselves. This has been going on for the last few years so there is no doubt that so far as Kalimpong is concerned there has been a deal of espionage and counter-espionage and a complicated game of chess by various nationalities and various numbers of spies and counter-spies there. No doubt a person with the ability to write fiction of this kind will find Kalimpong an interesting place for some novel of that type.

Shri Nath Pai: What is the Home Ministry doing about it? It seems to be absolutely ineffective.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: The Home Ministry or the External Affairs Ministry are not at all worried about the situation.

Shri Hem Barua: They allow the spies to espionage.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Absolutely yes, first of all, because when we suspect a person of espionage we keep a watch over him. If he does something patently wrong we take action, but there are certain limitations in the law, as the House very well knows, and we cannot function merely because we suspect somebody, and we have taken action in the past in regard to some people.

Shri P. N. Singh: In how many cases action has been taken?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I cannot say that—actions of various types, as I said.

Now, about this particular matter, the statement by the Chinese Government, please remember the statement, "this was the commanding centre of Tibetan rebellion". I cannot say—how can I—that nobody in Kalimpong has indulged

in espionage against the Chinese Government or against any other Government. I cannot say. Somebody whispers something to somebody else's ear. But I did repudiate and I repudiate today that to say Kalimpong has been the commanding centre gives it a place in this matter which is, I think, completely untrue.

Now, in the past several years—and I said so on the last occasion—the Chinese Government has drawn our attention to what they said were activities in the Kalimpong area, that is, activities aimed against them. And repeatedly we have made enquiries; apart from our normal enquiries we have made special enquiries. I say this because I find that in the Communist party's statement we are asked to have an investigation. In so far as espionage activities are concerned we have investigated them several times. One cannot investigate these activities in any other way except through intelligence methods. That is being done. We have fairly full reports about it. I have got—I need not go into it—a fairly full note as to when the protest came from the Chinese Government. Three or four years ago it was mentioned to me and it was mentioned to our Ambassador some years ago, and we enquired and we took action. Sometimes we found that their protests or the facts that they stated did not have any particular basis. They would say, for instance, that an organisation in Kalimpong was doing something or other. We found there was no such organisation in Kalimpong at all. There were organisations there; they were of course people in Kalimpong. Everybody knows that. There are some emigrants from Tibet. There are old Tibetans, that is to say, who have been there for a generation or more, but whose feelings may be against the Chinese Government. That is so; there is no doubt about it, and we cannot do anything about it but we did make it perfectly clear to them in accordance with our normal policy that they must not indulge in any propagandist activities and much less, of course, in any subversive activities.

In the nature of things they could not do much even if they wanted to intimate except perhaps—I cannot guarantee that—occasionally send a message or receive a message. It is very difficult to stop that but that is on a very small scale. They could not do very much in India except again to whisper something in somebody's ears. That I cannot stop. They may have whispered something here and there. But it is obvious to me that they could not do much and they did not. Once or twice a certain leaflet or

certain document was issued; somebody issued it. The moment it was issued we took action. We tried to trace it and we told them that they must not have been done. This has happened in three or four occasions. Again I repeat,—we were charged with—it was said that Kalimpong was a commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion. I denied that statement and I further said that apart from the last few years when there has occasionally been a paper or a leaflet or occasionally somebody in Kalimpong has perhaps met somebody else, privately and not publicly—that can always take place—and more particularly in the last five or six months, more particularly I might say since we received the last protest from the Chinese Government—I think the last was early in August last year—we took particular care to enquire again and we had no complaints since then. So, even if some activities took place there by some people there previously they were of a relatively small nature except of course contacts, and what can we say about contacts in a place which, as I said, is so full of spies—there may be contacts, somebody meeting somebody. But in the last six months, we have taken particular care, and we have had no cause to think that any such action or activities had taken place there. I cannot conceive that Kalimpong could be—it has been described by the Chinese Government as the commanding centre—a commanding centre with the Indian Government not knowing about it. It is quite inconceivable to me. Some odd message can go or come and that is possible, but it cannot be, and to imagine that the Tibetan rebellion was organised from Kalimpong does seem to me a statement which cannot be justified.

Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri: Did the Chinese Government in August complain that somebody was organising a rebellion from there?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: No, Sir. Not that. They did not talk about rebellion. But so far as our records go, the first mention of it was made informally to us in 1956-57, when Premier Chou En-lai came here and it was mentioned to me and I replied that our policy was that we did not wish our soil—Indian soil—to be used for any subversive activities against a friendly country. But I also pointed out that there were obvious limitations under our law to take action on the basis of suspicion, and I requested his Government to supply me with special cases and that we would immediately enquire and take action if necessary. Then a year and a half later, the same matter was mentioned to our Ambassador in Peking. At that time a photostat copy

of a pamphlet which has been circulated in Kalimpong was sent to us. This was about 15 or 16 months ago, i.e. in January, 1958. There is no doubt about it that that pamphlet was anti-Chinese. But on enquiry and examination, we found that there was no such association as had been described in that pamphlet and the pamphlet itself, as a matter of fact, was two years old and had been issued in autumn of 1956—some ancient pamphlet which they have got. That pamphlet was a bad one from our point of view, too, but some bogus name was given and somebody had issued it there.

There were, in fact, two associations in Kalimpong—one Tibetan Association, which has been in existence for 25 years and odd and the other, the Indo-Tibetan Association brought into being in 1954. The office-bearers of either of these associations were prominent emigrants, but neither of these associations was supposed to be engaged in political activities. In July, 1958, the Foreign Office in Peking presented a memorandum protesting against the use of Kalimpong area as a base for subversive and disruptive activities and five points were mentioned. Some names of persons were given. We immediately enquired into the activities of all these persons and we made detailed reports. We found that no doubt these persons held views which might be said to be anti-Chinese, but we could not get any information of any activity, propagandist or subversive.

The charge was made that they were in collusion with the United States and with the Kuomintang authorities of Formosa or their representatives. Some of the prominent emigrants in Kalimpong had previously been in the United States and had lived there for sometime. And, no doubt, they had their contacts there. We had no doubt about their views about it. But we have made it clear to them, even when they settled down in India, that we do not wish Indian soil to be used for any subversive activities. Once when some letter or something was sent, we particularly looked into it and all those six persons who had been named in the Chinese Government's note were given specific warnings on the 14th of August through the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling and to our knowledge, since that date, they have not done so. But as I said, I cannot guarantee any secret thing.

There are three organisations mentioned in the Chinese note, viz., the Tibetan Freedom League, the Kalimpong-Tibetan Welfare Conference and the Buddhist Association

which were alleged to be engaged in collecting intelligence from Tibet. We could not trace any of these three organisations and so far as we know, they are not in existence. Two other ones which I have mentioned previously were in existence and so far as we know, engaged in non-political activities.

Shri M. P. Mishra: How did the Chinese get the information?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: The third objection in the Chinese note was to the reactionary views of a monthly called the *Tibetan Mirror*, which is edited by an Indian national of Ladakhi origin. As a matter of fact, we issued a warning to the editor, but we pointed out to the Chinese that many newspapers in India were far more anti-Government, i.e. anti-Government of India, and we could not and did not take any legal action against them.

Shri Tyagi: Peking must be inspiring them.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: A statement was further made in the Chinese note that agents and saboteurs were sent into Tibet and arms were smuggled and despatched to the rebels. But no evidence was given and we are not aware of a single case. It is not an easy matter to cross the border between India and Tibet. Nobody can guarantee an individual perhaps going across, but to take arms, etc., was exceedingly difficult, practically impossible, without our knowledge.

Then the Chinese Government protested against agents of the Kuomintang operating in Kalimpong, particularly one gentleman whose name was given. We enquired into this matter....

Shri Surendranath Dwivedy: May I ask whether all these details are necessary?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I thought they were not necessary; I agree with the Hon. Member. But this matter has been discussed at such considerable length and warmth. We found that this gentleman who had been named had been in Calcutta two years earlier and had presumably returned, because we could not trace him.

Another note was presented to us by the Chinese Ambassador on the 4th August—that was in July, the previous month—drawing our attention to the setting up of a committee in Kalimpong for giving support to resistance against

violence by the Tibetan reactionaries and that this committee was forcing people into support of the signature campaign, and also drawing attention to the alleged meeting of 15 aristocrats wanting to make an appeal for support for Tibet. We enquired into this matter and we gave him our reply that so far as the leaders were concerned, we had already warned them.

The House will see that all this took place in August and there has been to our knowledge nothing which we could have called objectionable, except private expression of opinion—that we cannot guarantee—during this period. Therefore, I venture to say that, in spite of the presence of people in Kalimpong to whom the Chinese Government might object because they were opposed to Chinese—Government's policy and all kinds could be made into the basis of a statement that Kalimpong was the commanding centre of the Tibetan rebellion.

Shri Khadilkar: I would like to know one thing. We have heard so many notes that we have received regarding Kalimpong from Chinese Government. As he mentioned, in 1956, when Chou En-lai was here and when, fortunately or unfortunately, Dalai Lama was here, he was reluctant to leave this country and asked for a sanctuary. Through the intervention of our Prime Minister and an assurance was given that no repressive measures would be taken by the local Chinese command and on that specific assurance, he returned. The Prime Minister promised that he would pay a visit soon to see that that assurance was carried out.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: What the Hon. Member has said is not at all correct, not at all. There is no question of my getting an assurance from Premier Chou En-lai or his giving it or my asking for it. No such question arose at all. There was a question whether Dalai Lama should visit Kalimpong or not. It was in that connection that that was said. Naturally, we were anxious about Dalai Lama's security when he went to Kalimpong or anywhere. We discussed this with Premier Chou En-lai and ultimately the Dalai Lama decided to go there. We had informed the people—the Tibetans and the people of Tibetan origin in Kalimpong that they will have to behave when the Dalai Lama went there. They did it when he went there. So, there is no question of assurance and all that. I do not know from where the Hon. Member got all that.

Shri Khadilkar: The second information is from "Thought".

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I would not say anything against that periodical but I can say this particular information is completely basically untrue. I cannot say about one or two sentences, as I have not seen it. But most of the rest of it is untrue.

Shri Sadhan Gupta: It is only a thought.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Coming to the statement issued by the....

Shri Mohammed Imam: I would like a clarification. Is it till August there were anti-Chinese activities at Kalimpong by the spies. Were these things that provoked the Chinese to occupy Tibet? What was the immediate cause that provoked the Chinese Government to occupy Tibet?

Mr. Speaker: That does not arise.

Shri Tyagi: It is another thought.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: Presumably, the spies came afterwards.

About the article in the *People's Daily* of Peking, first of all, it is not for us to object to any article that appears in a newspaper in Peking. Obviously, if we started objecting we may disagree with them; there are many articles in the world press with which we are not in agreement; some are even very censorious of India or Indian policy—we can answer them. The only point is whether the circulation of that article here was proper or improper. That is it. Now I should like to point out that article appeared in Peking well before they could have had any report of my statement here. It took two days to come across here. But when it appeared in Peking it had no relation to my statement. It appeared, I cannot say the exact time but probably sometime or a few hours before. They could not have had it. But even if they had it, they have every right to do what they like.

Now about the Embassy circulating papers, a question was raised here of, shall I say, breach of diplomatic privilege. There is no such thing. It depends, of course, on how it is done. But reproducing a newspaper article in their own country can certainly not be thought of in that light. It may be an impropriety, it may not be the right thing to do. It is very difficult to draw the line. We have throughout been trying to impress on the various Embassies

here that we do not approve of the cold war being brought into India. That is, articles being circulated here, attacking apart from India other countries, in that sense. And, on the whole, I would say we have succeeded, not completely; but I must say the foreign Embassies here have been good enough to avoid doing many things which I find they are doing in other countries in regard to the cold war attitude. Now, I do not wish to mention countries, but I may mention one country. If the articles that have often appeared in the Pakistan newspapers were circulated here frequently, well, we would not approve of it, and in fact we have not in the past approved it, because sometimes we consider these articles very objectionable. We cannot stop them. But they should not be circulated by an Embassy here. I have given one instance. I can give many other instances. This is an instance of the very regrettable cold war between Pakistan and India. But in the bigger sphere of the cold war in the world many articles appear which use the strongest language in attacking the other country. We try not to have them circulated here. Well, the foreign Embassies have been good enough to co-operate with us in this matter. In this particular matter, as I said, it is anybody's opinion whether this was a very proper thing to do or an improper thing to do, although I would like to draw attention to the actual phrase of it to which objection has perhaps been taken. It is slightly different from the phraseology in the Chinese Government's reference to Kalimpong. Here it says the reactionaries in Tibet etc. "utilising Kalimpong, which is in a foreign land, as a centre for collusion with imperialism", slightly different from saying that Kalimpong, is the commanding centre of, collusion. May be, that may be explained by saying that somebody met somebody and whispered and, as such, that is collusion certainly.

I am merely putting various aspects of this matter. It is an unsavoury matter altogether. But I want the House to deal with this matter with dignity and restraint, because behind all these minor matters lie much bigger matters which we have to face today, tomorrow and the day after, and we should not allow ourselves to be diverted from that major and difficult issue by relatively minor issues.

PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT REGARDING DALAI LAMA

THE PRIME MINISTER, SHRI JAWAHARLAL Nehru, made the following statement in Lok Sabha regarding the Dalai Lama on April 3, 1959:

The other day, three days ago, I think, when I was speaking about recent happenings in Tibet, I mentioned that I would keep the House informed of every fresh development. In the last two days, day before yesterday and yesterday, we have been receiving a number of messages. They were often delayed because they had to come through a rather devious route.

Yesterday I was thinking of informing the House of a certain development, but then I hesitated to do so, because I wanted it to be fully confirmed; I was waiting for some details. We received them last evening. We could have issued this news to the Press last evening, but I thought I should inform the House first and then the Press can have it.

The facts are that on the 1st April, i.e. day before yesterday morning, we received a message via Shillong dated 31st March evening that an emissary with a message from the Dalai Lama had arrived at our border check-post at Chutangmu in the north-East Frontier Agency. He had arrived there on the 29th March stating that the Dalai Lama requested us for political asylum and that he expected to reach the border on the 30th March, i.e. soon after he himself had come. We received the message on the 1st. The same evening, i.e. 1st April evening, a message was received by us again via Shillong dated 1st April that the Dalai Lama with his small party of 8 had crossed into our territory on the evening of the 31st March.

Excepting that some such development might occur, we had instructed the various check-posts round about there what to do in case such a development takes place. So, when he crossed over into our territory, he was received by our Assistant Political Officer of the Tawang sub-division, which is a part of the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency. A little later, the rest of his party, the entourage, came in. The total number who have come with him or after him is 80. From the 2nd evening, i.e. yesterday, we learn that this party in two

groups is moving towards Tawang, which is the headquarters of that sub-division and that he is expected to reach Tawang the day after tomorrow, Sunday, 5th evening.

Shri Braj Raj Singh: I want a clarification, which is a very important one.

Shri Khadilkar: I want a little more information.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker: This is the information that the Prime Minister has got just at present. If he gets more, he has promised us that he will place it before the House.

Shri Braj Raj Singh: I want a clarification. There is a news in the Press that the New China News Agency had published the very same news yesterday. How is it that the Government of India here did not get this confirmation even till the last evening? The Prime Minister himself said that he knew the information when he was making a statement here yesterday, but he could get the confirmation only last evening. May I know whether we are going to give political asylum to the Dalai Lama.

Shri Khadilkar: We have given the Dalai Lama asylum here

Shri Nath Pai: We do not know if we have given him.

An Hon. Member: We have.

Shri Khadilkar: I want a clarification. The Dalai Lama is the temporal and spiritual head of Tibet. Does the asylum confer the same right on him and will he be functioning in the same capacity on the Indian soil? That is a very serious matter.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: So far as Mr. Khadilkar's question is concerned, about spiritual rights, etc., I cannot answer it. It is a complicated matter which will have to be considered. But there is no doubt that he will receive respectful treatment.

Shri Naushir Bharucha: Is it a fact that the Dalai Lama was injured?

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: No, Sir; he is quite healthy.

As for the other question, I myself stated that we knew it day before yesterday evening--in fact, if I may say so, I was not here then, but we knew about his having crossed the frontier, but we wanted certain confirmation about details, whether the whole party had crossed over.

where they were, etc., before I mentioned it to this House. Yesterday morning, I was not in a position to do so, although I knew that he had crossed the border. In the evening I was, but I wanted to wait for the meeting of the Lok Sabha today to say so, instead of giving the news to the Press.

PRIME MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON 5TH APRIL 1958.

QUESTION: HOW DID THE NEWS OF THE ARRIVAL OF the Dalai Lama come to be announced from Peking before it was announced here?

Prime Minister: I am afraid I cannot answer that question. Of course, we could have announced it before and certainly a day before and possibly a day and half before; but among other reasons, one reason of our not announcing it then was security. We wanted to make adequate arrangements for security before we announced it.

Question: This question is important because it seems there are spy activities on our borders, otherwise how could they know it when even our own people did not know anything?

Prime Minister: I cannot tell you because I do not know. I can guess if you like. I do not think any news could have got out of the border. I don't think it is conceivable. I don't say anything is impossible but it is very unlikely.

Question: Did it leak out from Delhi?

Prime Minister: That too seems very very unlikely. As a matter of fact, in Delhi for that brief period, a little before too, the secret was very well kept.

Question: It remained secret from Indians but the Chinese Embassy got it and the Reuters also sent a telegram quoting diplomatic sources. Only we people did not know anything about it.

Prime Minister: No diplomatic sources. I think these are vague guesses based on an intelligent anticipation of what might happen. I believe the Reuters first message was that he had

gone to Bhutan. It was obvious that he was coming in this direction. Where he would get through, they were guessing.

Question: The first communication about Dalai Lama, was it made when the Chinese Ambassador met the Foreign Secretary or were there any earlier communications?

Prime Minister: No. After the arrival of the Dalai Lama and his entry into India and our reception to him, our Foreign Secretary sent for the Chinese Ambassador to inform him of this.

Question: Will the Dalai Lama function as Dalai Lama from India too as spiritual leader of Tibet? What are the implications of this?

Prime Minister: There is nothing in, shall I say, our regulations, rules, conventions about spirituality and how a person functions spiritually. That is not supposed to be a political post or designation. People acknowledge him as a spiritual leader, they acknowledge him. There the matter ends. How can he function in Tibet when he is in India.

Question: You will ask him not to associate himself with any political activities while on India soil?

Prime Minister: Well, it is natural that any person in India cannot, is not expected, to function on the political plane in this way.

Question: It is presumed when political asylum is given that the man is free to operate politically at least as far as other countries are concerned

Prime Minister: I don't think that is the general assumption at all.

Question: There are several instances in Europe. For example our own people went and got asylum, for example Raja Mahendra Pratap gave his own case as an instance in Parliament. He was operating politically in all the countries where he was given asylum.

Prime Minister: When?

..Question: He says all his life until India became free. He was a political person in all countries he went to.

Prime Minister: It was the time of the First World War chiefly when he functioned abroad. I don't think he functioned much since then, after the First War ended.

Question: You have said that political activity must be ruled

out. Does it also mean that he will not be allowed to make a statement explaining the facts?

Prime Minister: No; I cannot tell you exactly what the position might be. We shall have to consider it because, as you know, quite apart from political and other reasons, he is a person greatly revered in India and certainly among all Buddhists and even non-Buddhists in India and it is not our intention to put, what might be called undesirable curbs on him but we shall have to discuss this matter with him and I am sure that he would not like to take any steps here which embarrass us and him.

Question: Where is he likely to be kept? There is a rumour that he will be kept in Ooty?

Prime Minister: I cannot tell you finally yet. But two things I can tell you—that he is not likely to stay anywhere near the frontier nor is he likely to go to Southern India.

Question: Is there any correspondence with Mr. Chou En-lai on the subject of Tibet?

Prime Minister: You mean recently.

Question: Yes, within recent days.

Prime Minister: No. We had no correspondence about Tibet at all. On one or two other matters some months ago we had correspondence—nothing to do with Tibet.

Question: Will you tell us when and where you will meet the Dalai Lama?

Prime Minister: I can't say that. I suppose I will meet him of course at some place sometime but we have not even given thought to that matter. We don't quite know when he will arrive. Of course there is no point in our rushing him. He had a hard journey, I suppose, and he comes slowly resting on the way.

Question: When you spoke last in the Lok Sabha, you referred to letters from Dalai Lama and you said: 'I should like to have a little greater confirmation about them, about what they are, in what circumstances they were written, whether they were written at all.' I want to know have you any confirmation or any news about them and what was your basis that you doubted about their authenticity?

Prime Minister: You see, the statement that the Dalai Lama was being compelled to do some thing, that the Dalai Lama in

fact complaining of his own people, who revere him so much, seemed to me a very odd statement. Whoever else might be against the Dalai Lama, I should have thought that the great mass of the Tibetan people are not against him. They are devoted to him. Therefore I could not understand that. Is that all?

Question: Do you think that China has observed Panchsheel scrupulously in regard to Tibet?

Prime Minister: I don't think the question of Panchsheel directly arises in this connection. We may disapprove of what one country has done or not. There is hardly a country which you cannot criticise on the ground that the principles of Panchsheel have not been observed but in this particular matter I don't quite see how that particular thing arises.

Question: The Japanese Ambassador has written an article in a Japanese paper which was circulated here in press comments in which he says that this Panchsheel agreement with China has been wearing out for some time and the uprising in Tibet shows that it has completely worn out.

Prime Minister: I have not seen that article but the Panchsheel lays down certain principles of international relations. Those principles, if they are good principles, they remain good whatever any individual or country might do. People seem to think that the so-called Panchsheel is some temporary arrangement to meet a temporary set of circumstances. It is not. It is a basic approach to international affairs and life generally. It may have to be adapted because of changing circumstances.

If we believe in Panchsheel, we follow it, even if no country in the wide world follows it. Of course, it cannot be easily followed in a one-sided way, but that is a different matter. But our attitude will be to follow it. Our attempt will be to follow it, if we believe in it, as we do.

Now, what has happened in Tibet is related to the agreement between China and the authorities in Tibet, in 1950, I think. You will see that on both sides there, it is stated that that agreement has ended or broken up. There is no doubt about it and if both say so there is no doubt about it, and events also indicate that. Now, that is an important fact that it has broken down. That agreement was based on two factors—on the recognition of the sovereignty of China over Tibet and the autonomy of Tibet. These are two major factors. Well, that agreement has broken down; and it is not possible for me to give a precise account of what happened in Tibet. But it is well-known that there have been conflicts and pulls there in various direc-

tions; and it is obvious that at present, since this uprising, there is no autonomy in Tibet. These are obvious facts whatever the background may be.

Question: Do you think national autonomy is possible in a Communist State,

Prime Minister: Surely, why not? I don't see any contradiction in that.

Question: But it has never happened.

Prime Minister: Well, you see, the difficulty is that we are gradually becoming conditioned, wrongly conditioned, by the cold war attitude in the world. If we have always to live with the cold war as our companion, well, many things happen which normally should not happen. But if the cold war was not there, we would all become a little more normal.

Question: It is reported that you are having correspondence with the Dalai Lama. Is it about his wishes?

Prime Minister: No, I don't know, except that I got a message from him which he sent to me on his arrival, and I sent him a very brief message of greetings.

Question: To what extent would the Dalai Lama's personal safety be the Government of India's responsibility?

Prime Minister: One hundred per cent.

Question: You had said that since this conflict started, autonomy in Tibet has disappeared.

Prime Minister: Tibet has disappeared?

Question: Do you mean the conflicts started from 1953 or the recent conflict?

Prime Minister: Tibet has not disappeared.

Question: The autonomy of Tibet has disappeared.

Prime Minister: Well, yes.

Question: From which period do you date this breaking up of the agreement?

Prime Minister: You might say the date when it officially ended is this date, say ten days ago. That is the official date. For the rest, there have been troubles over Eastern Tibet and a little in Southern Tibet. That means that there were troubles there but constitutionally it did not end. Actually, it may function or not because of these troubles.

Question: In regard to the question of autonomy which we speak of, we also speak of autonomy in the case of the Centre and the States, where the Centre is autonomous in respect of certain subjects and the States are autonomous in respect of certain other subjects. In what respect was Tibet considered to be autonomous?

Prime Minister: I am afraid I cannot spell that out, except to tell you my own interpretation of what Premier Chou En-lai said to me. I mentioned that in the Lok Sabha. He laid stress, first of all, that Tibet was and had always been, according to him, a part of the Chinese State, a part of the larger family of China. Then he said: "But Tibet is not a province of China. It is different from China proper. We recognise that and, therefore, we consider it to be an autonomous region of the Chinese State. The Chinese people are called the Han people. The Tibetans are not Hans. The Tibetans are Tibetans." That is what he said. Therefore, if you compare it to India, here, first of all there is no question of any person or any part of India not being an Indian. He is an Indian whatever else he might be.

Secondly, the autonomy of an Indian State is laid down, the measure of it, in our Constitution. It is definitely a limited autonomy. There are lists of subjects where the States are autonomous and there are other lists where the Central Government's authority prevails. Normally speaking the Central Government cannot invade the autonomy of the States in India and certainly the States cannot do so in regard to the Central Government, but, abnormally the Constitution provides that the Central Government can take charge of a State under special circumstances. So, the type of autonomy here is different, I thought, from the type of autonomy in the autonomous region of Tibet. Of course, there are many other factors also. From the social, religious and economic points of view, there is considerable difference, I take it, between Tibet and many other parts of China proper. Tibet has been cut off from the world practically for ages. Economically speaking, it is very backward and this impact of vast changes which are taking place in China itself must produce tremendous reactions.

Question: Sir, according to the Soviet Constitution an autonomous region is more backward constitutionally than the Federating Republic. Do you think the same provision is there in the Chinese constitution that is, like Inner Mongolia enjoying autonomous status like Tibet? What is the exact position? For example, in Russia, the Republics certainly have more powers such as a Foreign Minister, even a standing army and

so on. Do you think that under the Chinese constitution there is similar provision?

Prime Minister: I am afraid I cannot answer this question precisely but I imagine that the various constituting units of the Soviet Union, including the autonomous regions, are all more or less wedded to a certain policy which might be called the Communist policy while Tibet was not and is not Communist. And the mere fact of the Dalai Lama being the religious head and till recently the political head under, broadly the Chinese umbrella, itself shows that it was very different.

Question: Would you like to give a broad definition of the term 'suzerainty' as distinct from 'sovereignty'?

Prime Minister: No. I am afraid it requires a jurist to do that and probably two jurists might differ—except that 'suzerainty' is obviously less than 'sovereignty.'

Question: How far does this disappearance of the agreement over Tibet with China affect our agreement about Tibet?

Prime Minister: The disappearance of that does not affect it—if you read it—but I do not know what the consequences of developments in Tibet might be. You see what was our agreement with China in regard to Tibet. Apart from our withdrawing certain small forces that we had there in old times, this agreement related to pilgrimage, to trade and trade routes, to certain passes over which these trade routes should pass. To that type of thing. And you know that thousands and thousands of pilgrims go to Tibet from India. Apart from Buddhists, vast numbers of Hindus go there to Kailash and the Mansarovar Lake and we wanted to make arrangements for them. That is one part of the treaty. The other was something about trade. The third was about the routes to be followed, the passes to be traversed. Then, there was something which was definitely mentioned in the treaty—not directly—but indirectly it was there the close contact of the Buddhists in Ladakh, who used to go for some kind of education and training in the Buddhist scripture to Lhasa and other places, to the monasteries there. Hundreds of these people used to go and hundreds are supposed to be there who did not take the trouble to carry any normal papers and passports, etc. They carried on in the old way. Now, how far all these will be affected by these developments. I cannot say.

Question: Perhaps you have answered the question. But how are we politically concerned or affected by the events in Tibet?

Prime Minister: Well, we are obviously concerned and interested in what happens there, in what political developments take

place there. We cannot ignore them, forget them or look away from them. What we do about them is another matter, to be considered in regard to circumstances. But I should like to put to you that apart from the purely political considerations, there are other considerations which move people powerfully. We have had no desire, certainly ever since we became independent, to interfere in the slightest degree in Tibetan affairs. But we could not give up our interest, call it if you like sentimental interest, apart from politics, and you can observe for yourself the enormous feeling that has been aroused in India by these recent developments in Tibet and about the Dalai Lama and all those.

It shows that deep sentimental attachment which has little to do with politics which goes back hundreds of years. You saw—I was not present that day—but some of you might have been present in the Lok Sabha three or four days ago when Members of every group, every party in the Lok Sabha, except the Communist Party, were vastly exercised over this question. It brought out rather, well, very markedly and prominently how some matters are so deeply rooted in national sentiment that they override even party boundaries and they come up. They brought out also how the Communist Party in India has uprooted itself from those matters and feels quite differently. I am not talking about politics or economics—but just what is called national sentiment which has deep roots in a country. And we saw there that marked distinction of the people who however they differed among themselves, had that common bond of a strong national tradition and sentiment, call it nationalism for brief, while the Communist Party had no kinship with that sentiment, it had not its roots there. It had its roots in different thinking and that document or statement that they issued exhibited that entirely different approach from the point of view of national sentiment. And the strong reactions of Members of Parliament and those others, outside to that was due to that. It had not much to do with any factual statement or no statement. It had nothing to do to my thinking with any Parliamentary privilege, but it had to do basically that, that deep-rooted sentiment of the Indian people was hurt by that statement. Therefore it reacted.

to exploit the situation to the advantage of their thinking. There is that danger on every side on both sides if you like, if you divide it, and that is, if I may introduce a slightly personal element; that when I spoke in the Lok Sabha two days ago rather deliberately, I suppressed myself in order to avoid adding to this heat of the cold war. I felt strongly enough about some matters but I felt that one must try to be a little dispassionate.

Question: Don't you feel disillusioned or disappointed about the development in Tibet particularly in view of the Panch Sheel Agreement? When the first time it was propounded, you and Mr. Chou En-lai, went into night long vigil to draft that agreement.

Prime Minister: I do not think you are factually correct. Mr. Chou En-lai was not here when the draft Agreement was made. He was in Peking, I was here.

Question: After he came from the Geneva Conference?

Prime Minister: There was no Agreement; there was a brief press communique then. That had nothing to do with Tibet at all. I do not think there was any reference to it.

Question: In view of the good relations between India and China, has China, at any time, written to you asking you to use your good offices, particularly in relation of Tibet and China, to the revolt among Khampas and others?

Prime Minister: May I say that for a variety of reasons, historical, sentimental, practical and of the present day, I have thought and I think that it is of great importance for India and China to be on friendly terms with each other even though they might differ greatly in regard to their policies internally and further that neither country has any business to interfere in the other country because such interference does not produce any desirable results even from the point of view of the person who wants to interfere unless the result aimed at is just ill-will and anger which is the essence of the cold war. The cold war does not convert the other party at all; it makes it more rigid. So that has been our basic policy, conditioned always of course by guarding, protecting the interests of India and the larger causes that we hold dear. Now, Tibet, as I told you, affects some deeper chords in our hearts. Tibet, culturally speaking, is an off-shoot of India. That is to say of Buddhism not of India politically and we may be Hindus, we may be anything in India but Buddha is the greatest Indian that ever lived and we still in India are under the umbrella of this feeling for the Buddha. Tibet of course is far more so and there is this tremendous bond. We do not want Tibet to remain economically or socially backward. We want it to progress. Now,

at no time during the last few years, last some years, has there been any correspondence, so far as I can remember with Chinese Government or Premier Chou En-lai about Tibet with us but when Premier Chou En-lai was here last time when he was here, we discussed many matters and among them Tibet. I have just told you a little while ago what he said about Tibet to me. As a matter of fact, he discussed this question at some length explaining the Chinese Government's attitude to Tibet and pointing out that they respected and wanted to respect the autonomy of Tibet, and that they had no desire to push Communism in Tibet, for the major reason, he said, that Tibet was as far removed from Communism as any country could be and that it could not be pushed and imposed in this way and it was for the people of Tibet themselves to grow up economically and socially.

Question: A comparison was made in the Lok Sabha between the situation in Algeria and in Tibet. It was said that in Algeria the French people are settling there. In the same way in Tibet also the Chinese are settling in vast numbers. What are your views?

Prime Minister: The question essentially was about the Chinese settling in Tibet just as the French people had previously settled in Algeria. I do not know, first of all—one hears reports about large numbers of Chinese settling in Tibet; I have no information about it, about numbers, I cannot say. There is no comparison. If people settle in some other country and a country which is different, they bring with them some problems. That is true.

Question: Do you propose to take any steps to persuade China to restore Tibet's autonomy?

Prime Minister: There is no question of my taking steps to that end. First of all, the Chinese Government so far as I know has not denied the fact that Tibet should be autonomous. What they have laid stress on is that this has broken-down, according to them, by the action of the other party; but they have not denied the fact that Tibet should be autonomous, and this business of giving advice to others does not always lead to right results.

Question: Has the Chinese Government conveyed its reaction to you regarding your giving political asylum to the Dalai Lama?

Prime Minister: No. But it is an acknowledged fact that any country has the right to give asylum if it chooses. I don't think that is denied anywhere.

Question: Some people talk of the Naga trouble and Hyderabad when this question of the autonomy of Tibet comes. Will you please clarify the two positions?

Prime Minister: Well, there is no comparison, of course. There is Hyderabad. I do not know what to say. The question does not arise at all in any shape or form, because the Nizam and some of his advisers there adopted a policy which was patently a policy against the Government of India, patently against his own people's wishes and all that. In regard to the Naga problem the position is different certainly from that of Hyderabad.

The Naga area, you know, is a small area on our border, an area which has in the past some times given a lot of trouble and according to our policy, we give these tribal areas the fullest autonomy. There is no policy that we wish to impose upon them. This trouble started because they declared—some of them declared an organisation—independence there. We did not start a shooting war because they declared independence. Some of them came to me and said, "We want to be independent." Others said, "No. We want to have something else." We did not punish them for saying that. It was only when they rather brutally killed a number of our officers and men, when they started a violent campaign, that we took measures to meet this because they were just waylaying and killing important people—our own officers and men and important Nagas who were with us. We had to protect those people and put an end to this kind of reign of terror that the Naga National Council in the name of the Naga people was creating there. I think that any person who knows how we have functioned there will probably be amazed at the constant attempt on our part—an attempt which has largely succeeded; I won't say always—at the friendly approach, the lenient approach, the approach which is always kept in view of non-interference in Naga customs and the rest, and we have always kept open the door to a considerable measure of autonomy for them which, by and large, a great majority of them have accepted in conventions and congresses and the rest.

Question: You said earlier that it was very important for India and China to remain on friendly terms now and in the future and you said that this was our basic policy conditioned by the

interests on India and larger causes we hold dear. Do you consider that Tibet is among these larger causes or have we now by our agreement with Tibet put ourselves beyond taking up this matter?

Prime Minister: Tibet or a country does not become a cause. It is a country. A country or the developments in the country may effect a cause. Certainly, we are deeply interested in the autonomy of Tibet and Tibet being allowed to carry on in its own way.

Question: You said in Lok Sabha that the rights renounced by India in Tibet were a relic of British imperialism. By the same token, does not the McMahon Line become a relic of British imperialism?

Prime Minister: By the same token, you might go back a little when Asoka governed the whole of Central Asia and China governed at one time or other Burma and Indo-China and Tibet at one time governed a bit of China. You cannot go back on history like this. At what period do we draw a line? There is a difference between certain extra-territorial rights in a country. Obviously, there is no question if we had 150 soldiers in Gyantse or whatever the number was, no country would tolerate that kind of thing. That continued because they were there from the British times on the plea, mind you, of lack of law and order there, to protect our consulate or whatever it was. That is a completely different thing from conditions in a part of the country—border if you like—which had continued for generations and somebody comes and tells us that, "Oh! a hundred years ago this was different." There is no particular significance or meaning, unless that person wants to do mischief.

We have to accept certain things; we cannot historically trace back where the Indian frontier was. We accept for a long time, for a hundred years or so that the frontier is this and we have been in possession. We have functioned administratively and otherwise. There the matter ends so far as we are concerned, and as a matter of fact the McMahon Line was accepted by Tibet, and some parts of that McMahon Agreement, by the then existing Chinese Government were not settled, but this part was not objected to even then.

Prime Minister: I do not think C.P.I.'s policy is expansionist. It is submissive. It is not expansionist.

Question: Sir, in the latest issue of the Communist Party organ, the weekly 'New Age' they say that the spy ring is not only there is Kalimpong but it operates also in Calcutta, Bhutan and Sikkim. And they have also alleged that there was collusion between some of our Political Officers and the spies, and they have named, Shri Apa Pant in this connection. It has come in the latest issue of the 'New Age'.

Prime Minister: I have not seen that. If the C.P.I. goes about naming our principal officers, the C.P.I. shows, even more than I suspected, a certain lack of balance in mind and a total absence of feeling of decency and nationality. What they are I do not know. They cease to be Indians if they talk in this way.

May I say about this matter? Of course I said in the Lok Sabha about Kalimpong being a nest of spies. Well, I indicated that there was every variety and every shade and colour of spies there. Probably you could even balance the anti-communist spies with the communist spies there. The whole place, it is a detective story unravelling itself there. In a great city like Calcutta no doubt you have all manner of people like that belonging to every shade and colour. To say that is one thing; for the matter of that in any great city in the world you will find these valiant representatives of the cold war.

By the way may, I mention one thing, which is horrifying to me? And this was a statement which appeared some little time ago and our External Affairs Ministry contradicted it yesterday, a statement by Prince Peter of Greece, who stayed in Kalimpong for a number of years. He made a statement—he is supposed to be and is described as an international authority on Tibetan affairs—he said that the Indian Government had given assistance to the Chinese invasion of Tibet for fear that Tibet might fall under British or American influence. The Chinese armies were receiving supplies along the only road from the Indian border to Lhasa. He stated: "While I was still at Kalimpong I discovered for myself that truck convoys to Tibet, alleged by Indians to be loaded with rice, were full of military supplies"! Now, a more fantastic and despicable lie I have never heard and I say that by my knowledge. A person like Prince Peter of Greece, who had the hospitality of India for several years, dares to say that shows the atmosphere of Kalimpong, what it was. Even a person thinking even slightly, cannot say that in 1950 thousands of trucks—how do trucks go, where do they go? Any supplies to Tibet had then and now to go through the Nathula Pass. Now there is a road. We

have built it. They had to go over mules, a most terrible journey on mule-back. In 1954-55, because there was a famine in Tibet, we agreed to send some rice—about, I forget now, may be ten to 20 thousand maunds, less than a thousand tons—and it was a terrible job to send this. You just calculate how many mules are required to carry it. It took seven or eight months for these mule caravans to carry this rice over the Nathula. And this was in 1954-55. This is physically impossible apart from the fact that it is inconceivable that we should send military supplies of all things to the Chinese authorities—by mules—who had far more military supplies than we possessed, and then that we should do that is quite an extraordinary statement.

Question: There has been a report in the press that the Chinese have in the last recent two or three weeks drawn our attention to what they said, or expressed the hope that the Indian Consul at Lhasa would take an objective view of the situation. What have you to say about that?

Prime Minister: We take a very objective view. The Consul sits at his window and looks at Lhasa. What I mean is I do not think he has been outside his Consulate during all these days. He has been sitting there taking this objective view.

Question: Does it mean that his movements are restricted?

Prime Minister: Yes, but of course, they are restricted for a few days. I can understand it because there was trouble in Lhasa, and even now, it is said, for the sake of security etc., people from our Consulate are not permitted to go out in Lhasa. They have said as soon as things are normal, they can go out. But for the moment we have troubles even in such small matters—they are not very small—as in food supplies in going to the market.

Question: There has been a lot of speculation that because of expression of sympathy with the Tibetans and the offer of asylum to the Dalai Lama the relations between India and China may deteriorate? Is this true?

Prime Minister: Naturally conditions are such that difficult, delicate and embarrassing situations are created and may continue in various shapes and forms, and we have to keep the various factors in view, the major factor being, of course, our own security. After all every Government's first duty is to protect its country in every way. The second factor, our desire to have and continue to have friendly relations with China. The third factor, our strong feeling about developments in Tibet. Now, sometimes there is certain contradiction in these. That is inevitable. One has, therefore, in so far as one can, to balance, adjust, and sometimes to make difficult choices.

Question: Do you think the Dalai Lama left Lhasa and sought asylum in India of his own free will, or under Chinese duress?

Prime Minister: I should imagine so, because I cannot conceive of the Dalai Lama being pushed about by his own people. I said that.

Question: Have you any information about the extent of damage in Tibet?

Prime Minister: None whatever in the rest of Tibet. I would say, none perhaps, a little here and there in some towns of Tibet. In Lhasa, we had some reports, not accurate reports, but like the report of an eye-witness who saw a house damaged but could not say how much. The summer palace of the Dalai Lama has been shelled, that famous palace full of art treasures and manuscripts. It will be a great tragedy if those treasures and manuscripts were destroyed. We cannot say that they have been destroyed but a part of the palace was shelled, some other buildings in Lhasa, important buildings, and somewhere else. For the rest, we have no information.

SITUATION IN TIBET SHRI NEHRU'S STATEMENT

SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU MADE THE FOLLOWING statement in the Lok Sabha on the situation in Tibet on April 27, 1959.

I have made several statements in the House in regard to the developments in Tibet. The last statement was made on April 3, in which I informed the House that the Dalai Lama had entered the territory of the Indian Union with a large entourage. I should like to bring this information up-to-date and to place such additional facts as we have before the House.

A few days ago, the Dalai Lama and his party reached Mussoorie, where Government had made arrangements for their stay. I have had occasion to visit Mussoorie since then and have had a long talk with the Dalai Lama.

In the course of the last few days, reports have reached us that considerable numbers of Tibetans, numbering some

thousands, have recently crossed into the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency and some hundreds have also entered the territory of Bhutan. They sought asylum, and we have agreed to this. Such of them as carried arms were disarmed. We do not know the exact number yet. Temporary arrangements are being made in a Camp for their maintenance until they can be dispersed in accordance with their wishes and the necessities governing such cases. We could not leave these refugees to their own resources. Apart from the humanitarian considerations involved, there was also the law and order problem to be considered. We are grateful to the Government of Assam for their help and cooperation in this matter.

So far as the Dalai Lama and his party are concerned, we had to take adequate measures on ground of security and also to protect them from large numbers of newspaper correspondents, both Indian and foreign, who, in their anxiety to obtain first-hand information in regard to a matter of world importance, were likely to harass and almost overwhelm the Dalai Lama and his party. While we were anxious to give protection to the Dalai Lama and his party, we were agreeable to giving these newspapermen suitable opportunities to see him. I had received an appeal from nearly 75 representatives of news agencies and newspapers from Tezpur requesting me to give them such opportunities. A senior officer of the External Affairs Ministry was, therefore, deputed to proceed to Tezpur in advance to deal with the press representatives and photographers who had assembled in that small town of Assam. This officer made the necessary administrative arrangements to meet, as far as possible, the wishes of the newspapermen to see the Dalai Lama and to photograph him. Soon after entering India, the Dalai Lama indicated his wish to make a statement. We were later informed that this statement would be released at Tezpur. Our officer made arrangements for the distribution of a translation of the statement to the newspaper correspondents.

In view of certain irresponsible charges made, I should like to make it clear that the Dalai Lama was entirely responsible for this statement as well as a subsequent briefer statement that was made by him from Mussoorie. Our officers had nothing to do with the drafting or preparation of these statements.

I need not tell the House that the Dalai Lama entered India entirely of his own volition. At no time had we sug-

gested that he should come to India. We had naturally given thought to the possibility of his seeking asylum in India and when such a request came, we readily granted it. His entry with a large party in a remote corner of our country created special problems of transport, organization and security. We deputed an officer to meet the Dalai Lama and his party at Bomdila and to escort them to Mussoorie. The particular officer was selected because he had served as Consul-General in Lhasa and therefore was to some extent known to the Dalai Lama and his officials. The selection of Mussoorie for the Dalai Lama's stay was not finalised till his own wishes were ascertained in the matter and he agreed to it. There was no desire on our part to put any undue restrictions on him, but in the special circumstances, certain arrangements had necessarily to be made to prevent any mishap. It should be remembered that the various events in Tibet, culminating in the Dalai Lama's departure from Lhasa and entry into India had created tremendous interest among the people of India and in the world press. After arrival in Mussoorie, steps were taken to prevent the Dalai Lama from being harassed by crowds of people trying to see him as well as by newspapermen. Apart from this, no restrictions about movement were placed on him. He has been told that he and his party can move about Mussoorie according to their wishes. It should be remembered that the Dalai Lama has recently not only had a long strenuous and dangerous journey, but has also had harrowing experiences which must affect the nerves of even a hardened person. He is only just 24 years of age.

These are some bare facts, but behind these facts lie serious developments which may have far-reaching consequences. Tragedy has been and is being enacted in Tibet, passions have been let loose, charges made and language used which cannot but worsen the situation and our relations with our northern neighbour. I am sure that the House will agree with me that in considering matters of such high import, we should exercise restraint and wisdom and use language which is moderate and precise. In these days of cold war, there has been a tendency to use unrestrained language and often to make wild charges without any justification. We have fortunately kept out of the cold war and I hope that on this, as on any other occasion, we shall not use the language of cold war. The matter is too serious to be dealt with in a trivial or excited way. I would, therefore, appeal to the press and the public to exercise restraint in language. I regret that occasionally there have

been lapses from this on our side. In particular, I regret that grave discourtesy was shown some days ago to a picture of the head of the Chinese State, Chairman Mao Tse-tung. This was done by a small group of irresponsible people in Bombay. In the excitement of the moment, we cannot allow ourselves to be swept away into wrong courses.

It is not for me to make any similar appeal to the leaders, the press and the people of China. All I can say is that I have been greatly distressed at the tone of the comments and the charges made against India by responsible people in China. They have used the language of cold war regardless of truth and propriety. This is peculiarly distressing in great nation with thousands of years of culture behind it, noted for its restrained and polite behaviour. The charges made against India are so fantastic that I find it difficult to deal with them. There is the charge of our keeping the Dalai Lama under duress. The Chinese authorities should surely know how we function in this country and what our laws and Constitution are. Even if we were so inclined, we could not keep the Dalai Lama under some kind of detention against his will, and there can be no question of our wishing to do so. We can gain nothing by it except the burden of difficult problems. In any event, this matter can be easily cleared. It is open to the Dalai Lama at any time to go back to Tibet or wherever he wants to. As the Panchen Lama has made himself responsible specially for some strange statements, I have stated that we would welcome him to come to India and meet the Dalai Lama himself. Should he choose to do so, every courtesy will be extended to him. I have further said that the Chinese Ambassador or any other emissary of the Chinese Government can come to India for this purpose and meet the Dalai Lama. There is no barrier for anyone to come peacefully to India, and whether we agree with him or not, we shall treat him with courtesy due to a guest.

Another and an even stranger allegation has been made about "Indian expansionists" who, it is alleged, are inheritors of the British tradition of imperialism and expansion. It is perfectly true that British policy was one of expansion into Tibet and that they carried this out by force of arms early in this century. That was, in our opinion, an unjustified and cruel adventure which brought much harm to the Tibetans. As a result of that, the then British Government in India established certain extra territorial rights in Tibet. When India became independ-

ent, we inherited some of these rights. Being entirely opposed to any such extra-territorial rights in another country, we did not wish to retain them. But in the early days after Independence and partition, our hands were full, as this House well knows, and we had to face very difficult situations in our own country. We ignored, if I may say so, Tibet. Not being able to find a suitable person to act as our representative at Lhasa, we allowed for some time the existing British representative to continue at Lhasa. Later an Indian took his place. Soon after the Chinese armies entered Tibet, the question of these extra-territorial rights was raised and we readily agreed to give them up. We would have given them up anyhow, whatever developments might have taken place in Tibet. We withdrew our army detachments from some places in Tibet and handed over Indian postal and telegraph installations and rest houses. We laid down the Five Principles of the Panchsheel and placed our relationship with the Tibet region on a new footing. What we were anxious about was to preserve the traditional connections between India and Tibet in regard to pilgrim traffic and trade. Our action in this matter and whatever we have done subsequently in regard to Tibet is proof enough of our policy and that India had no political or ulterior ambitions in Tibet. Indeed, even from the narrowest practical point of view, any other policy would have been wrong and futile. Ever since then we have endeavoured not only to act up to the agreement we made, but to cultivate the friendship of the Chinese State and people.

It is therefore a matter of the deepest regret and surprise to us that charges should be made which are both unbecoming and entirely void of substance. We have conveyed this deep feeling of regret to the Chinese Government, more especially at the speeches delivered recently in the current session of the National People's Congress in Peking.

I stated some time ago that our broad policy was governed by three factors; (1) the preservation of the security and integrity of India; (2) Our desire to maintain friendly relations with China; and (3) Our deep sympathy for the people of Tibet. That policy we shall continue to follow, because we think that a correct policy not only for the present but even more so for the future. It would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia, India and China, which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past, should develop feelings of hostility against each other.

We for our part will follow this policy, but we hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the wider point of view of the peace of Asia and the world. The Five Principles have laid down, inter alia, mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of cold war used.

I have already made it clear previously that the charge that Kalimpong was a centre of the Tibetan rebellion, is wholly unjustified. We have a large number of people of Tibetan stock living in India as Indian nationals. We have also some Tibetan emigres in India. All of these deeply respect the Dalai Lama. Some of these have been exceedingly unhappy at developments in Tibet; some no doubt have anti-Chinese sentiments. We have made it clear to them that they will not be permitted to carry on any subversive activities from India and I should like to say that by and large they have acted in accordance with the directions of the Government of India. I cannot obviously say that someone has not done something secretly, but to imagine or say that a small group of persons sitting in Kalimpong organised a major upheaval in Tibet seems to me to make a large draft on imagination and to slur over obvious facts.

The Khampa revolt started in an area of China proper adjoining Tibet, more than three years ago. Is Kalimpong supposed to be responsible for that? This revolt gradually spread and no doubt created a powerful impression on the minds of large numbers of Tibetans, who had kept away from the revolt. Fears and apprehensions about their future gripped their minds and the nationalist upsurge swayed their feelings. Their fears may have been unjustified, but surely they cannot be denied. Such feelings can only be dealt with adequately by gentler methods than warfare.

When Premier Chou En-lai came here two or three years ago, he was good enough to discuss Tibet with me at considerable length. We had a frank and full talk. He told me that while Tibet had long been a part of the Chinese state, they did not consider Tibet as a province of China. The people were different from the people of China proper, just as in other autonomous regions of the Chinese State the people were different, even though they formed part of that State. Therefore, they considered Tibet

an autonomous region which would enjoy autonomy. He told me further that it was absurd for any one to imagine that China was going to force Communism on Tibet. Communism could not be enforced in this way on a very backward country and they had no wish to do so even though they would like reforms to come in progressively. Even these reforms they proposed to postpone for a considerable time.

About that time, the Dalai Lama was also here and I had long talks with him then. I told him of Premier Chou En-lai's friendly approach and of his assurance that he would respect the autonomy of Tibet. I suggested to him that he should accept these assurances in good faith and cooperate in maintaining that autonomy and bringing about certain reforms in Tibet. The Dalai Lama agreed that his country, though, according to him, advanced spiritually, was very backward socially and economically and reforms were needed.

It is not for us to say how far these friendly intentions and approaches materialised. The circumstances were undoubtedly difficult. On the one side there was a dynamic, rapidly moving society; on the other, a static, unchanging society fearful of what might be done to it in the name of reforms. The distance between the two was great and there appeared to be hardly any meeting point. Meanwhile changes in some forms inevitably came to Tibet. Communications developed rapidly and the long isolation of Tibet was partly broken through. Though physical barriers were progressively removed, mental and emotional barriers increased. Apparently, the attempt to cross these mental and emotional barriers was either not made or did not succeed.

To say that a number of "upper strata reactionaries" in Tibet were solely responsible for this appears to be an extraordinary simplification of a complicated situation. Even according to the accounts received through Chinese sources, the revolt in Tibet was of considerable magnitude and the basis of it must have been a strong feeling of nationalism which affects not only upper class people but others also. No doubt, vested interests joined it and sought to profit by it. The attempt to explain a situation by the use of rather worn-out words, phrases and slogans, is seldom helpful.

When the news of these unhappy developments came to India, there was immediately a strong and widespread

reaction. The Government did not bring about this reaction. Nor was this reaction essentially political. It was largely one of sympathy based on sentiment and humanitarian reasons. Also on a certain feeling of kinship with the Tibetan people derived from long-established religious and cultural contacts. It was an instinctive reaction. It is true that some people in India sought to profit by it by turning it in an undesirable direction. But the fact of that reaction of the Indian people was there. If that was the reaction here, one may well imagine the reaction among the Tibetans themselves. Probably this reaction is shared in the other Buddhist countries of Asia. When there are such strong feelings, which are essentially not political, they cannot be dealt with by political methods alone, much less by military methods. We have no desire whatever to interfere in Tibet; we have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China; but at the same time we have every sympathy for the people of Tibet, and we are greatly distressed at their helpless plight. We hope still that the authorities of China, in their wisdom, will not use their great strength against the Tibetans but will win them to friendly cooperation in accordance with the assurance they have themselves given about the autonomy of the Tibet region. Above all, we hope that the present fighting and killing will cease.

As I have said above, I had a long talk with the Dalai Lama three days ago at Mussoorie. He told me of the difficulties he had to face, of the growing resentment of his people at the conditions existing there and how he sought to restrain them, of his feelings that the religion of the Buddha, which was more to him than life itself, was being endangered. He said that up to the last moment he did not wish to leave Lhasa. It was only on the afternoon of the 17th March when, according to him, some shells were fired at his palace and fell in a pond nearby, that the sudden decision was taken to leave Lhasa. Within a few hours the same day he and his party left Lhasa and took the perilous journey to the Indian frontier. The departure was so hurried that even an adequate supply of clothes etc. could not be brought. When I met the Dalai Lama, no member of his entourage was present. Even the interpreter was our own. The Dalai Lama told me that the two statements which had been issued were entirely his own and there was no question of anybody coercing him to make them. Even though he is young, I could not easily imagine that he could be coerced into doing something he did not

wish. All my sympathy goes out to this young man who at an early age has had to shoulder heavy burdens and to face tremendous responsibilities. During the last few weeks he has suffered great physical and mental strain. I advised him to rest for a while and not to take any hurried decisions. He felt very unhappy at conditions in Tibet and was especially anxious that fighting should stop.

DEBATE ON SITUATION IN TIBET

REPLYING TO A DEBATE ON THE SITUATION IN Tibet, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, made the following statement in Rajya Sabha on May 4, 1959.

Mr. Chairman, the hon. Mover of this motion spoke in such dignified and restrained language that I feel deeply beholden to him. He set a good example for all of us. In the course of this discussion this example has been more or less followed, not entirely; but I do not wish to object to anything that has been said or the manner of saying it. Unfortunately in some other countries, and in China more specially, the way we function in our Parliament here or outside is perhaps not fully appreciated; that is to say that it may not be quite appreciated that here everyone has a right to say—here in Parliament and indeed outside Parliament also and in the Press—everyone has a right to say whatever he feels like subject to some very very broad limitations of libel or slander, and that what he or she may say may indeed be in condemnation of Government, as it often is; it does not represent Government's policy. I say this because objection is taken, has been taken in China to remarks made by hon. Members in Parliament or outside or the Press. It is different here from what it is in China, and I am not saying that it is better or not here or it is different here. Here one can see even in the last few weeks an amazing unanimity and similarity of words, expressions and slogans coming from various quarters, which shows an amount of uniformity which is truly formidable, and it has its virtues no doubt but I am not criticising anything. But what I wish to say is that things said in Parliament sometimes convey a very different impression outside, and people do not realise that in such Parliaments as these are, every viewpoint has the

fullest expression and need not necessarily be right or wrong.

In this connection--not by way of again criticism but because Mr. Bhupesh Gupta referred to a very unfortunate incident that happened in Bombay where Chairman Mao Tse-tung's picture was shown grave discourtesy--I should like to refer to that firstly to express my regret again for it and at the same time to say that the facts of this particular incident as we know them, and know them correctly--we are presumed to know them a little better than people sitting in Peking--nevertheless oddly enough our version of the facts is not wholly accepted by the Peking Government on a small matter, which is surprising. We are sitting here, we ought to know better what takes place in our country, about facts, whatever other opinions may be. However, it is a very regrettable incident with which obviously Government had nothing to do. The party which organised it, I believe, is not represented in this House even. But what is not realised is that in the city of Bombay pictures even of a leader of ours like Mahatma Gandhi have been burnt by some groups or others. Two and a half or three years ago my humble self also has been treated in that way in Bombay and elsewhere. Well, we take that in our stride and, as the hon. Member who spoke last mentioned, a few years back President Eisenhower's effigy had the honour of being burnt near the Ochterlony Monument. I regret all these cases, but what I am mentioning is that these things happen in a country like ours because of our laws, etc. They happen. Quite apart from law, I think it is a grave breach of decency to do this kind of thing or do anything else. We regret it. But people outside this country, some people, do not realise this and seem to imagine that somehow or other the Government or some Government officials must have connived at it, otherwise it could not have taken place, or they think that we should take the people who have done this by the scruff of the neck and throw them in the dungeon.

An Hon. Member: Let them do it themselves.

Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: I am saying that it is rather difficult because it produces misunderstandings as to the way of functioning, our parliamentary procedures and the like, and other procedures where a Government does not permit opposition of any kind.

Hon. Members have referred to a statement made by me a few days ago which was read out in this House also.

So far as the major facts are concerned I have stated them there and I have really nothing to add, even though after that statement was made it was not accepted—the facts I mean, even the facts were not fully accepted by the Chinese authorities and the Chinese Press, which is unfortunate because again I would say that as to what happens in India I would imagine that we could be better informed than the Chinese authorities who presumably can only be informed through certain intelligence agents that they may have at Kalimpong or elsewhere. But I do not wish to enter into polemical argument about these minor matters because the issues before us are far more serious, far deeper, far deeper than Tibet, the whole of Tibet, although Tibet is important and we are discussing events which have cast their shadow round about Tibet too. That shows that they are really deeper than that, and therefore we have to be particularly careful as to what we say and what we do. Now I accept the limitations and also the responsibility of what one should say on such occasions.

First of all, we must be alive to what we are aiming at. We are not, I hope, merely aiming at denouncing somebody or some government or some phrase. There has been too much of this denunciation and slogan-raising, I regret to say, in China recently, and some of the slogans have been quite extraordinary. But I do not think we should be so thin-skinned as to get upset by some slogans in the excitement of the moment. We must not be led off our main path because that is of very considerable consequence in the future.

I should like again to read a few lines of what I said in that previous statement to indicate what we aim at. I said this:

"It would be a tragedy if the two great countries of Asia—India and China—which have been peaceful neighbours for ages past should develop feelings of hostility against each other. We for our part will follow this policy, but we hope that China also will do likewise and that nothing will be said or done which endangers the friendly relations of the two countries which are so important from the wider point of view of the peace of Asia and the world. The five principles have laid down, *inter alia* mutual respect for each other. Such mutual respect is gravely impaired if unfounded charges are made and the language of cold war used."

Mr. Bhupesh Gupta asked rather rhetorically. "Do we

stand by Panch Sheel?" Well, sometimes I wonder if the words we use are used in the same meaning or with some different meaning in our minds but—I have no claim to superiority—so far as India is concerned, we have earnestly striven to stand by these principles and I do not think we have offended any principle. It is not for me to stand up and criticise or justify other countries, but we have tried to do that not because of some temporary policy, not because these five principles have been declared in some agreement—that was merely a confirmation of what we thought, as to what we said—but because we have felt that that is the only way to function in this world of ours. Some people say, "Oh! After all that has happened, you still hold by that." It is a curious question. If these principles are right, we hold by them and we should hold by them, even though nobody in the wide world is holding by them. Naturally, we have to adapt our policies to what happens in the world; we cannot live in isolation. But a principle should be acted upon even though somebody else has not acted upon it. One tries. Anyway, we are imperfect beings in an imperfect world. So I should like to assure the hon. Member opposite that so far as the Government is concerned—I cannot speak for every ordinary individual in India—we hold by those principles and we shall endeavour to act up to them whatever other countries may or may not do. Some people certainly—as Mr. Bhupesh Gupta said—taking advantage of these occurrences in and relating to Tibet have raised a cry that India will now have to consider how far she can adhere to the policy of non-alignment. All that shows a strange misunderstanding of our ways of thinking in our policies. Non-alignment—although the word is itself a kind of negative word—nevertheless has a positive concept, and we do not propose to have a military alliance with any country come what may and I want to be quite clear about it, because the moment we give up that idea of non-alignment, we lose every anchor that we hold on to and we simply drift. We may hang on to somebody or some country. But we lose our own self-respect, of the country's. If one loses one's self-respect, it is something very precious lost. Therefore this business of thinking always in terms of getting something from this country or the other country is not desirable. It is perhaps not very relevant. It is said often in Pakistan, let us have a common defence policy. Now I am all for settling our troubles with Pakistan and living a normal, friendly, neighbourly life. We try for that. But I do not understand when people say that we

have a common defence policy. Against whom? Immediately the question comes up: "Against whom is this common defence policy?" Are we going to become members of the Baghdad Pact or the SEATO or some body? We do not want to have a common defence policy which is almost another meaning of some kind of a military alliance. The whole policy that we have pursued is opposed to this conception. We want friendly relations with Pakistan. We hope we shall get them. But we are not going to tie ourselves up, our conceptions, our policies, with other countries involving military defence and attacking and all that.

So the present difficulties that we have to face in relation to the happenings in Tibet will, I hope, gradually pass. But it is a tragedy not only for Tibet, but a deeper tragedy for many of us that something that we have laboured for for all these years which may be said to be enshrined if you like in the Panchsheel or in Bandung has suffered very considerably in people's mind. I may say I shall hold on to it, but the fact is in people's minds there is that crack, there is that suffering, there is that uneasiness, that something they valued might slip away. These words like all other words—Bandung, Panchsheel; it does not matter what word you use—begin to lose their shine and to be hurled about without meaning, and in fact, just like even the word 'peace' become almost like a thunderbolt or a minor war the way it is used. Sometimes the manner of using it—it is the manner—that counts. I have come more and more to believe that means are even more important than ends. They show to us that the way one does things is even more important than what one does. And that is why I have been aggrieved beyond measure at these various recent developments and at what is being said in China—the charges made against India. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta did not say a word about all these, not a word. I can understand where these things lead to. Hon. Members of this House being seasoned public men and women may restrain themselves, may not allow themselves to be affected too much. But it is difficult for the general public not to be affected by such charges and they are charges, I do submit, which do not stand the slightest scrutiny. What have we done about this matter, about Tibet, apart from some speeches or things?

We have received the Dalai Lama and party, and subsequently we have received some thousands of refugees. We have given them asylum, and it is admitted—I don't

think anybody denies it—that as a sovereign country we have every right to do so, and nobody else can be a judge of that except ourselves. Now is it suggested that we should have refused to give asylum to the Dalai Lama when he asked for it? Well, if it is suggested by someone outside India I can tell them—I do not know about the handful out of the four hundred millions of people of India; I doubt if even a few thousands would have agreed with that policy—I can tell them this that the hundreds of millions of India would have become angry at that action of ours if we had refused asylum to the Dalai Lama and his party. Almost everybody in India—a few may not have—approved of our policy, and it would have been an impossible thing, an utterly wrong thing, for us to do otherwise from any point of view, political, humanitarian or whatever you like. So this is what we have done. Of course we are charged with as having connived at Kalimpong; of Kalimpong being the commanding centre—this is the word they used, I think—of this rebellion in Tibet. Now it is said that the commanding centre has shifted to Mussoorie—I know words have lost their meaning, because I find it very difficult to deal with these charges. And why has the commanding centre gone to Mussoorie? Because the Dalai Lama is there and because the brother of the Dalai Lama who normally lives in Darjeeling, I think, went to see him, and after seeing him went back to Darjeeling or Kalimpong. These are very serious charges against a country's leaders being made irresponsibly in this way by the leaders of a people whom we have not only honoured and respected but whom we have considered particularly advanced in culture and politeness and the gentler art of civilisation. It has been a shock to me beyond measure because, quite apart from everything else, I have looked up to the Chinese and I look up to them still because of their great accomplishments, because of their great culture and all that, and it has been a shock to me that this kind of thing should be said and done in the excitement of the moment. I hope that excitement will pass.

Now, Sir, I want to tell the House exactly how these matters came into our ken. On the 11th of March, for the first time we got a message from our Consul-General in Lhasa saying that there was some excitement in the town and that a large number of people had come and visited him consisting of representatives of the public and some Tibetan officials, monks, heads of monasteries, etc. They had come to him with a series of complaints about the Chinese authorities there and they said that they were very much in

distress. Now our Consul-General in Lhasa was naturally very embarrassed. What is he to do? He did not wish to interfere; it was none of his business to interfere and he told them: "Well, I cannot do anything for you" and he reported to us. That was on the 11th—the message dated the 10th reached us on the 11th. That was the first information we had, that something was afoot there. After that the Consul-General sent us brief reports about the general excitement in the town, the tense situation and people holding meetings, not public meetings but group meetings and all that. On the 14th he again sent us a message that a crowd of 5,000 Tibetan women had come to the Consulate-General with the same kind of complaints and asked him to accompany them to the Chinese Foreign Office in Lhasa to bear witness to what they said. At that again the poor Consul-General was exceedingly embarrassed. It was none of his business to do this and he said: "I cannot go", and he asked, "What do you mean by that?" Well, in short he said, "I just cannot go." Quite rightly. He reported it to us. We drafted a message—it was kept ready to be sent—to say: "Don't get entangled in what has happened and was happening in Lhasa." This was on the 14th. So this kind of thing went on. And it was at this time, when speaking, I think, in the Lok Sabha, I said that there was a clash of wills in Lhasa—whether that was a correct description, I do not know. The point was there was no actual fighting going on at this time; that came a few days later. On the 20th March when it started, how it started, I do not know, nor did our Consul-General know sitting in the Consulate, and he could not be expected to know when it started. And as we now know, he did not know it then. On the 17th night the Dalai Lama and party left Lhasa, rather secretly. According to them, on the 17th afternoon at 4 o'clock, two shells or bombs, something like that, fell into a lake in the Summer Palace. Well, this made them think "Now this is the last moment, and now the Palace is going to be shelled and there is going to be war everywhere" and they left Lhasa. As far as I know—I am not sure—even then it was not fully his intention to leave Tibet. But as Lhasa was being shelled, subsequently that intention must have developed. Anyhow, in the course of a week, from the 11th to the 20th or the 21st, during these, say, ten days this was the news that came to us. We could do nothing about it and before the 10th or 11th we knew nothing about the situation except that we naturally knew that all kinds of cross-currents were at work at Lhasa and in Tibet. Then the question came before us, of the possibility

of the Dalai Lama coming here, and we decided that we should receive him. He came. As the House might know I resisted and I was asked repeatedly: "Are you going to throw your doors open to any number of refugees from Tibet?" I resisted that although in my mind I knew that I could not very well refuse asylum to people who were in great difficulty; I could not; but I did not want to say it and invite people to roll into India from all over the place. So that is the short story of what has happened and what we have done. And now we are called expansionists and imperialists and what not, all kinds of phrases, which I suppose would not make any real difference to what we are; nevertheless coming from those whom we consider friends they do hurt us.

Now I want just to give you a few facts. Again an extra-ordinary thing appeared in the newspapers in Peking. They go back now to what had happened in 1950, that is, to some memoranda that we had sent, when Chinese armies were entering Tibet. Very polite memoranda they were. The answers were not very polite, but the point now is that they refer to them, that what we wrote to them was after consultation with the British Government, that though we called ourselves independent we really acted as stooges or tools of the British Government.

It is, of course, completely wrong and untruthful. There was no question of our consulting the British Government. Our view on Tibet was different from that of the British.

Now, one thing about the Panchen Lama's statement. I was rather distressed to read it, that a statement should be made, so lacking in generosity and dignity, by a person who had been our honoured guest. I do not know about the petty things he says that somewhere his staff was not given proper accommodation. I cannot answer that, whether at Aurangabad or some such place there was some difficulty because the entourage of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama was so big—hundreds of people with them. It was not quite so easy to make as much preparation as we wanted.

About the refugees, now the latest position is that approximately 6,500 refugees are on their way down through the Kemeng Division of NEFA, 1,500 are trekking through Bhutan and 700 have come to Sikkim—round about 9,000. The Bhutan Government have asked us to receive the Tibetan refugees coming through their territories and we have agreed to do so. Thus we have about 9,000 refugees for whom we have made ourselves responsible for some kind of

arrangements. A few of the refugees, when they entered India, were armed. They were disarmed on entry into India.

The refugees coming through NEFA will be accommodated temporarily in a camp at Mismari in Assam. Though the Assam Government are making arrangements for their shelter, medical relief, etc., the West Bengal Government have agreed to construct temporary camp somewhere in Cooch-Behar for the refugees who are coming through Bhutan. We are grateful to these two State Governments.

Special Officers to deal with the refugees have been appointed by the External Affairs Ministry. They are proceeding to Assam and West Bengal. It is not proposed to keep these refugees in these temporary camps for a long time and other arrangements will have to be devised for them. I cannot just say at present what or where, but it is obvious we are not going to keep them in camps.

One Hon. Member—I think Dr. Kunzru, may be Mr. Shiva Rao—said something that we should allow these refugees to earn their own living and give them freedom to do many things. Broadly speaking, of course we intend that. We are not going to keep them as prisoners in camps. In fact, our instructions to our officers at the border were to tell them that we do not assume responsibility for their indefinite upkeep. For sometime we would help them. And naturally to some extent we are responsible when these people are coming in. We cannot let them loose on India. Again, there is the question that they cannot easily be kept anywhere except in cooler climates—and we cannot send them to the rest of India simply—in mountain regions.

I think Mr. Shiva Rao said something about China and the United Nations. I do not suppose it is necessary for me to say so, but obviously our policy in regard to the entry of the People's Government of China into the U.N. remains as it was. It is not that it is based on certain facts like these things; it is not because we get angry with something that happens in China that we change our policy. That would mean that we have no firm policies, that we are deflected by temporary happenings in the world.

Just one thing more. Mr. Bhupesh Gupta talked about national uprising. Again it depends upon how you use that word. I do not know exactly what happened in Tibet. But, as I said in my previous statement, according to Chinese accounts this has been a fairly big affair, a very large scale

affair. Also looking at the surrounding circumstances as well as the past history of Tibet, one can very well imagine that apart from the so-called people representing vested interests—they would be there—it is a fact that large numbers of Tibetan people—I cannot say whether they are in a majority or a minority, but large numbers undoubtedly—went to the extent of taking this step which they did, which really meant a very dangerous step. Anyhow it is there and one feels strongly about it.

Now so far as we are concerned, we have not interfered either from Kalimpong or Mussoorie or otherwise. We have exercised our undoubted right to give asylum. I have said that Dalai Lama is perfectly a free agent to go where he likes in India or go back to Tibet.

Some people—some foreign pressmen—said about two days after he had come to Mussoorie that we are keeping him behind barbed wire. That sounds rather horrible. The fact was that the Mussoorie police, to lighten their burden, because of all kinds of curious people trying to go into the compound of the house, had put a little barbed wire on that compound before he came, to be able to protect him, for his security and general protection. But that was not to keep him in, and he goes, I believe, round about Mussoorie. He can go back to Tibet the moment he likes.

It is no use my going on repeating what I have said earlier that the Dalai Lama is not kept under duress here, that he did not enter India under any duress, excepting the duress of circumstances, if you like—compulsion of events. And, certainly, I can speak from personal knowledge having met him and talked to him, that he is staying there of his own free will in India and even at Mussoorie. With all respect, I would say that anyone who denies this fact, well, is totally ignorant of facts and speaks without knowing.

Further, Hon. Members might have seen in the newspaper headlines—because odd remarks are given as headlines—that I said that I would be happy if the Dalai Lama went back to Tibet. I did so. Somebody asked a question and I said, "Naturally I would be happy if he went with dignity." But that did not mean at all that I am going to push the Dalai Lama out or put him in an embarrassing position. It is entirely for him to decide what to do, when to do it. The only advice I gave him when I was with him was: "You have had a very hard journey and very harassing experi-

ences. If I may, as a person very much older than you, suggest it you might rest for a few days, and calmly think about the events and then do what you like."

One more matter, if I may say so, specially to the press. I do not particularly fancy this constant sensational way of referring to the Dalai Lama as the God-king, and, in fact, I do not think he likes it either. This is not the Indian way; it is a foreign way of doing things. It sounds sensational no doubt. I hope that that word will not be used. It is good enough to refer to him as the Dalai Lama. Thank you, Sir.

Mr. Chairman: Dr. Kunzru, would you like to say anything?

Dr. H. N. Kunzru: There is nothing to reply to. I thought my friend, Mr. Bhupesh Gupta, might raise some point but he has hardly spoken to the point.

Mr. Chairman: Then we pass on to the next item.

DEBATE ON THE SITUATION IN TIBET PRIME MINISTER'S REPLY

REPLYING TO A DISCUSSION ON THE SITUATION in Tibet, Shri Jawaharlal Nehru made the following statement in the Lok Sabha on 8 May 1959

Mr. Deputy Speaker, Sir, this matter concerning the developments in Tibet has come up before the other House on several occasions in the course of the last few weeks and I have had occasion to make many statements on the situation arising from these developments. I should have thought that enough had been said for the time being about the basic facts. So those facts as known were challenged in statements from China. Some of the statements from China, in so far as they related to India, were not accepted as facts by us. And I wondered sometimes whether it would serve any useful purpose for us to carry on this argument which could only mean really a repetition of what had been said. Nevertheless, it is perhaps a good thing for us to have this brief discussion here. But in the course of this

discussion so many basic facts have been challenged, or basic ideas have been challenged, that it raises much wider issues than what has happened in Tibet.

The Hon. Member who just spoke before me with warmth said many things which challenged all the basic assumptions of our policy which has been accepted by this House and I think by the country as a whole with remarkable unanimity. Nevertheless, he challenged all those basic assumptions. Either he has never believed in those basic assumptions or what has happened in Tibet has made him change his opinion.

Now, I do not propose in these few minutes to discuss all the basic assumptions of our policy. All I would like to say now is that I do not hold with what the Hon. Member has spoken. I do not agree with much that he has said and so far as Government is concerned, we are not going to follow the policy that he has suggested that we should follow. I should like to make that perfectly clear.

I may say in passing that we have laid no limitations on the Dalai Lama, except the limitation of good sense and propriety of which he himself is the judge. But for the Hon. Member to suggest that we should allow him to do something which he has not himself suggested, that is, making India the headquarters of some kind of a campaign and that we should allow the Hon. Member and his party to join in this campaign is something which seems to be so odd, so remarkable of utterance that I cannot imagine how even he could have made it if he had thought about it. I need not say much about it, because it has no relation to what is happening in the world, or in India, or in Tibet, or in China or anywhere.

He also laid stress on the 1954 Agreement, the agreement with China with regard to Tibet. He said we should never have done it. Again I do not quite understand what is meant by this kind of statement or this kind of viewpoint. What exactly he expects us to do is not clear except maybe perhaps to hold public meetings in Ramlila grounds and deliver speeches. That is not the way that foreign policy of a country is conducted, by public meetings held in various places in India. Public meetings are important no doubt. But we have to come up against not only basic policies and assumptions, but hard facts in regard to foreign policy.

I have no doubt in my mind that the agreement we

made with China with regard to Tibet was a right agreement. It was a correct agreement and we shall stand by it and it is not correct even for him to say that that agreement has been broken. It may be said that he thinks that certain implications of that agreement have not been, according to him or according to anybody else, carried out. That is a different matter. But there is no question of that agreement having been broken. It lasts; it functions.

I do not know how many people here know the background of all these problems. We have been moved naturally, we have had a kind of emotional upheaval, by recent happenings and it is quite understandable that that should be so because of certain intimate emotional and other bonds with Tibet, with the people of Tibet or the mountains of Tibet, or Kailash or Manas Sarovar and so on, a mixture. We can understand that. And we can respect this emotional response. Nevertheless any policy that we lay down or attempt to lay down cannot be based on an emotional upheaval. They have to bear some relation to facts.

I do not know how many Hon. Members here know the history, the background of Tibet, of China, of Mangolia, of Bhutan and Sikkim and Nepal in the last few hundred years. I wonder how many have cared to look into them. I do not know whether the Hon. Member who just spoke knows anything about it at all. I happen to know something about it and I have taken the trouble to read quite a number of books and histories, Chinese chronicles, Indian reports, etc. Here is the history of six or seven hundred years, or more, from the moment when Chengiz Khan invaded Tibet, when Kublai Khan also held Tibet in a peculiar way, considering the then Dálai Lama as a spiritual guru. It is a curious combination. Politically he was dominant, in Tibet, but Kublai Khan considered the Dalai Lama as his spiritual leader, so that you see a curious combination coming up. And in fact for a considerable period the relationship of Tibet with China was very peculiar; in a sense, I believe I am not wrong in saying, the Chinese rather looked down upon the Tibetans from the Mongol times. The Chinese rather look down upon every country other than their own. They consider themselves as the middle kingdom, as the celestial race, a great country, whether it was the Tang kingdom, or the Ming kingdom or ultimately the Manchus for a long period. The relations between China and Tibet varied from sovereignty or suzerainty, or half-sovereignty or semi-independence for long periods like this coming one

after the other till the Manchu dynasty right up to the beginning of the twentieth century held full sway over Tibet, quite a considerable sway. Even in the last days of the Manchu dynasty, when it fell, it held some considerable influence in Tibet.

When the Manchu dynasty fell round about forty or fifty years ago it weakened. It weakened, but who ever held China, whether it was the Emperor, or whether it was President Yuan Shih Kai, whether it was the war lords after them or whether it was Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's regime, or whether it was the Peoples Government, they had one consistent policy from Emperor to the communist of considering themselves as overlords of Tibet. No doubt, when Tibet was strong, it resisted that from time to time. There have been occasions when, twice at least, Tibetan armies reached the capital of China—it is rather old history—as the Chinese armies came repeatedly into Tibet. There have been occasions when Nepalese army went into Tibet and Tibetan army came into Nepal. There was one occasion at least when a certain General from Kashmir, Zoravar Singh, who carried out a brilliant campaign across the Himalayas in Tibet only, of course, to meet a stouter enemy than Tibetan or anybody, the cold of Tibet. The temperature of Tibet put an end to him and his army there. All this is history, mixed history. There is no doubt that the countries with whom Tibet has been most intimately connected in the past have been Mongolia and China, naturally for historical and other reasons, religious reasons, cultural reasons.

But, all these do not count. In considering the present day situation, we have to take things as they are and have been recently. We cannot think of Chengiz Khan's time or Kublai Khan's time or the Manchu Emperors or Chiang Kai-shek or anybody else. In regard to the present situation, what exactly are we after? If we accept the Hon. Member Shri Vajpayee's statement, we should, more or less, prepare for an armed conflict on this issue. We cannot pat somebody on the back and tell him to fight and say, we will cheer you from the background. That is an absurd situation. We must be clear in our mind what we are saying or aiming at. I take it that we aim at, whatever problems may arise, first of all, a peaceful solution of these problems. Peaceful solutions are not brought about by warlike speeches and warlike approaches. It is obvious that if some people in China think that by threats and strong speeches, they can frighten India, that is wrong. It is equally obvious that if

some people in India think that by threats and warlike speeches, they can frighten China, that is equally wrong. Obviously not. Great countries, India or China, are not pushed about in this way. They react in the opposite direction.

So far as China is concerned,—not with us, but with other countries, we know very well; with the U.S.A., with other countries—China herself is a part of a military bloc system on the one side and China herself is intimately concerned with cold war. Not with us; but because of this bloc system. They have got used to ways of expressing their opinion which, personally, I find, is not the right way in international parlance.

And now about the cold war technique, we have recently had some experience of that in regard to India. It is true, we have reacted against it. We did not like it. The question arises whether we should adopt that technique or not. It is an important thing, because it concerns our policy too. I think that neither that policy nor that way of expression which may be called cold war expression is right for any country: certainly not for us, unless we want to change our policy completely. We do not want to change it. We think it would be harmful from every point of view to change this policy. We should pursue that policy. That policy is based not so much on what the other country does, but on its inherent rightness in so far as we can understand it. We may be swept away now and then. It is a different matter. We are human beings. But, if we think coolly and calmly, we must realise that we must adhere to that policy. If so, our expressions of opinions, our challenges, our threats, etc., should not be made if they do not fit in with that particular policy.

That, I would submit to this House, is not a sign of weakness. I do not think any country in the world thinks that India, in the past few years, has adopted a policy of weakness. Some have accused us of bending backwards and of siding with this side or that side. I think they have begun to realise that if we are sometimes soft of speech, friendly of speech, it does not denote weakness, but a certain conviction that that is the only right way to deal with international problems or, for the matter of that, national problems. Therefore, I submit that we must not talk about these warlike approaches and threats. We must not be overcome by anger even though, sometimes, we may feel a little angry about events that are happening. We must

show by our firm policy, and calm demeanour that we will continue that friendly effort that we have always made even when it comes right up to our borders.

There is a great deal of sympathy for the people of Tibet, undoubtedly. Certainly not because the people of Tibet have a feudal regime. They have been cut off and have had a static social system which may have existed in other parts of the world some hundreds of years ago, but has ceased to exist elsewhere. Nobody wants that here. As a matter of fact, I am quite sure, even the Dalai Lama does not want it in Tibet. Here, we see a strange thing, a society which had been isolated completely for hundreds of years suddenly coming out into the open, events throwing it into the mad world of ours, cold wars and all kinds of things happening, dynamic policies and ferocious policies and authoritarian policies. Imagine the contrast in these two. It is a vast gulf. It is inevitable that painful consequences flow from this type of thing. You can lessen them. You can try to moderate the effect of that impact. You cannot simply wish it away. It was the policy, I believe, of the Peoples Government of China, who realised that a country like this cannot be treated in a sudden way, to go slowly about the so-called reforms or whatever it may be. Whether that policy has changed or not, I cannot say. May be, it has changed somewhat. That is quite possible. Whether other changes are taking place in China, I cannot say. It was definitely a policy and they stated it publicly and privately that they realised this.

There is another difficulty in my or our dealing with these matters, and that is, that the words we use have a different meaning for other people. For instance, we talk of the autonomy of Tibet. So do the Chinese. But, a doubt creeps into my mind as to whether the meaning I attach to it is the same as they attach to it. I do not think so. There are so many other words. I am not talking of any deliberate distortion. That apart. Quite apart from any distortion, the ways of thinking have changed. They have changed anyhow and the cold war methods have made them change even more. It is frightfully difficult really to talk the same language, the same language of the mind, I mean. That difficulty arises because of that also, and tremendous misunderstandings arise. However, I cannot go into all these matters.

One thing, I may say. Some reference was made, I think by Shri S. A. Dange, to some convention on Tibet by

a certain Mazumdar. I have not heard of it except today. In fact, just when I came, he heard something about it. In so far as I have seen all the papers—I did see them—I think that whatever that convention appears to aim at or whatever it seems to represent, seem to be very wrong. It is a wrong approach, an approach which will do no good to anybody at all, and may do a good deal of harm if really it was the approach of any responsible people in India. For, we must realise first of all one thing. What do we want? What are we aiming at? How can we get there? What can we do about it?

I take it that we are sad, we are distressed at events in Tibet. Why are we distressed? Presumably because we feel that a certain people are being sat upon, are being oppressed: whether the certain people, according to Shri S. A. Dange, are certain feudal landlords or some people like that, or according to others, they are the common people of Tibet, or whatever it may be, there it is. I have no doubt in my mind that it is difficult to draw the line in such cases between the top feudal elements and the others. They all can be mixed together. And as a result: for the moment, they are all uprooted.

Now, where a society has existed for hundreds and hundreds of years—it may have outlasted its utility, but the fact is—uprooting it is a terribly painful process. It can be uprooted slowly, it can be changed even with rapidity, but with a measure of co-operation. But any kind of a forcible uprooting of that must necessarily be painful, whether it is a good society or a bad society. When we have to deal with such societies anywhere in the world, which as a social group may be called primitive, it is not an easy matter, how to deal with it. All these difficult things are happening. They should have happened; they would have happened, may be a little more slowly but with a greater measure of co-operation, because such a change can only take place effectively and with least harm to the fabric, to those people concerned, by themselves,—they may be helped by others, may be advised by others, but by themselves. The moment a good thing is done by bad means that good thing becomes a bad thing. It produces different reactions. That is, I cannot judge of what is happening in Tibet. I do not have facts, neither does anybody in this House, except broadly some odd fact here and there. But I am merely venturing to say that all these complicated systems—not so easy to disentangle; anyhow, whatever it may be—have brought undoubtedly a great deal of suffer-

ing to the people of Tibet. And I should have liked to avoid it. But what can I do?

People talk in a strange way, of a number of representatives of countries being summoned and orders being issued, do this, and do that. I am surprised that they should think on these lines, as if this can be done.

Here is, after years of effort, going to be, I believe, what is called a summit conference somewhere in Europe, where the great ones of the earth, Russia, and America, England and France, and may be somebody else, Italy or whatever it may be, would be summoned to decide the fate of the world; it has taken years and years. What they will decide, I do not know. I wish them well. I wish they will come to some understanding. But the way casually Hon. Members here say that we should issue orders and decrees, get together and decide or it will be the worse for you, seems almost like a comic opera approach; it has no relation to reality.

It is a basic fact that China is a great country, and India is a great country, great in extent, great in background, great in many things. I am not talking so much about military power, although, from the point of view of defence or offence, no doubt, their potentials or actuals are considerable.

Now, looking at the subject from any long perspective, or even in the short perspective, it is a matter of considerable consequence that China and India should be friends, should be co-operative. It does not mean that they should go the same path, but they should not come in each other's way; they should not be hostile to each other; it is neither good for India nor for China. And China may be a very strong country as it is, and is growing stronger, but even from the Chinese point of view, it is not a good thing to have a hostile India; it makes a great deal of difference to have that kind of thing—I am not talking in military terms, but otherwise. It is to the interest of both these countries, even though they function in different and in many ways, not to be hostile to each other. If China starts telling me what to do, I am likely to be irritated. If I go about telling China what to do, China is likely to be irritated, even more than I am, because, I am supposed to be a soft person and the Chinese are not supposed to be very soft about these matters; maybe. So there it is.

Now, maintaining our dignity, maintaining our rights.

maintaining our self-respect, and yet not allowing ourselves to drift into wrong attitudes and hostile attitudes, and trying to help in removing or in solving such problems as they arise, we may help a little—they cannot be solved quickly—that is the very utmost that one can do in the circumstances, or at any rate, creating an atmosphere which may help in doing this. How far it will go, I do not know.

So, I venture to say that this should be our broad approach in this matter. We cannot go any further. We might possibly help in that approach there.

After all, this House and the country have expressed in fairly effective language their reactions to Tibet developments, to events in Tibet. Nobody doubts them. But I might say, that talking in fiery and hostile language will not carry conviction but in fact, it will only lead to greater gulf being created and less possibility of any help being rendered in understanding or in finding a solution.

Therefore, I would beg to suggest that we should not allow ourselves to be swept away in these matters.

One thing which was referred to by two or three Members was the question of maps. Now, there is no doubt about it that this continuance of what are called old maps of China, which show certainly fairly large areas of Indian territory, as if they belong to the Chinese State, has been a factor in creating continual irritation in the minds of people in this country. It is not some crisis that has arisen, but it has been difficult for our people, naturally, to understand why this kind of thing continues indefinitely, year after year. It is not, mind you, a question of some odd little pocket here and there which may be in dispute on which we can argue—there are two or three pockets about which we have had, and we are going to have, discussions—but this business of issuing these maps which are not true to fact, which are factually untrue, and which can hardly be justified on the ground of history, of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's regime or any previous regime.

I shall just say one word more. I think Shri S. A. Dange talked about the palace of the Dalai Lama and all that. I think that is an exaggeration. First of all, it is not his choice. It is our choice. And it is rather slightly bigger than a normal house in Mussoorie. We had to find a biggish house because of the number of people involved.

As I have said, there is no question of surveillance on him except for security reasons, and we have not prevented

him from meeting anybody if he wants to meet. He has met, in fact, large numbers of people; some people go for *darshan* to him, and some individuals, often Buddhist representatives from Ceylon and other places are coming to see him; they all go there. Nobody prevents anyone. Certainly, as for the odd newspaper man, especially from foreign countries, who comes here in search of sensation, even him we do not prevent, but we do not welcome him, because such persons reduce everything to high sensationalism.

The other day, I said in the other place that all this business of God-king etc., is not to my liking. He is the Dalai Lama, referred to as the Dalai Lama; and if anyone creates sensation-mongering by saying God-king all the time. And I may say that the Dalai Lama himself does not like this business.

Therefore, we do not want this whole occurrence to be reduced or kept up to the sensational level. That was why we were not at all anxious that so many correspondents should go there and besiege him; and then there will always be difficulties, interpreters and all that; and confusion will arise, and contradictions and all that.

Acharya Kripalani: You may allow some Communist friends to go and see him.

Shri Nehru: We shall allow both our Communist friends and our PSP friends, both of them. It is not really a question of our allowing, we do not give permits. It is for him.

Acharya Kripalani: You may give them some extra facilities.

Shri Nehru: Now, we have to face the larger problem of these refugees. It is a difficult problem, and it has been thrust upon us.

If I may say just one word, before the 11th March—that is not so long ago, about seven weeks ago is it?—we had no inkling of what might happen in Tibet. On the 11th March was the first word we got of some demonstrations in Lhasa by Tibetans, and on the 17th, six days later, came this business or, so it is said, shelling the Dalai Lama's palace. Shri Dange said something about bad marksmanship. I am only saying what he said. It is not bad marksmanship, but deliberately they were sent there as a kind of warning. Anyhow, then the situation developed on the 20th, fighting took place there. The situation developed

rapidly after that, and the House knows what happened afterwards. The Dalai Lama left there on the 17th evening, and arrived here at the end of the month, so that we really were rather overtaken by events. We did not know that the Dalai Lama was coming here till about two days before he actually entered India. We had imagined when we knew he was travelling south that he might come, but it was only two days before that that we heard that he would like to come, so that we were overtaken by events.

We had decided to accept him; later, when others came, we decided to allow them to come too, and there they are, all these refugees, apart from the Dalai Lama. The present estimates are about 10,000—and all kinds of refugees, the old, the aged, some young people, some women, and it is obviously going to be a bit of a problem for us. We are not going to keep them in barbed wire enclosures for ever; for the present we are keeping them in two or three camps.

Shri M. P. Mishra: Are all of them fed and lodged?

Shri Nehru: But the sooner we spread them out the better. Maybe some will have to remain for some time, I do not know.

Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri: I have one question to ask, only one small question.

One thing has intrigued many observers greatly, that the Dalai Lama has been elected by the People's Congress in China as one of the Vice-Chairman.

An Hon. Member: The Panchen Lama.

Shri Tridib Kumar Chaudhuri: The Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama. I am sure of my facts. That is correct.

Because he is also a part of that State, has our Government received any request from the Chinese Embassy here that the Chinese Ambassador or any of his representatives should see the Vice-Chairman of the People's Republic?

Shri Nehru: No, Sir. We have received no such request. I stated, as you might remember, that the Chinese Ambassador would be welcome to see him if he so wishes.

Dr. Sushila Nayar: I want to ask the Hon. Prime Minister if these 10,000 refugees that have come are all well-to-do feudal lords, or they are the common people of Tibet.

Shri Nehru: I cannot give any description of all of them. They have not reached, they are on the way, but it is hardly likely that Tibet will produce 10,000 lords.

5

THE LEADERS

U.N. DHEBAR

EVENTS IN TIBET SHOULD CAUSE SINCERE CONCERN to everyone in India who believes in friendly relations with China and Tibet. Tibet and India, although they have been independent of one another, have something deeply in common. Milky waters of the snows descending on the north and south of the Himalayan Ranges have watered our respective cultures with the same sentiments and emotions. It becomes sometime difficult to decide which idea or emotion has travelled from India to Tibet and vice versa. India and Tibet are bound by such close ties. It is extremely difficult to reconcile ourselves with any thought of any harm coming to the people of Tibet.

For the last few days, in fact it is since some time that we have been hearing distinct sounds of conflict in that region. There was little of official news till yesterday, when all of a sudden it was reported that the Chinese Government has abolished the Dalai Lama Government and have installed Panchen Lama as the Head of the new regime.

The Chinese Government in 1951 had agreed that "Tibet would enjoy regional autonomy and the Chinese Central Government would not interfere with its political institutions and internal administration." The Chinese Government had also assured as a part of that agreement "That the Chinese Central Government would recognise and maintain Dalai Lama's position."

There are charges and counter-charges. But the residue that a sensible man can pick up, after weighing both, is that the Chinese Government had failed to secure emotional allegiance from the people of Tibet. There must be something basically deficient when the Chinese Government has been forced to declare eighteen important members of the Preparatory Committee which was "warmly welcomed by the Tibetan people as traitorous" on their own admission. They are obviously the persons who have not shown willingness to ditto the official line. It is also alleged that there was collusion with imperialism and assembling of bandits to carry out the rebellion. It is difficult to accept this wholly (though there may be violence on the side of Tibetans), because it is not normal for weaker elements to undertake such hazards against a modern organised army. The only explanation is that an element of desperation had entered into a section of the people in Tibet. What was necessary was to trace the causes of such discontent and desperation, rather than falling foul on all and sundry. The story about the hand of the imperialists and the conspiracy of the Chiang Kai Shek's people is also brought into service. While Chiang Kai Shek's people have not always behaved and the imperialists may have not always been above blame, in this particular case, the quantity of ammunition discovered is too small to support any such theory unless there is more concrete evidence of their complicity.

The impression therefore that is created on the mind of an average citizen in India is that a world power has once again failed to behave justly and fairly with its weaker neighbour; words of agreement are of little account when it concerns the interest of the stronger of the two contracting parties and the philosophy of socialism is no guarantee against expansionist tendencies.

In the interest therefore of the clearance of air, it is necessary that the Chinese Government reconsider the steps. India does not wish to interfere in the matter. But it would be a failure of duty on our part as friends to hide or conceal what we feel about the situation. How to revise the decision, to restore peace in that place, to re-establish cordial relations and to generate trust is for the Chinese Government, the Dalai Lama and the people of Tibet to consider. All we wish is that the peace of a happy family should return to Tibet.

One can say to Tibetans who have been the victims of this unhappy episode that they have our deepest sympathies in their hour of trial. They and we have learnt at the same

fountain of philosophy that 'No right cause if rightly pursued has failed.' We have not the heart to preach to them anything in face of this calamity that has befallen them. We only hope that the spirit of freedom in the freedom loving people, in this part of the world will be respected, and all cause for misunderstanding removed at an early date.

ASOKA MEHTA

MR. ASOKA MEHTA, M.P., MADE AN IMPASSIONED PLEA in New Delhi on Friday that the Dalai Lama must be allowed to function in India as the "leader, spokesman and symbol" of the Tibetan people's struggle for independence.

The Dalai Lama was the voice and conscience of his people. He had come to India to "draw inspiration from this holy land of ours to carry on the struggle for freedom with dignity," he said.

Mr. Mehta made a spirited reply to the indirect threat held out by the "People's Daily" in a recent article. This official organ of the Chinese Government threatened that if India supported the Tibetan claim to autonomy, China, too could do so in regard to "one of India's States or one of India's national minorities."

Mr. Mehta said that if the reference was to Kashmir or the Nagas, "we have nothing to be ashamed of." In any case India had never made its friendship conditional on support for her policies and actions.

Mr. Mehta raised his voice when he denounced the Chinese view that "those who are not with us are against us." This concept of friendship amounted to slavery, he said.

He recalled his talks with the former Tibetan Prime Minister. The latter had told him, Mr. Mehta said, that young Tibetans would not seek asylum in India because they were determined to die fighting for their country's freedom. He added that if this urge of the Tibetan people for freedom was not allowed to express itself, it would get distorted and "haunt and harm not only this area but the whole continent of Asia."

Mr. Mehta drew the attention of the Chinese to the impact of Tibetan developments on the minds of the peoples all over South-East Asia. He emphasised that on this question "we shall not yield." Threats would not be of any avail with us.

H. N. KUNZRU

Mr. H. N. Kunzru was no less trenchant in his criticism of the Chinese policy in Tibet. He dismissed the Chinese contention that the rebellion in that country was the handiwork of the "aristocracy and reactionary elements" anxious to defend their interests. As in the case of Hungary, the whole Tibetan nation was involved in the struggle for freedom. He was convinced that attempts by the Chinese Government to colonise Tibet was the biggest cause of the trouble.

Mr. Kunzru expressed regret that despite the Prime Minister's statement, the Chinese Government should continue to repeat its charge that Kalimpong was the commanding base of the rebellion in Tibet.

He said that the Chinese thought in terms of consolidating their military position on the Indian borders. In that context the Indian people were fully justified in "thinking of their own position" in this strategically vital area.

INDIA'S STAND ON TIBET ISSUE

SPEAKERS, INCLUDING MANY MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT, at a symposium on "Tibet and its repercussions on India and the rest of the world" in Delhi on Sunday welcomed the Dalai Lama to India and expressed sympathy with the Tibetans people in their struggle for autonomy.

They were cautious in references to the Chinese action as they did not want to say anything that would strain the relations between India and China. But they strongly criticised the Communist Party of India for having "no mind of its own and looking to foreign countries for inspiration and guidance."

Mr. Ahmed Mohiuddin, Union Deputy Minister for Civil Aviation, who presided, said that the introduction of reforms in any country was to be welcomed provided they were not forced upon the people. He pointed out that it could not be ascertained for certain as yet whether the reforms in Tibet were being forced by the Chinese authorities or that they were demanded by the people themselves.

TIBET PART OF CHINA

Mr. Mohiuddin said that though the veracity of Dalai Lama's statement could not be doubted, there were two things which should not be overlooked. First Tibet was a part of China; and, secondly, China itself had guaranteed autonomy to Tibet. He said that the people of India naturally sympathised with the Tibetan people in their present struggle because of the age-old cultural and spiritual relations between the two countries.

Dr. G. S. Melkote, M.P., asserted that India was not going to interfere in the internal affairs of any country but at the same time "our sympathies go to anyone whose freedom or autonomy has been snatched away". He said that the Indian people should lend all their moral support to the people of Tibet.

THREAT TO SECURITY

Mr. S. D. Patil, M.P., was of the opinion that the violation of the autonomy of Tibet constituted a danger to India's security. He said that though India did not want to strain her relations with China, it could not at the same time ignore Tibet's desire for autonomy.

He appealed to the people not to be led away by Communist propaganda and to lend all possible support to the Tibetan people.

Mr. G. K. Vijayvargiya, M.P., advised people not to form any opinion till the full facts were available. It was no use taking sides in the controversy over the Tibetan problem, he said. It had yet to be ascertained, he added, whether the reforms being introduced in Tibet were in conformity with the Tibetan people's desire for autonomy. "Our support should not extend beyond the people's demand for autonomy," he stated.

Mr. Padam Dev, M.P., said that though Tibet was not a part of India, this country could not idly watch the principles of Panch Sheel being violated.

—*The Times of India*, April 29, 1959.

NATIONAL UPRISING

The Acharya said that India must state her opinion on this issue without any inhibition. Uncommitted countries in Africa and Asia counted on our moral support. But the people would hardly give credit to our "pious assertions of impartiality and justice if we did not raise our voice when the independent existence of a small and peaceful nation was threatened by an intoxicated power."

He strongly criticised the attitude of the Communist Party of India towards the Tibet issue. They were confirming the assertions of those who were out to malign us. He warned that India was never defeated by an external enemy but always by a "section of our own people."

He added that the people must not fail to take note of internal threats if the Government continued to adopt an indifferent attitude.

He added that even though the Dalai Lama had reached India safely, "we cannot but feel that we are meeting under the shadow of a tragedy." Our friends in Tibet were being denied the right to live their way of life.

Mr. U. N. Dhebar, former Congress President, said that China would be branded as imperialist if she did not come to an agreement with Tibet. He appealed to China to heed the voice of African and Asian countries against imperialism raised at the Bandung Conference.

The action of China, he added, had considerably embarrassed India which had been fighting for her admission to the United Nations.

Mr. Asoka Mehta, M.P., urged the Prime Minister, to convene a meeting of the Colombo Powers to discuss the Tibet issue. These Powers he added, must press China to retrace her step.

He also appealed to the Government not to prevent Tibetan refugees from the voicing their sufferings and feelings. To deny any one the right to express his views was the worst type of torture, he added. According to his information, about 10,000 persons from Tibet had crossed into India.

Mr. M. R. Masani, M.P., quoted from Mr. Nehru's "Glimpses of the World History" describing Tibet as an independent country. Tibet, he added, had participated as a free country in the Asian Relations conference in New Delhi in 1946. In no case, should her freedom be allowed to be snatched away, he said.

Mr. Atal Behari Bajpai, Jana Sangh leader, sought to assure the Tibetans that Indians were with them and would not allow

PRAJA SOCIALISTS

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION
on Tibet:

JAYAPRAKASH NARAYAN

One of the great tragedies of history is being enacted in full view of the world. Tibet is being gobbled up by the Chinese dragon. A country of less than ten million souls is being crushed to death by a country of six hundred and fifty million people. Patriotism, courage, faith can perform miracles. The Tibetans love their country; they are brave; they are devoted to their religion and their Dalai Lama. Yet, one-to-sixtyfive is an odd that even a nation of Herculeases will find it difficult to over-come.

The attention of the world is currently turned elsewhere. Moreover, Tibet for most countries of the world, except its immediate neighbours, is an obscure, distant, benighted land—not worth bothering about. This makes the tragedy of Tibet deeper.

India, as an immediate neighbour of Tibet and as a country regarded for its moral position, its detachment and freedom from power politics has a great responsibility in this matter. The world looks to India for a lead and India must not fail.


It is not only the question of the fate of ten million people. That of course is important and would be so whatever the number. But there is also the question—and this of much greater importance—of the basis of international justice and peace. Is world peace possible if the strong are free to oppress the weak with impudence? Such a world would be dominated by a few powerful nations and peace would consist in an uneasy balance of power between them and the small nations would be at their mercy.

The main elements of the Tibet situation have been clear enough from the beginning.

Tibet is not a region of China. It is a country by itself which has sometimes passed under Chinese suzerainty by virtue of conquest and never by free choice. Chinese suzerainty has always been of the most nominal kind and meant hardly more than some tribute paid to Peking by Lhasa. At other times Tibet was an independent sovereign country. For some time in the 8th century Peking paid an yearly tribute of 50,000 yards of chinese brocade to Tibet.

After the fall of the Manchu empire in 1911, Tibet functioned as an Independent country till 1951, when the Chinese Communist Government invaded it. In between there were attempts to reimpose Chinese suzerainty by the treaty in which the British Government took a leading hand. Pressed from both sides by two powerful forces, Tibet had little choice, nevertheless nothing came out of these attempts and till the communist invasion, Tibet was a free country.

VIEW FROM THE WINDOW



Courtesy: Times of India

"ABOMINABLE SNOWMAN"



Courtesy: Times of India

In 1956 a preparatory committee was set up for Tibet with the Dalai Lama as vice-chairman and Gen. Chang Kuo-hua as the representative of the Chinese Government. In practice, even this body had little power, and decisions in all important matters were taken by the Chinese authorities. The Dalai Lama and his Government tried their best to adhere to the 17-point agreement but the interference of the Chinese authorities persisted.

By the end of 1955, a struggle had started in the Kham province and this assumed serious proportions in 1956. In the consequential struggle, the Chinese armed forces destroyed a large number of monasteries.

MANY LAMAS KILLED

Many lamas were killed and a large number of monks and officials were taken and employed on the construction of roads in China and the interference in exercise of religious freedom increased.

The relation of Tibetans with China became openly strained from the early part of February 1959. The Dalai Lama had agreed a month in advance to attend a cultural show in the Chinese headquarters and the date was suddenly fixed for March 10. The people of Lhasa became apprehensive that some harm might be done to the Dalai Lama and as a result about 10,000 people gathered around the Dalai Lama's summer palace at Norbulingka and physically prevented the Dalai Lama from attending the function.

Thereafter, the people themselves decided to raise a bodyguard for the protection of the Dalai Lama. Large crowds of Tibetans went about the streets of Lhasa demonstrating against the Chinese rule in Tibet. Two days later, thousands of Tibetan women held demonstrations protesting against Chinese authority. In spite of this demonstration from the people, the Dalai Lama and his Government endeavoured to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese and tried to carry out negotiations with the Chinese representatives as to how best to bring about peace in Tibet and

SHELLING OF PALACE

While these negotiations were being carried out, reinforcements arrived to strengthen the Chinese garrisons in Lhasa and Tibet. On March 17, two or three mortar shells were fired in the direction of the Norbulingka Palace. Fortunately, the shells fell in a nearby pond.

After this, the advisers became alive to the danger to the person of the Dalai Lama and in those difficult circumstances it became imperative for the Dalai Lama, the members of his family and his high officials to leave Lhasa.

The Dalai Lama would like to state categorically that he left Lhasa and Tibet and came to India of his own free will and not under duress.

It was due to the loyalty and affectionate support of his people that the Dalai Lama was able to find his way through a route which is quite arduous. The route which the Dalai Lama took involved crossing the Kyichu and Tsangpo rivers and making his way through the Lhoka area, Yarlung Valley and Psonad Zong before reaching the Indian frontier at Kanzey Mane, near Chutargum.

EMISSARIES TO BORDER

On March 29, 1959, the Dalai Lama sent emissaries to cross the Indo-Tibetan border requesting the Government of India's permission to enter India and seek asylum there. The Dalai Lama is extremely grateful to the people and the Government of India for their spontaneous and generous welcome as well as the asylum granted to him and his followers.

India and Tibet have religious, cultural and trade links extending over 1,000 years and for Tibetans it has always been the land of enlightenment having given birth to Lord Buddha. The Dalai Lama is deeply touched by the kind greetings extended to him on his safe arrival in India by the Prime Minister, Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, and his colleagues in the Government of India. The Dalai Lama has already sent a reply to this message of greeting.

Ever since the Dalai Lama entered Kanzey Mane, near Chutargum, he has experienced in full measure the respect and hospitality extended to him by the people of the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency and the Dalai Lama would like to state how the Government of India's officers posted there had spared no effort in making his stay and journey through this extremely well-administered part of India as comfortable as possible.

The Dalai Lama will now be proceeding to Mussoorie which he hopes to reach in the next few days. The Dalai Lama will give thought to his future plans and, if necessary give expression to them as soon as he has had a chance to rest and reflect on recent events.

DIFFICULT PERIOD

His country and people have passed through an extremely difficult period and all that the Dalai Lama wishes to say at the moment is to express his sincere regret at the tragedy which had overtaken Tibet and to fervently hope that these troubles will be over soon without any more bloodshed.

As the Dalai Lama and the spiritual head of all the Buddhists in Tibet, his foremost concern is the well-being of his people and in ensuring perpetual flourishing of his sacred religion and freedom of his country.

While expressing once again his thankfulness at his safe arrival in India, the Dalai Lama would like to take this opportunity to communicate to all his friends, well-wishers and devotees in India and abroad his sincere gratitude for the many messages of sympathy and concern with which they have flooded him.

(April 18th)

REPLY TO CRITICS

"We are authorised by His Holiness to make the following statement. 'On April 18, I issued a statement at Tezpur. I do not wish to follow it up with another statement at this stage. However, I have seen a *New China* news agency report implying that I was not responsible for this earlier statement. I wish to make it clear that the earlier statement was issued under my authority and indicated my views and I stand by it. I am making this brief statement to correct the wrong impression created by the *New China* news agency report and do not propose to state anything more at present."

PRESS CONFERENCE

Ever since my arrival in India I have been receiving almost every day sad and distressing news of the suffering and inhuman treatment of my people. I have heard almost daily with a heavy heart of the increasing agony and affliction, their harassment and persecution and of the terrible deportation and execution of innocent men. These have made me realize forcibly that the time has manifestly arrived when in the interests of my people and religion and to save them from the danger of near annihilation, I must

not keep silent any longer but must frankly and plainly tell the world the truth about Tibet and appeal to the conscience of all peace-loving and civilized nations.

To understand and appreciate the significance and implication of the recent tragic happenings in Tibet, it is necessary to refer to the main events which have occurred in the country since 1950.

It is recognized by every independent observer that Tibet had virtually been independent by enjoying and exercising all rights of sovereignty whether internal or external. This has also been implicitly admitted by the Communist Government of China for the very structure, terms and conditions of the so-called agreement of 1951 conclusively show that it was an agreement between two independent and sovereign States. It follows, therefore, that when the Chinese armies violated the territorial integrity of Tibet they were committing a flagrant act of aggression. The agreement which followed the invasion of Tibet was also thrust upon its people and Government by the threat of arms. It was never accepted by them of their own free will. The consent of the Government was secured under duress and at the point of the bayonet.

My representatives were compelled to sign the agreement under threat of further military operations against Tibet by the invading armies of China leading to utter ravage and ruin of the country. Even the Tibetan seal which was affixed to the agreement was not the seal of my representatives but a seal copied and fabricated by the Chinese authorities in Peking and kept in their possession ever since.

While I and my Government did not voluntarily accept the agreement, we were obliged to acquiesce in it and decided to abide by the terms and conditions in order to save my people and country from the danger of total destruction. It was, however, clear from the very beginning that the Chinese had no intention of carrying out the agreement.

AUTHORITY UNDERMINED

Although they had solemnly undertaken to maintain my status and power as the Dalai Lama, they did not lose any opportunity to undermine my authority and sow dissensions among my people. In fact, they compelled me, situated as I was, to dismiss my Prime Ministers under threat of their execution without trial, because they had in

all honesty and sincerity resisted the unjustified usurption of power by representatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet.

Far from carrying out the agreement they began deliberately to pursue a course of policy which was diametrically opposed to the terms and conditions which they had themselves laid down. Thus commenced a reign of terror which finds few parallels in the history of Tibet. Forced labour and compulsory exactions, a systematic persecution of the people, plunder and confiscation of property belonging to individuals and monasteries and execution of certain leading men in Tibet, these are the glorious achievements of the Chinese rule in Tibet.

During all this time, patiently and sincerely, I endeavoured to appease my people and to calm down their feelings and at the same time tried my best to persuade the Chinese authorities in Lhasa to adopt a policy of conciliation and friendliness. In spite of repeated failures I persisted in this policy till the last day when it became impossible for me to render any useful service to my people by remaining in Tibet. It is in these circumstances that I was obliged to leave my country in order to save it from further danger and disaster.

I wish to make it clear that I have made these assertions against the Chinese officials in Tibet in the full knowledge of their gravity because I know them to be true. Perhaps the Peking Government are not fully aware of the facts of the situation.

But if they are not prepared to accept these statements let them agree to an investigation on the point by an international commission. On our part I and my Government will readily agree to abide by the verdict of such an impartial body.

It is necessary for me to add that before I visited India in 1956 it had become increasingly clear to me that my policy of amity and tolerance had totally failed to create any impression on the representatives of the Chinese Government in Tibet.

NEHRU'S ADVICE

Indeed they had frustrated every measure adopted by me to remove the bitter resentment felt by my people and to bring about a peaceful atmosphere in the country for the purpose of carrying out the necessary reforms. As I

was unable to do anything for the benefit of my people I had practically made up my mind when I came to India not to return to Tibet until there was a manifest change in the attitude of the Chinese authorities. I therefore sought the advice of the Prime Minister of India who has always shown me unfailing kindness and consideration. After his talk with the Chinese Prime Minister and on the strength of the assurances given by him on behalf of China, Mr. Nehru advised me to change my decision.

I followed his advice and returned to Tibet in the hope that conditions would change substantially for the better and I have no doubt that my hopes would have been realised if the Chinese authorities had on their part carried out the assurances which the Chinese Prime Minister had given to the Prime Minister of India.

It was, however, painfully clear soon after my return that the representatives of the Chinese Government had no intention to adhere to their promises. The natural and inevitable result was that the situation steadily grew worse until it became impossible to control the spontaneous upsurge of my people against the tyranny and oppression of the Chinese authorities.

At this point I wish to emphasize that I and my Government have never been opposed to the reforms which are necessary in the social, economic and political systems prevailing in Tibet.

CHANGES NEEDED

We have no desire to disguise the fact that ours is an ancient society and that we must introduce immediate changes in the interests of the people of Tibet. In fact, during the last nine years several reforms were proposed by me and my Government but every time these measures were strenuously opposed by the Chinese in spite of popular demand for them, with the result that nothing was done for the betterment of the social and economic conditions of the people.

In particular it was my earnest desire that the system of land tenure should be radically changed without further delay and the large landed estates acquired by the State on payment of compensation for distribution amongst the tillers of the soil. But the Chinese authorities deliberately put every obstacle in the way of carrying out this just and reasonable reform. I desire to lay stress on the fact that

we, as firm believers in Buddhism, welcome change and progress consistently with the genius of our people and the rich tradition of our country.

But the people of Tibet will stoutly resist any victimization, sacrilege and plunder in the name of reforms—a policy which is now being enforced by the representatives of the Chinese Government in Lhasa.

I have attempted to present a clear and unvarnished picture of the situation in Tibet. I have endeavoured to tell the entire civilized world the real truth about Tibet, the truth which must ultimately prevail, however strong the forces of evil may appear to be today. I also wish to declare that we, Buddhists, firmly and steadfastly believe in peace and desire to live in peace with all the peoples and countries of the world. Although recent actions and policies of the Chinese authorities in Tibet have created strong feelings of bitterness and resentment against the Government of China, we Tibetans, lay and monk alike, do not cherish any feelings of enmity and hatred against the great Chinese people.

We wish to live in peace and ask for peace and goodwill from all the countries of the world. I and my Government are, therefore, fully prepared to welcome a peaceful and amicable solution of the present tragic problem, provided that such a solution guarantees the preservation of the rights and powers which Tibet has enjoyed and exercised without any interference prior to 1950.

We must also insist on the creation of a favourable climate by the immediate adoption of the essential measures as a condition precedent to negotiations for a peaceful settlement. We ask for peace and for a peaceful settlement but we must also ask for the maintenance of the status and the rights of our State and people.

To you gentlemen of the Press I and my people owe a great debt of gratitude for all that you have done to assist us in our struggle for survival and freedom. Your sympathy and support has given us courage and strengthened our determination. I confidently hope that you will continue to lend that weight of your influence to the cause of peace and freedom for which the people of Tibet are fighting today.

June 20, 1959.

